

Office of Recommendations

Highlighted Recommendations

- U.S. Ink Fire R1 to OSHA
- Aghorn Operating Waterflood Station H2S Release
 - R8 to OSHA
 - R9 to RRC
- Donaldson Enterprises, Inc. Fatal Fireworks Disassembly Explosion and Fire – R11 to EPA
- West Fertilizer Explosion and Fire R3 to EPA

U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board

U.S. Ink Fire




- Oct. 9, 2012
- During start-up
- New dust collection system
- combustible dust ignited
- 7 workers sustained burn injuries (3 were 3rd degree)

CSB Rec No. 2013-01-I-NJ-R1 to OSHA:

Add NAICS Code 325910, Printing Ink Manufacturing, to the list of industries in the Combustible Dust National Emphasis Program (NEP). Control Control Safety and Hazard Investigation Board

U.S. Ink Fire

OSHA implementation of R1:



ncellations: This directive cancels OSHA Instruction CPL 03-00-008 Combustible

- OSHA revised their Combustible Dust NEP on Jan. 23, 2023
- NAICS Code 325910 Printing Ink Manufacturing was added to the revised NEP

Aghorn Operating Inc. Waterflood Station H2S Release



- Oct. 26, 2019
- Worker responds to a faulty pump
- Pump came on (in auto)
- Water w/H2S was discharged
- 1 fatally injured worker
- 1 fatally injured member of the public (worker's spouse)

4

CSB Rec No. 2020-01-I-TX-R8 to OSHA:

Issue a safety information product that addresses the requirements for protecting workers from hazardous air contaminants and from hazardous energy.



Aghorn Operating Inc. Waterflood Station H2S Release

OSHA implementation of R8:

H_sS Detecto

H2S is a colorless, flammable, and

corrosive gas with an odor similar to

Because of olfactory fatigue, OSHA

not be used as a detection method.

warns that the sense of smell should

According to the National Institute for

Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)

ppm are immediately dangerous to life or health, concentrations greater than

500 ppm can cause a person to collapse within five minutes, and concentrations

H2S environmental concentrations of 100

exceeding 700 ppm can cause immediate

collapse, and death, within just one or

exposure limit (PEL) for H2S is 20 ppm

(29 CFR 1910.1000 Table Z-2) and is not to

shift, except if the exposure is 50 ppm for no more than 10 minutes in an 8-hou

shift so long as no other measurable

exposure occurs.

be exceeded at any time during an 8-hour

two breaths. The OSHA permissible

rotten eggs. People can lose their ability

to smell H2S, even at low concentrations a condition called olfactory fatigue.

OSHA FATALFacts Hydrogen Sulfide Release

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

A worker died of acute hydrogen suffice (H,S) poisoning while responding to an alaming water pump involved in the process of extracting crude oil and natural gas. The worker was alone in the pump house attempting to close process valves to loads the pump. Either before the worker's arrival or during his work, the pump unexpectedly energized, releasing water containing (H S) gas into the pump house. H_S monitors in and around the building were not functioning, and the worker was not warring a personal HS gas detected. The H S concentration nached faal levels killing the worker. A few hours later, and of concern that has had not head HS gas detected. The H S concentration nached faal levels killing the worker. A few hours later, the worker was not had had not head the gas the avelant of concern that has had not head the form he husband in a while, Emergency responders noted they could small H_S as soon as they entered the facility. As they approximate the gump house, the weell of H_S was overwhelming even though the pump house' bay doors were partially open and there were not H_S alams.

LIKELY CAUSES

The employer knew about the potential H₂S exposure hazard, but did not establish and enforce a formal policy requiring employees to wear personal H₂S detectors while in the pump house or adhere to OSHA's standard on *air contaminants*, 29 CFR 1910.1000.

Although the facility had been equipped with multiple H.5 detection and alarm systems, none of the detectors communicated with the system's control panel. Some detectors had been set to a testing mode, growenting any alarm signals. The moleting sett by any of those concerding the system signals. The setting setting and the concerding set up wave also unable to send a signal to the control room. The employer supplied personal H.5 gas detectors, which would have notified the worker of the potential exposure with an audite alarm context of the context and the setting setting and the use.

- The following contributed to the deaths. The employer:
- Failed to maintain and properly configure the H₂S detection and alarm system.
- Failed to enforce operator use of personal H₂S detectors when in the vicinity of equipment or facilities with the potential for an H₂S release
 Failed to develop, train, and enforce lockout/tagout procedures.
- Failed to develop, train, and enforce lockout/tagout procedures.
 Failed to evaluate the ventilation systems of the building to ensure it was adequately ventilated and in working condition.
- was adequately ventilated and in working cond
 Lacked a robust safety management program.
- Did not establish procedures prohibiting untrained visitors from entering processing buildings; which allowed the employee's spouse to access the facility and her subsequent toxic H₂S exposure and death.

* Some of the information in this Fata/Facts was obtained from the US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation


- Jan. 13, 2023, OSHA published a FatalFacts guidance document
 - "Hydrogen Sulfide Releases"
- Fully addressed the recommendations



Aghorn Operating Inc. Waterflood Station H2S Release

CSB Rec No. 2020-01-I-TX-R9 to RRC:

Develop and send a Notice to Operators to all oil and gas operators that fall under the jurisdiction of the Railroad Commission of Texas describing the safety issues identified in the Aghorn report.



RRC implementation of R9:

Feb. 6, 2023, RRC distributed a Notice to Operators that addressed all the requirements of the recommendation

U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board

Donaldson Enterprises, Inc. Fatal Fireworks Disassembly Explosion and Fire



- April 8, 2011
- Explosion and fire of seized fireworks inside a storage magazine

7

5 fatalities

CSB Rec No. 2011-06-I-HI-R11 to EPA:

Participate in the NFPA's standard development process to develop guidance on the safe and environmentally sound disposal of fireworks.



Donaldson Enterprises, Inc. Fatal Fireworks Disassembly Explosion and Fire

2023.

EPA implementation of R11:



Codes & Standards / All codes & standards / List of NFPA codes & standards / NFPA 401



lma<mark>ge</mark> Not Available Recommended Practice for the Prevention of Fires and Uncontrolled Chemical Reactions Associated with the Handling of Hazardous Waste

NFPA 401 applies to the generation, transport, treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste at generator sites, during transportation, and once it reaches a treatment, storage, and disposal facility. EPA has participated in the development of the first edition Of NFPA 401 as a Principal Member of the committee since Nov. 30, 2016. NFPA is expected to release the Recommended Practice in the Fall

8



West Fertilizer Explosion and Fire



- April 17, 2013
- FGAN at a fertilizer facility exploded
- 12 emergency responders & 3 members of the public were fatally injured, 260+ injured
- damaged 150+ buildings

CSB Rec No. 2013-02-I-TX-R3 to EPA:

Revise the Risk Management Plan rule to include fertilizer grade ammonium nitrate (FGAN) at an appropriate threshold quantity on the List of Regulated Substances.

West Fertilizer Explosion and Fire

EPA implementation of R3:

53556 Federal Register/Vol. 87, No. 168/Wednesday, August 31, 2022/Proposed Rule

a Docket ID No. for th

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

40 CFR Part 68 [EPA-HQ-OLEM-2022-0174; FRL-5766.6-

EPA will hold wirtue

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION sec FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT ant, Office of Emerge n DC 20460-tel ber: 202-564-2333; email SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION List of Abbreviations and Acronym ACC American Chemistry Council

an Society for Testing and

- **Previously Closed Unacceptable** In EPA's Aug. 31, 2022, FR notice focused on RMP, they discussed reviewing the list and targeted FGAN as a "priority chemical" to review.
- Feb. 7, 2023, EPA gave official notice of evaluating FGAN

Open – Acceptable Response or Alternate Response