



Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board

OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL

Memorandum

To: Board Members

From: Richard C. Loeb *RCL*

Cc: Leadership Team
Mark Kaszniak
Christina Morgan

Subject: Board Action Report – Notation Item 2013-19

Date: February 26, 2013

On February 14, 2013, the Board approved Notation Item 2013-19, thereby designating Recommendation 2003-13-I-LA-R13, to the Honeywell Baton Rouge Facility (from the Honeywell Chemical Incidents investigation), with the status of Closed – Acceptable Action.

Voting Summary – Notation Item 2013-19

Disposition: APPROVED

Disposition date: February 14, 2013

	Approve	Disapprove	Calendar	Not Participating	Date
R. Moure-Eraso	X				2/05/2013
M. Griffon	X				2/20/2013
B. Rosenberg	X				2/14/2013



U. S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board RECOMMENDATIONS STATUS CHANGE SUMMARY

Report:	Honeywell Chemical Incidents
Recommendation Number:	2003-13-I-LA-R13
Date Issued:	August 8, 2005
Recipient:	Honeywell International, Inc. Baton Rouge Facility
New Status:	Closed- Acceptable Action
Date of Status Change:	February 14, 2013

Recommendation Text:

Develop and implement a program for the identification and management of hazards in nonroutine situations. Ensure that this program covers the following:

- *Operations following an emergency shutdown.*

Board Status Change Decision:

A. Rationale for Recommendation

This recommendation was issued pursuant to CSB's investigation of the August 13, 2003 hydrogen fluoride release incident at the Honeywell International, Inc. Baton Rouge facility, which exposed two workers. At the time of the incident, workers were preparing to restart the refrigeration unit that had undergone an emergency shutdown; they were removing liquid HF from a vaporizer, a non-routine activity for which there was no standard operating procedure. Operators adapted a generic procedure and added references for HF handling, none of which contained specific instructions for identifying and controlling hazards. The CSB concluded that the highly hazardous nature of HF warranted more specific procedures and job planning to ensure the safety of the draining operation.

B. Response to the Recommendation

Honeywell reported that its procedures require the conduct of a job safety briefing for new jobs or jobs for which an existing standard operating procedure cannot be followed or does not exist and a highly hazardous chemical, such as HF, is involved. Honeywell also reported that all unit restarts after shutdowns are subject to Pre-Startup Safety Reviews (PSSRs); PSSRs are required regardless of whether the shutdown was planned or unplanned and regardless of whether the process is covered by OSHA's Process Safety Management (PSM) standard.

C. Board Analysis and Decision

Because Honeywell reports actions consistent with the intent of the CSB's recommendation, the Board voted to change the status of this recommendation to "Closed- Acceptable Action."