



**U.S. Chemical Safety and
Hazard Investigation Board**

BUDGET JUSTIFICATION

Fiscal Year 2013

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I. Introduction – Mission, Vision, and Strategic Goals

Mission

The mission of the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) is to independently investigate significant chemical incidents and hazards; and effectively advocate the implementation of the resulting recommendations to protect workers, the public, and the environment.

Vision

The vision of the CSB is to continue as a leader in protecting workers, the public and the environment from hazardous chemicals by issuing quality reports with high impact recommendations.

Strategic Goals

The CSB is in the process of updating its Strategic Plan. The goals outlined below may be revised depending on Board action.

Goal 1 – Conduct incident investigations and safety studies that involve releases or potential releases of hazardous chemical substances.

1. Select incidents and hazards for investigation which have high potential for generating recommendations with broad preventive impact.
2. Complete timely investigations that examine the technical, management systems, organizational and regulatory issues that lead to chemical incidents.
3. Develop recommendations that will help prevent future chemical incidents.
4. Complete studies with broad safety and environmental impact.
5. Advance the identification and understanding of emerging issues in chemical safety.
6. Promote effective collection and communication of results from incident and hazard data.

Goal 2 – Improve safety and environmental protection by securing implementation of CSB recommendations and broadly disseminating CSB findings through advocacy and outreach.

1. Advocate the timely implementation of high impact recommendations to the Congress, Federal agencies, State governments, and private and non-profit entities.
2. Emphasize Board and staff advocacy of a Most Wanted List of chemical safety improvements.
3. Disseminate information through the production of high quality investigation reports and videos and through targeted outreach.

Goal 3 – Preserve the public trust by maintaining and growing organizational excellence.

1. Institute best practice planning and project management in all CSB processes.
2. Ensure optimization of the agency's budget and resource management by aligning action plans to strategic priorities.
3. Maintain effective human capital management by promoting development in leadership, technical, and analytical competencies.
4. Support the CSB mission by maintaining state of the art information technology and effective administrative processes.
5. Foster effective internal communications.

II. Budget Justification

Budget Request Summary

For fiscal year (FY) 2013, the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) requests a budget of \$11.403 million a decrease of \$1,397,000 – or 10.9% – from the FY 2012 budget request of \$12.8 million. The requested funds will allow the CSB to conduct thorough chemical safety investigations, perform chemical safety studies, develop and advocate effective safety recommendations, and broadly disseminate its findings to industry and the public in accordance with the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.

The requested appropriation for FY 2013 will be used to fill vacant investigator positions within the agency and focus on the completion of a significant backlog of open major accident investigations. Additional investigators are also needed to increase the number of investigations the CSB initiates and completes every year. Each year the CSB tracks and monitors high-consequence chemical incidents that results in deaths, hospitalizations, property damage in excess of \$500,000, large evacuations, and/or off-site damage. CSB staff recorded an estimated 162 such incidents in 2010 and 282 incidents in 2011. The most recent data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics confirm that workplace deaths from exposure to harmful substances and environments, fires, and explosions have not decreased meaningfully in the past several years. Serious resource constraints have prevented the CSB from investigating more than a small percentage of the most serious incidents each year. Throughout 2011, the burden of the ongoing Deepwater Horizon investigation and a backlog of old cases has further hampered the CSB's ability to initiate new investigations.

An important part of the CSB's mission is to disseminate key findings and root causes from accident investigations to prevent similar events from occurring in the future. However, in order to effectively complete this important work, the CSB needs sufficient resources to produce high quality investigations and hire needed investigative staff.

FY 2011 Accomplishments

Safety Investigations

The CSB's first strategic goal is to conduct accident investigations and safety studies that involve releases or potential releases of hazardous chemical substances. In FY 2011, the CSB deployed to eight accident sites and has brought attention to several high priority safety issues across many industries, including offshore oil drilling, chemical production, and industrial manufacturing.

Deepwater Horizon Investigation – In June 2010, the U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce requested that the CSB conduct an independent investigation of the root causes of the blowout on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig that occurred on April 20, 2010, killing 11 workers and leading to massive pollution of the Gulf of Mexico. The Committee recognized the CSB's unique position to investigate BP's management systems and organizational safety culture, based on the agency's experience from investigating the 2005 explosion and fire at the BP Texas City refinery that killed 15 workers and injured an additional 180. Congress called on the agency to use its extensive knowledge to identify any parallels between the root causes of the April 20 oil rig explosion and the causes of the 2005 BP Texas City refinery explosion.

In accepting this request, the CSB initiated the most challenging investigation in agency history, from both a technical and organizational standpoint. As of December 2011, the CSB has invested \$2.26 million in the investigation of the mechanical failures of the blowout preventer (BOP), the organizational effectiveness of the primary companies involved in the accident, and both the domestic and international regulatory framework and oversight systems for the offshore drilling industry. The CSB contracted with technical experts throughout the offshore drilling industry to help analyze these important issues.

To gather information on the current state of offshore drilling safety, the CSB held a full-day public hearing on international regulatory regimes in December 2010 and heard testimony from regulators from the United Kingdom, Norway, and Australia on the strengths and weaknesses of the various international regulatory systems. Additionally, the CSB heard testimony from both labor and industry representatives about the key challenges facing the sector. Throughout FY 2011 and FY 2012 to date, the investigation team has continued to review thousands of documents and interview witnesses to develop a comprehensive report on the accident's root causes. Following the completion of the final report in FY 2013, the CSB will release its findings and safety recommendations to the public in the hope that this tragedy is never repeated. The CSB also plans 1-2 interim public reports on Deepwater Horizon during 2012.

Bayer CropScience Investigation – In January 2011, the CSB released its final report into the fatal accident at the Bayer CropScience facility near Charleston, West Virginia, where an explosion in a pesticide waste tank fatally injured two workers. The report

found that had the trajectory of the exploding vessel been different, pieces of the vessel could have impinged upon and possibly caused a release from a nearby storage tank of highly toxic methyl isocyanate (MIC), the chemical involved in the 1984 release at the Union Carbide facility in Bhopal, India.

The CSB final report contained a recommendation to Kanawha County, West Virginia, to establish a Hazardous Chemical Release Prevention Program with the authority to inspect and regulate chemical facilities in the county and release its findings to the public. The CSB recommended that this initiative be based on an existing program in Contra Costa County, California, which has dramatically reduced the number of chemical and petrochemical accidents over the past decade. The CSB noted the dense concentration of chemical plants in West Virginia's Kanawha Valley, including the DuPont Belle plant (see below). The CSB produced a new 16-minute computer-animated safety video to accompany the report, entitled "Fire in the Valley," which includes interviews with CSB investigators, local officials, and safety experts and is intended to inform industry and regulators about the detailed causes of the accident.

Finally, following the completion of the CSB's Bayer report, the agency designed and oversaw a Congressionally-mandated study by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) entitled *Inherently Safer Chemical Processes: The Use of Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) at Bayer CropScience*. The study arose from concerns about the potential for an airborne release of the highly toxic chemical that could adversely impact the health of the workers and community. As a result of these efforts, Bayer CropScience released a plan to remove all storage of lethal MIC from the facility in March 2011, thus eliminating the risk to the community. The NAS study, due for completion in early 2012, is expected to contain important recommendations and lessons learned for industry on the application of inherently safer technologies for worker and community protection.

DuPont Investigation – A series of three serious accidents occurred over a 33-hour period on January 22 and 23, 2010, at the DuPont Corporation's Belle, West Virginia, chemical manufacturing plant, resulting in the death of a veteran operator who was exposed to lethal phosgene gas. The three accidents particularly concerned the Board given DuPont's longstanding reputation for a commitment to safety and the company's role as a safety innovator and leader.

The CSB final report recommended that the DuPont Corporation require all its phosgene production and storage areas to have secondary enclosures, mechanical ventilation systems, emergency phosgene scrubbers, and automated audible alarms, which are at a minimum consistent with the standards of the National Fire Protection Association for highly toxic gases. Conformity to these industry safety standards would demonstrate a renewed dedication by DuPont to providing a safe work environment in all of its facilities. The CSB investigation uncovered key documents from the past decades showing that DuPont had considered but rejected installing improved safeguards for phosgene, a lethal gas used as a chemical weapon in World War I. The CSB report proposed that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and other

standards-setting organizations require improved safety for phosgene and other highly toxic gases throughout industry.

Due to the significance of the CSB's findings from this investigation, a draft report was released for public comment so that stakeholders could submit their comments for suggested improvements. During the public comment period the CSB received notable support for its draft recommendations from industry organizations like the American Chemistry Council (ACC), which endorsed the report's call for a modernized OSHA standard for highly toxic compressed gases. The CSB's final report was approved and released in September 2011.

Hoeganaes Investigation – A series of three serious flash fires occurred over a four-month period from January to May 2011 at the Hoeganaes Corporation's powdered metal production facility in Gallatin, Tennessee. The three flash fires occurred in part as a result of the company's failure to recognize the hazards associated with the accumulation of highly combustible iron dust throughout the facility. CSB investigators discovered accumulations of combustible iron dust that were inches deep on elevated and other surfaces throughout the plant. The three dust fires, one of which was ignited by a hydrogen explosion, resulted in the deaths of five workers from severe burn injuries. The CSB determined that continued presence of combustible dust throughout the facility presented an unacceptably hazardous environment to the plant's 180 workers.

The Hoeganaes facility has been in operation for over 30 years, yet management never adequately controlled the hazard of combustible metal dust. The combustibility hazard of metal dust is not a new discovery, but dust explosions continue to claim lives and destroy property indicating that this hazard remains unknown or uncontrolled in many industry sectors. CSB investigators found that combustible dust is an insidious workplace hazard when it accumulates on surfaces, especially elevated surfaces. Since the CSB was established in 1998, three of the deadliest accidents investigated were determined to be combustible dust explosions.

The CSB investigation of Hoeganaes is bringing renewed attention to the urgent need for OSHA to develop a comprehensive regulatory standard for combustible dust in general industry. The absence of a comprehensive OSHA dust standard was a key finding in the CSB's 2006 Combustible Dust Study and resulted in a CSB recommendation to OSHA to initiate rulemaking. Although OSHA has now committed to developing a standard, the CSB recommendation remains open and workers throughout various industries continue to be at risk until a comprehensive standard has been developed and enforced. The CSB's final report was approved in December 2011; it called for OSHA to complete work on a proposed dust standard within one year and also urged improvements in enforcement and in fire codes related to combustible dust.

Texas Tech University – In January 2010, an explosion at Texas Tech University in Lubbock, Texas, severely injured a graduate student handling a high-energy organometallic compound. However, the CSB found that there was no formal system for communicating production limits on energetic chemicals. The investigation also found

that the when compared to industry, academic laboratories are often unregulated and lack good practice guidance.

The CSB has continued to monitor explosions and fires in high school and university laboratories during the past ten years.

The frequency of academic laboratory incidents in the U.S. is an area of significant concern for the CSB. Since 2001, the CSB has gathered preliminary information on 120 different university laboratory incidents that resulted in 87 evacuations, 96 injuries, and three deaths.

In previous years, other institutions have attempted to collect data on laboratory incidents, but there is no ongoing, nationwide reporting system to track near misses and incidents; as a result, academia is missing a significant opportunity to improve laboratory safety. With over 110,000 graduate students and postdoctoral researchers estimated to be working in academic laboratories,¹ these identified safety gaps must be addressed. The investigation – the CSB’s first effort in laboratory safety – was completed and released in September 2011. The CSB’s first-ever webinar to release a final report attracted more than 400 participants, including many from leading universities around the country. The report called for the American Chemical Society (ACS), a prominent scientific society, to develop new nationwide guidance on assessing and controlling laboratory risks. ACS has agreed with the recommendation and is working on the new safety tools.

Ongoing Investigations

Throughout FY 2011 and FY 2012, CSB investigators have continued their efforts on several other important open accident investigations. The CSB anticipates, with adequate funding, a number of open investigations will be closed in FY 2012 and result in significant safety recommendations to regulators, industry, and individual corporations.

Donaldson Enterprises, Inc. (DEI) – On April 8, 2011, an explosion and fire occurred at the DEI fireworks storage bunker in Waipahu, Hawaii, near Honolulu. Five employees were fatally injured as a result of the incident. These government contract workers, employed by DEI, were directed to dismantle hazardous, illegal consumer fireworks that had been seized by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) a year earlier. ATF had previously identified these three shipments as display-grade fireworks that had been illegally labeled for consumer use. The fireworks were seized and scheduled to be destroyed, using a federal contract with Virginia-based VSE Corporation, which subcontracted the work to Hawaii-based DEI.

Preliminary analysis by the CSB suggests that DEI’s unsafe disassembly of contraband fireworks led to an accumulation of explosive components within the storage bunker. Additionally, there appears to be no federal regulatory or industry guidance on the

¹ National Science Foundation (NSF). (2007). *Survey of Federal Science and Engineering Support to Universities, Colleges, and Nonprofit Institutions*. Accessed at <http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/srvyfedsupport> on 7/1/2011.

disassembly and disposal of contraband fireworks. As a result, the CSB is examining the existing regulatory and voluntary consensus standards in order to consider recommendations for the safe storage and disposal of fireworks. Information provided to CSB investigators indicates that the handling and disposal of seized fireworks is a growing problem, with contraband fireworks impounded and stored at multiple sites across the country.

Tesoro Refinery – On April 2, 2010, an accident at the Tesoro Refinery in Anacortes, Washington, killed seven workers when a nearly forty-year-old heat exchanger catastrophically failed while being brought online following maintenance. When the vessel failed, it released highly flammable hydrogen and naphtha that ignited and exploded. Throughout its history, the investigation of serious accidents at petrochemical facilities has been a foundation of the CSB’s work.

Leading insurance industry statistics indicate that the U.S. refining sector has more than three times the rate of property losses of similar refineries overseas. On April 1, 2011, the CSB released a video safety message calling on the U.S. refining industry to strengthen its safety systems which are vital not only for protecting workers and communities but also for assuring stable, affordable energy supplies for American consumers and businesses. The CSB called on the refining industry to implement robust mechanical integrity programs with an emphasis on thorough inspections of critical equipment; to monitor process safety performance using appropriate leading and lagging indicators that measure process safety before major accidents occur; and to maintain an open and trusting safety culture where near-misses and loss-of-containment incidents are reported and investigated.

As part of the Tesoro investigation, the CSB is working in collaboration with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in Boulder, Colorado, on a metallurgical study that may finally and definitively explain the failure mode for the heat exchanger. With the results of this examination, the CSB will determine the root causes of this catastrophic failure and issue recommendations to improve refinery safety through better equipment designs and enhanced inspection programs at refineries across the country.

Other Open Investigations

In addition to the investigations described above, the CSB is continuing work on four other high-profile investigations for release in FY 2012 or FY 2013, including a metal dust explosion at AL Solutions in New Cumberland, West Virginia, that killed three workers; fatal explosions at Carbide Industries in Louisville, Kentucky, and Horsehead Corporation near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; and a large ammonia gas release at Millard Refrigerated Services in Mobile, Alabama, that exposed nearby workers who were engaged in the Gulf of Mexico oil spill cleanup effort.

Advocacy Initiatives

The agency's second strategic goal is to improve safety and environmental protection by securing the implementation of CSB recommendations and broadly disseminating CSB findings through advocacy and outreach. Throughout FY 2011 and FY 2012, the CSB has performed advocacy efforts with recommendations recipients and other stakeholders to encourage the implementation of key safety changes throughout industry.

Fuel Gas Safety – The CSB has been working with several code development bodies and the State of Connecticut to ban unsafe practices involving natural gas. The CSB recommendations originate from two safety investigations at the ConAgra Slim Jim facility in Garner, North Carolina, and at the Kleen Energy power plant in Middletown, Connecticut. The CSB identified two industry practices – gas blows and indoor gas pipe purging – that can release large amounts of highly flammable natural gas into work areas and are inherently unsafe.

The explosions at ConAgra Foods and Kleen Energy resulted from planned work activities that led to large releases of flammable natural gas in the presence of workers and ignition sources. The CSB determined that no specific federal safety standards prohibit such intentional releases of natural gas into workplaces, and made recommendations to OSHA, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), the International Code Council (ICC), and the State of Connecticut to ban these practices. The CSB produced an award-winning computer-animated safety video, “Deadly Practices,” that was released in February 2011 and was designed to educate stakeholders and advocate the CSB’s fuel gas safety recommendations.

As a result of the continued advocacy of these recommendations, the Governor of Connecticut signed a bill in August 2011 to permanently ban the dangerous practice of using high-pressure flammable gases to blow out debris from gas piping. At the national level, the NFPA released a completely new *Standard for Fire and Explosion Prevention during Cleaning and Purging of Flammable Gas Piping Systems (NFPA 56)* to prohibit the use of flammable gas for internal cleaning of piping systems. Finally, the International Code Council’s (ICC) Board and membership approved an emergency amendment to the fuel gas purging requirements of the International Fuel Gas Code (IFGC) and the International Residential Code (IRC) in October 2010, thus preventing future tragedies resulting from unsafe purging practices at industrial, commercial, and public facilities.

Tank Safety Study – In September 2011, the CSB completed a safety study on hazards to children and young adults at oil and gas exploration and production (E&P) facilities. Over a seven-month period from October 2009 to April 2010, a total of four young

people were killed and two others suffered injuries in explosions on oil and gas E&P sites. All three incidents involved rural unmanned oil and gas storage sites that lacked fencing and warning signs which might have otherwise deterred public access. Upon further investigation, the CSB found that 24 similar accidents from 1983 to 2011 resulted in a total of 42 fatalities and 25 injuries in ten states. All of the victims were less than 25 years of age, and many were in their teens.

As part of an education and outreach effort, the CSB released a safety video in April 2010 entitled “No Place to Hang Out: The Danger of Oil Sites” designed to inform children and adults about the danger of gathering or socializing at oil and gas production sites. In 2011, the CSB distributed a lesson plan developed with the assistance of teachers from Mississippi to incorporate the CSB video into middle school and high school science classes. The CSB’s lesson plan and safety video have been incorporated into curricula in both Texas and Mississippi thus increasing awareness among youth living in these areas.

The CSB’s advocacy on oil and gas storage tank safety has not been limited to youth education. The CSB has worked with legislatures and regulators in oil- and gas-producing states, including Mississippi, to address the lack of security measures and regulatory standards protecting children from oil site hazards. As a result of these efforts, the State of Mississippi has implemented regulations requiring facilities to post warning signs at thousands of oil production sites across the state and to install locked gates to restrict public access to oil storage tanks. The CSB’s final report recommended that the Environmental Protection Agency, American Petroleum Institute, the National Fire Protection Association, and key oil-producing states implement additional safeguards at oil production sites to protect children and young people from future harm.

Most Wanted List – In addition to the advocacy efforts conducted in individual investigations, the CSB is in the process of developing a Most Wanted List, patterned on a similar highly successful program at the National Transportation Safety Board, which will identify the most pressing safety concerns facing the chemical, petrochemical, and manufacturing industries. The development of a Most Wanted List will streamline the CSB’s advocacy and outreach efforts to achieve lasting safety changes.

Examples of important safety issues that could be addressed through a Most Wanted List include a comprehensive OSHA standard on dust, and on fuel gas safety, as well as a reformed OSHA process safety management (PSM) standard including coverage for reactive chemicals. Additional examples would include, among others: workforce safety protections for public employees; adoption of stringent National Fire Protection Association requirements for combustible dust; safety guidance for university laboratories on hazard assessment; enhanced state/local chemical plant oversight programs; standards for public protections at oil/gas production sites; and fatigue prevention guidance for plant operators.

As issues are identified through new investigations and studies, they will be added to the CSB’s Most Wanted List. Through the use of this outreach tool, the CSB will be able to bring attention to the most serious worker and environmental safety hazards that currently exist to achieve their eventual elimination.

CSB Safety Videos – The CSB distributes computer-animated safety DVDs free of charge both domestically and internationally. In FY 2011, the CSB distributed nearly 9,500 DVD safety video compilations to stakeholders in more than 30 countries. Each compilation contains 26 different safety videos developed by the CSB, describing the causes of major accidents the agency investigated in recent years. These safety videos provide invaluable training resources for workers throughout industry, university students, and State and Federal occupational safety and health trainers. Over the past twelve months, the CSB has released five new safety videos.

In December 2010, CSB safety videos were again recognized for excellence, receiving two CINE Golden Eagle Awards in a national competition. “No Place to Hang Out,” the CSB’s video on oil site dangers, received the prize in adult education. A second CSB safety video, the 14-minute “Dangers of Hot Work,” received the award for safety, training, and employee development. The video, which includes compelling interviews with accident victims, describes the often fatal danger from explosions of flammable vapor ignited by welding and cutting torches. In June 2011 “Deadly Practices,” a 15-minute video on fuel gas safety, also received a CINE Golden Eagle award. Finally, in November 2011, the CSB received several awards from the Television, Internet and Video Association of Washington, DC (TIVA-DC) Peer Awards. “Fire in the Valley,” about the Bayer CropScience explosion won a bronze award for computer animation; “No Escape,” about the Xcel Energy tunnel fire, won a bronze award for education and training videos, and “Deadly Practices,” about the ConAgra and Kleen energy explosions, won a silver award for education and training videos.

FY 2013 Budget Request

In February 2011, the CSB requested a budget of \$12.8 million for FY 2012; however to comply with federal deficit reduction plans, the CSB is requesting a budget of \$11.403 million in FY 2013, a reduction of 10.9% from the previous request. The reduced budget continues to support the core mission of the CSB, to investigate chemical incidents and effectively advocate for the implementation of high impact recommendations from these investigations to protect workers, the public, and the environment.

The CSB budget request for FY 2013 will be used to fill open investigator positions within the agency. The agency is currently working through a severe investigation backlog – see chart below – to complete open safety investigations. In order to meet this goal, the CSB must fill positions for investigators.

Year	Deployments	Open Investigations
2011	8	14
2010	15	17
2009	13	9

2008	8	6
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Fig. 1: CSB Investigation Backlog

In June 2010, the U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce requested that the CSB investigate the Deepwater Horizon oil rig blowout that occurred in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010. In response to the Congressional request, the CSB agreed to pursue the investigation, noting that additional funding would be necessary to produce a complete analysis of all technical, safety system, and human factors issues arising in this case. However, the CSB received no additional funding for this investigation, and investigators had to be removed from other projects to undertake this investigation full time. As a result, the investigation backlog has persisted and resources from other open investigations have been shifted to the Deepwater Horizon investigation. Even with the completion of six investigation reports and studies in 2011, the number of backlogged cases stands at a high level of 14, with the oldest case dating back to January 2008.² The existence of the backlog reflects static resource allocations for the past several years, coupled with increasing demands from Congress and other stakeholders for major CSB investigations.

Over 91% of the funds requested in FY 2013 will be distributed into four main object classification categories: personnel compensation; personnel benefits; rent; and other services. Of the requested \$11.403 million, compensation costs (including fringe benefits) account for \$7.7 million – or 67.5% of the total agency budget. To procure mandatory services provided by other government agencies (including payroll, personnel, accounting, and travel services) and other non-governmental contractors, the CSB requests \$1.734 million – or 15.2% of the agency’s budget. Finally, \$1.038 million – or 9.1% – is requested for rent in the Washington, DC, and Denver, Colorado offices.

The most significant changes in object classification category spending occur in equipment (146.6% increase); transportation of things (81.5% decrease); communications, utilities, and misc. (34.1% decrease), printing and reproduction (32.7% decrease), and other services (21.1% decrease). The increase in equipment purchases is predominantly to be used to modernize current information technology systems and equipment within the agency to create a more efficient workforce. Decreases in printing/reproduction and travel/transportation reflect the CSB’s dedication to completing and publishing open investigations (including Deepwater Horizon) in FY 2013, and significantly reducing the current investigation backlog. The CSB projects the agency will have lower costs for investigative consultants in FY 2013 as two large investigations of the Tesoro refinery in Anacortes, Washington, and Deepwater Horizon will be completed early in FY 2013. As a result, the total funds requested for services have been reduced by 21.1%.

² The backlog of open investigations peaked at approximately 22 in June 2010.

III. Budget by Object Classification Category

The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) requests \$11.403 million for FY 2013. The funding and staffing requested will enable the CSB to carry out its core mission, as required by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. The proposed budget for FY 2013 by object classification category is shown in the table below, along with the FY 2012 estimated costs. A narrative explanation of the amount requested for each object classification follows.

Object Classification Table
Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013

Budget Object Class	FY 2012	FY 2013	Change FY 2012-2013	
			\$	%
11.0 Personnel Compensation	5,278,889	5,707,505	428,616	8.1%
12.0 Personnel Benefits	1,713,631	1,947,245	233,614	13.6%
Subtotal Personal Services	6,992,520	7,654,750	622,230	9.5%
21.0 Travel	385,661	415,900	30,239	7.8%
22.0 Transportation of Things	59,500	11,000	(48,500)	-81.5%
23.1 Space Rental Payments	1,013,072	1,038,420	25,348	2.5%
23.3 Communications, Utilities and Misc.	157,599	103,900	(53,699)	-34.1%
24.0 Printing and Reproduction	35,825	24,100	(11,725)	-32.7%
25.0 Other Services	2,198,561	1,734,131	(464,430)	-21.1%
26.0 Supplies and Materials	172,227	139,450	(32,777)	-19.0%
31.0 Equipment	114,200	281,600	167,400	146.6%
Total	11,129,165	11,403,251	274,086	2.5%
FTE*	49.0	51.0	2.0	4.1%

* FY 2012 Authorized FTE was 49.

Object Classification Detail

11.0 Personnel Compensation

Change FY 2012-FY 2013

<u>FY 2012</u>	<u>FY 2013</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>%</u>
\$5,278,889	\$5,707,505	+\$428,616	+8.1

The budget request for FY 2013 includes \$4,871,467 to fund direct payroll costs and benefits for five board members and 46 staff members. Included in this object class is funding to hire two additional investigators in order to deal with a backlog of investigations. This object class also includes awards to recognize those employees whose performance is superior; student loan repayment program and promotions and step increases to retain and advance entry level employees; and recruitment benefits for new employees.

12.0 Personnel Benefits

Change FY 2012-FY 2013

<u>FY 2012</u>	<u>FY 2013</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>%</u>
\$1,713,631	\$1,947,245	+\$233,614	+13.6

CSB personnel compensation and benefits include the government's contributions to the CSRS and FERS retirement programs; life and health insurance programs; the Transit Subsidy Program; and the Thrift Savings Plan.

21.0 Travel

Change FY 2012-FY 2013

<u>FY 2012</u>	<u>FY 2013</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>%</u>
\$385,661	\$415,900	\$30,239	7.8

There will be increased travel costs in FY 2013 of \$30,239 or 7.8% as the agency deploys to new accident sites to conduct full investigations of catastrophic incidents. In FY 2012, the agency focus was to complete open investigations, reducing the existing backlog. As a result, travel will be significantly decreased in FY 2012 as investigation teams participate in fewer deployments. However, in FY 2013, the agency anticipates a return to a higher level of deployment activity and will require additional travel funds.

22.0 Transportation of Things

Change FY 2012-FY 2013

<u>FY 2012</u>	<u>FY 2013</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>%</u>
\$59,500	\$11,000	-\$48,500	-81.5

An amount of \$11,000 is requested for relocation costs of new employees. The agency will fill several vacant positions in FY 2012, but anticipates it may need to authorize one additional relocation for a new hire in FY 2013.

23.1 Space Rental Payments

Change FY 2012-FY 2013

<u>FY 2012</u>	<u>FY 2013</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>%</u>
\$1,013,072	\$1,038,420	\$25,348	2.5

The request includes \$1,038,420 for office space rental for the headquarters office in Washington, DC, and the Western Regional Office in Denver, Colorado. These projected rent costs are based on FY 2013 estimates provided by the General Services Administration (GSA), and the lessor of the headquarters office building in Washington, DC – to the CSB. The increase in these costs comes principally from rent increases for the Washington, DC headquarters. A very small part of the increase, approximately \$7,500, is due to increased space needs in the Denver Office of the CSB.

23.2 Communications, Utilities and Miscellaneous Charges

Change FY 2012-FY 2013

<u>FY 2012</u>	<u>FY 2013</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>%</u>
\$157,599	\$103,900	53,699	-34.1

Communication and postage costs are projected to require a total of \$103,900 in FY 2013, a 34.1% decrease from FY 2012. The decrease is due in part to changes in mobile communication devices in FY 2012, which resulted in a higher initial cost in FY 2012, but lower costs in out years as fewer broadband cards are needed.

24.0 Printing and Reproduction

Change FY 2012-FY 2013

<u>FY 2012</u>	<u>FY 2013</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>%</u>
\$35,825	\$24,100	-\$11,725	-32.7

Printing costs consist mainly of the charges for meeting materials for CSB public meetings and news conferences, human resources advertising, and announcements of proposed agency actions and public meetings in the *Federal Register*.

25.0 Other Services

Change FY 2012-FY 2013

<u>FY 2012</u>	<u>FY 2013</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>%</u>
\$2,198,561	\$1,734,131	-\$464,430	-21.1

A total of \$1,734,131 is requested for services in FY 2013. Requirements in this area fall into two basic categories: interagency agreements for services provided by other Federal agencies; and contractual services provided by non-Federal vendors. Additional information on each category is provided in the following paragraphs.

Services Provided by Other Federal Agencies. A total of \$604,710 is requested for services provided by other Federal agencies. These services include \$74,700 for personnel and payroll services provided by the National Business Center (NBC) of the Department of the Interior; and \$459,727 for financial, procurement, travel, and administrative services provided by the Bureau of the Public Debt (BPD) of the Department of the Treasury. The remaining funds will be used for other Interagency Agreements such as Federal Occupational Health for investigator physical examinations and respirator fit testing, Library of Congress subscriptions, accident notification services by the National Response Center (NRC), background checks by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), HSPD-12 compliance, and Employee Assistance Program (EAP) support.

Other Contractual Services. The CSB procures a variety of services to support the mission, including expert consultants for investigations and testing (\$243,000), support for safety video production (\$162,000), maintenance of the information technology system (\$78,853), court reporting and transcription services for witness interviews (\$85,000), and training (\$63,100). Overall, the cost for these services is expected to decrease substantially in 2013 due to the completion of the CSB's costly and far-reaching Deepwater Horizon and Tesoro refinery explosion investigations.

26.0 Supplies and Materials

Change FY 2012-FY 2013

<u>FY 2012</u>	<u>FY 2013</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>%</u>
\$172,227	\$139,450	-\$32,777	-19.0

The amount of \$139,450 is requested for supplies and materials in FY 2013, including books and reference materials (\$46,600), subscriptions (\$32,500), investigation and safety tools (\$22,000), general office supplies (\$18,350) and information technology supplies and software (\$12,000), and other supplies.

31.0 Equipment

Change FY 2012-FY 2013

<u>FY 2012</u>	<u>FY 2013</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>%</u>
\$114,200	\$281,600	+\$176,400	+146.6

The amount of \$281,600 is requested for equipment in FY 2013 to fund the CSB's IT Capital Plan, including an improved electronic records systems infrastructure, upgrades to the agency network infrastructure, and an assortment of other smaller investments to facilitate communications between regional offices and advance the agency's mission. Information technology equipment includes personal computers, printers, a local area network, and associated peripherals. These funds will also be used to enable the CSB to comply with Government-wide mandates such as the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA). Finally, a small portion of this funding will be used to purchase any office furniture that may be needed.

IV. Additional Tables

CSB Appropriations by Fiscal Year (Dollars in Millions)

Salaries & Expenses

Fiscal Year	One-Year Funds	Two-Year Funds	Total Funds
1998	\$4.00	\$0.00	\$4.00
1999	6.50	0.00	6.50
2000	7.97	0.00	7.97
2001	4.99	2.49	7.48
2002	5.34	2.50	7.84
2003	7.31	0.50	7.81
2004	8.20	0.00	8.20
2005	9.03	0.00	9.03
2006	9.06	0.00	9.06
2007	9.11	0.00	9.11
2008	9.26	0.00	9.26
2009	10.20	0.00	10.20
2010	11.15	0.00	11.15
2011	10.78	0.00	10.78
2012	11.13	0.00	11.13
2013 ^a	11.40	0.00	11.40

^a Request

Emergency Fund^c

Fiscal Year	New Funding	Amount Spent to Date	Total Available
2004	\$0.44	\$0.00	\$0.44
2005	0.40	0.00	0.84

^c The Emergency Fund was established in FY 2004. It provides a funding mechanism so periodic accident investigation cost fluctuations can be met without delaying critical phases of the investigations. It is no-year funding, meaning it is available until expended.

CSB Personnel Data

Grade	On Board 9/30/2008	On Board 9/30/2009	On Board 9/30/2010	On Board 9/30/2011	Projected FY 2012	Request FY 2013
GS-4	0	0	0	1	0	0
GS-5	0	0	0	0	0	0
GS-7	3	4	2	1	0	0
GS-8	0	0	1	1	1	1
GS-9	4	1	6	2	1	1
GS-11	4	6	1	5	2	3
GS-12	1	2	6	7	7	7
GS-13	3	3	3	6	7	7
GS-14	8	10	9	9	14	14
GS-15	10	9	10	8	10	10
Executive	4	4	5	3	5	5
SES	1	1	1	2	2	3
Totals	38	40	44	45	49	51