U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigations Board

Business Meeting

October 30, 2019

CSB Headquarters Office - Washington, DC

U.S. CHEMICAL SAFETY BOARD MEMBERS PRESENT:
KRISTEN KULINOWSKI, INTERIM EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY
MANNY EHRLICH, MEMBER
RICK ENGLER, MEMBER

STAFF PRESENT:
Tom Goonan, General Counsel
Crystal Thomas, Investigator
OPERATOR: Welcome to the Chemical Safety Board October business meeting. My name is Adrienne and I’ll be your operator for today’s call. At this time, all participants are in a listen-only mode. Later we’ll conduct a question and answer session. During the question and answer session, if you have a question, please press * and 1 on your touchtone phone. Please note this conference is being recorded. I’ll now turn the call over to Dr. Kristen Kulinowski. You may begin.

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Good morning and thank you. We will now call to order this business meeting of the U.S. Chemical Safety Board or CSB.

Before we begin, I’d like to highlight safety information. Please take a moment to note the locations of the exits at the side and the back of the room. I also ask that you please mute cellphones so that these proceedings are not disturbed.

I am Kristen Kulinowski, Interim Executive Authority of the Board. Joining me today are Board Members Manny Ehrlich and Rick Engler. Also with us today is our General Counsel, Tom Goonan, and other members of the staff.

Today, we meet in open...in open session, as required by the Government in the Sunshine Act, to discuss operations and agency activities.
The CSB is an independent, non-regulatory federal agency that investigates major chemical incidents at fixed facilities. The investigations examine all aspects of chemical incidents, including physical causes related to equipment design, as well as inadequacies in regulations, industry standards, and safety management systems. Ultimately, we issue safety recommendations which are designed to prevent similar accidents in the future.

Today’s agenda for new business includes the release of the CSB’s factual update on the ongoing Intercontinental Terminal Company investigation in Deer Park, Texas, and an excerpt from the full video of the Pryor Trust gas well explosion.

If you are in the room and wish to make a public comment at the end of the meeting, please sign up using the yellow sheets at the registration table. Those on the line will have an opportunity to ask a question. Just follow the operator’s cues and the operator will unmute your line. You may also submit public comments by email to meeting@csb.gov, to be included in the official record.

Those in the room will also notice that there are a number of documents available at the sign-in table.

Before proceeding, I would like to note that today marks the last scheduled public business meeting that Member Ehrlich will attend, as his term expires in December. I would like to recognize
him for his five years of dedicated service to the agency and note two particular factors of his service. First is his technical experience and vast industry experience that he has brought to the Board, which gives him the ability to ask really discerning questions and to shortcut the understanding of the technical aspects of our reports. I have very much enjoyed and benefitted from conversations with Member Engler about his industry...

MEMBER EHRLICH: I’m Ehrlich.

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Sorry. Member Ehrlich [laughter].

MEMBER EHRLICH: You’re not going to be able to do that again.

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: [multiple voices], yes. You both begin with "E". I very much appreciate conversations we’ve had about our incidents and learning from him, from his on-the-ground, over 50 years’ experience in the chemical industry.

The second aspect of note is his vigorous and unceasing advocacy for our work, particularly in the area of emergency response and planning, which...for which he has a deep and abiding passion, I would say. He’s very...has demonstrated his concern for the first responder community and has done everything humanly possible to bring the lessons from our investigations to this community through outreach events for...for first responders, fire chiefs, local emergency planning committees, SERCs, TERCs, you name
it. So this is bittersweet that we say goodbye to him; wish him well in the future. And I would encourage the administration to seek out nominees who have similar industrial experience and passion for our mission.

And with that, I will now recognize my fellow Board Members for opening remarks. And I turn first to Manny.

MEMBER EHRLICH: Thank you for your kind words. It’s Ehrlich, okay. [laughter] But Vanessa used to do it, too, so I don’t feel bad. Good morning. I have a prepared statement I’d like to share with you.

It is likely this will be my last business meeting of the CSB, as my tenure expires on December 22nd, 2019. 2,013 days ago, on April 8th, 2014, during my Senate confirmation hearing, I committed to then-Senator Boxer and the Environment & Public Works Committee that, as a result of an experience I once went through with a chemical plant fatality, if confirmed to the CSB, I would dedicate my energies at the agency toward ensuring that such...such an accident never happens again.

I’m going to read you some statistics now, but they’re the ones that are on that chart. It’s not terribly easy to see. But I said, looking back nearly five years, 1,773 days to date, I’m able to take pride in the fact that I traveled to 32 states and China,
covered nearly 400,000 miles, and touching nearly 10,000 people. In addition, I’m thrilled I had the opportunity to establish CSB’s first-ever relationship with members of a Native American nation. Feedback has been provided from LEPCs and SERCs, as well as from EPA Region 9, concerning the positive effect of the agency’s outreach program.

As a Board Member, I realize how powerful the position can be in bringing together, and communicating with, agency staff and office heads. Ongoing communication, for example, with the Offices of General Counsel, Recommendations, Investigations, as well as Video Productions, have been particularly rewarding, as has the IT and Records functions and their staff.

I worked hard to positively influence CSB staff to understand they’re valued, cared for, and viewed by me as…as significantly positive contributors to the agency’s mission.

Special thanks are extended to ACC, ASTI, the Chlorine Institute, CHEMTREC, DHS, EPA, Hot Zone, IAFC, IAFF, ILTA, and NACD for their tremendous external support, as well as API. I kind of put them separately because I’m…I’ve got four or five more opportunities to talk to them.

Additionally, I want to express my gratitude and appreciation to the following for their guidance in orienting and molding my
Board Member term: Hillary Cohen, Raphael Moure-Eraso, Daniel Horowitz, Richard Loeb, Vanessa Sutherland. Additionally, Michele Bouziane has been brilliant in assisting me when requested and I will be eternally grateful to her. I have a special pen for her that’s marked the "comma pen".

A final thought for the future Board Members and agency staff. Presidential appointees bring with them rich experience. I have decades of industrial experience and broad knowledge. Being provided with the opportunity to share more of our experience to influence the organization, especially at a micro-agency, helps eliminate silo compartmentalization and maintains the outstanding reputation that CSB enjoys with stakeholders.

I sincerely appreciate the opportunity to have served the American people and will always take pride in my time at CSB. Thank you.

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Thank you, Member Ehrlich. Member Engler, do you have any opening comments?

MEMBER ENGLER: Just to say welcome to all those who are attending and I wish Member Ehrlich well in the future. Thank you.

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Thank you. We now turn to some updates on recommendations and investigations. I’m not going to go through them, but our status summaries of our open investigations and
current actions related to recommendations can be found on the table outside the room.

I will now turn to recognize Member Ehrlich once again, to provide an update on ongoing audits by the EPA Office of Inspector General. Member Ehrlich.

MEMBER EHRLICH: Can I take a step back, Madam Chairman?

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Yes, you may.

MEMBER EHRLICH: I didn’t tell anybody what that chart was about. I just said it’s there. That is a histogram that shows my travel for the five-year program that I’ve been in since I’ve been here. The X-axis shows the frequency of travel and the Y-axis shows the states that I’ve visited. All in all, I’ve visited 31 states and China and I’ve made 140 presentations. And I still have about nine left for this year when I leave. So, sorry to put something up and not explain it.


As of 30, 2019…October 30, 2019, the CSB is currently working with the OIG, Office of Inspector General, on two audits. There have been no changes to the audit status listed below.
Financial 2019 Financial Statement Audit. CSB continues to work with OIG’s requests for documentation. The Fiscal Year 2019 CSB Audit Exit Conference is scheduled for 12 November 19.

Federal Information Security Modernization Act, FISMA. CSB is on target to close the remaining recommendation from the Fiscal Year 2018 audit by October 31, 2019. CSB continues to provide documentation as requested from the Fiscal 2019 FISMA audit.

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Thank you, Member Ehrlich. I now recognize Member Engler to provide an update on appropriations for the agency for Fiscal Year 2020.

MEMBER ENGLER: Thank you, Dr. Kulinowski. CSB, like the rest of the federal government, is operating under a continuing resolution that provides sufficient short-term funding to continue work through November 21st of this year. We are awaiting final action on the Fiscal Year 2020 appropriation.

The House Appropriations Committee supports funding CSB at $12 million, which CSB received for annual operations in Fiscal Year 2019. And again, that was an increase of $1 million over prior years, the first increase in some time, indicating bipartisan support for our work.

The Senate Appropriations Committee has not yet acted on the Fiscal Year 2020 Appropriation Bill.
For planning purposes, we are presuming a $12 million appropriation and are carefully tracking expenses to ensure effective operations at that funding level. Thank you.

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Thank you, Members Ehrlich and Engler.

This brings us to the new business section of the meeting. We will start with a factual update we’re releasing today into the March 17, 2019, tank fire at the Intercontinental Terminal Company, or ITC, in Deer Park, TX.

I traveled to Houston...to the Houston area immediately following this incident and understand that its impact still weighs heavily on nearby residents. With today’s presentation, we share facts that we have gathered and verified to date on the events that took place there.

I would like to introduce Team Lead Investigator, Crystal Thomas, to present the factual update.

CRYSTAL THOMAS: Thank you, Dr. Kulinowski. My name is Crystal Thomas and I am the Investigator-In-Charge for this incident. My presentation today will summarize the information contained in the Factual Update document that we plan to release today and that document will be posted on the CSB website.

During my presentation today, we’ll cover the following topic areas and we’ll start with...beginning with an incident summary. On
Sunday, March 17, 2019, at approximately 10:00 am, a large fire erupted at the Intercontinental Terminals Company, or ITC, Deer Park Terminal. This terminal is located in Deer Park, Texas.

The fire originated within the piping manifold of an 80,000-barrel aboveground atmospheric storage tank that contained naphtha product, a flammable liquid. Recorded data indicates that the tank experienced a volume loss prior to the fire, indicating that naphtha product was released. The release was not detected prior to the fire and the release could not be controlled once the fire erupted. As a result, the fire continued to burn and intensify and over the next several days, the fire progressively involved other storage tanks within that tank farm. The fire was extinguished early on the morning of March 20, 2019.

This incident did not result in any injuries to either ITC personnel or emergency responders. However, the local community experienced disruption as a result of this incident, which forced local schools and businesses either closed or operate under modified conditions.

ITC is a terminal operator and storage facility that specializes in servicing the petrochemical industry. They operate two terminals near Houston, Texas. These terminals include the ITC
Deer Park terminal, which is shown on this map, as well as the ITC Pasadena terminal located nearby.

The ITC Deer Park terminal is a bulk liquid storage terminal that began operations in 1972. In general, storage terminals are facilities designed to store and ship liquid or gas products. Bulk storage tanks, pipelines, and other loading and unloading systems form integral parts of these types of facilities. The ITC Deer Park facility was equipped with both rail and truck access, five ship docks, ten barge docks, and multiple pipeline connections.

At the time of the incident, the terminal contained 242 storage tanks, which ranged in size from 8,000 to 160,000 barrels. This equates to an overall onsite storage capacity of about 13.1 million barrels. The storage tanks were reportedly used to store petrochemical liquids and gases, fuel oil, bunker oil and distillates. According to the company’s website, the terminal handles approximately 770 ships, 3,700 barges, 12,000 rail tank cars, and 33,600 cargo tank trucks on an annual basis, for a total throughput of roughly 144 million barrels per year.

The tank where the fire originated, Tank 80-8, was located in the facility’s first and second 80s tank farm, which is shown purpled on this slide. Tank 80-8 was an 80,000-barrel aboveground atmospheric storage tank. The tank was an original feature of the
ITC Deer Park terminal and it went into service in 1972, when the facility became operational. This picture shows Tank 80-8 and its piping manifold prior to the incident.

The tank was leased by a company for naphtha-butane blending operations and subsequent naphtha product storage. The bulk of material contained in the tank was naphtha, a flammable liquid, which is typically used as a feedstock in gasoline production. There were also limited amounts of butane, which is a flammable gas, that were added to the naphtha, per customer specifications, in order to create the naphtha products. The addition of butane to the naphtha increases the octane level of the naphtha product.

So, the butane is incorporated into the tank via cargo tank truck deliveries, by way of a fixed butane-injection system. This slide shows a simplified schematic of the system. The system was installed in 2014 and then was modified in 2016 to replace the two-inch diameter piping with a four-inch diameter piping, in order to reduce the amount of time required to offload the cargo tank trucks.

The butane-injection system originates at the truck loading rack, which is located on the southwest side, outside of this tank farm. And it terminates at an injection point in the tank’s circulation line. The control system’s designed so that the butane-
injection operation cannot be initiated unless the tank’s pump is turned on, to ensure that the product is circulating.

Once the pump’s turned on, the operator can open the automatic valve by pressing a button at the loading rack. This allows the butane offloading process to begin. Upon leaving...upon exiting the cargo tank truck, the butane travels through the piping to the tank circulation line, where it combines with the existing naphtha product. The pump remains on throughout the unloading activity and for several hours afterwards, in order to facilitate the naphtha...naphtha-butane blending.

Tank 80-8 was not equipped with emergency or remote-operated isolation valves. As a result, in order to isolate equipment such as the pump, operators would have to manually close both the supply and return valves to the tank in order to isolate the flow of product from the [inaudible] from the tank into the circulation line. Under a major fire scenario resulting from a leak near this equipment, this would not be possible.

On the evening of March 16, 2019, in preparation for two planned butane truck deliveries to the tank, an area operator lined up the tank for circulation and turned on the pump. He then notified the other operator at the truck loading rack that the tank was ready. The operator at the loading rack then initiated the
unloading process at the rack, which allowed the butane to flow from the truck into the tank.

The first delivery of roughly 170 barrels of butane occurred between roughly 7:23 and 8:15 p.m. that evening. The second delivery, which was about 193 barrels, took place between around 9:29 and 10:29 p.m. Following completion of that last delivery, the pump remained on overnight in order to circulate the naphtha product.

A ship was expected to arrive the following day, and all of the contents of the tank, Tank 80-8, were expected to be transferred to the ship that day.

On the morning of March 17th, ITC control system data indicates that a series of unanticipated changes to the monitored pump operating pressures began. This started occurring around 7:25 a.m. that morning. During that time, the pump’s discharge pressure readings continued to fluctuate up and down until about 9:45 a.m. that morning. These fluctuations suggest a mechanical problem that developed in the pump’s circulation system.

At about 9:34 a.m. the reported tank volume data indicates that the tank began to lose volume unexpectedly. This would indicate that naphtha product was being released from the tank during that time.
At about 10:00 a.m. that morning, March 17th, a large fire erupted in the vicinity of Tank 80—the Tank 80-8 piping manifold. Shortly thereafter, at around 10:01 a.m., control system event logs indicate that the pump shut down and the tank experienced electronic communication failure. No further control systems data for the tank or the pump were available after that time.

Data indicates that the tank experienced a volume loss of roughly 220 barrels between that 9:34 and 10:00 a.m. time frame, when the fire erupted.

The tank farm was not equipped with a fixed gas detection system, so no alarms were activated as a result of the release. The reduction in tank volume that occurred as the naphtha released did not trigger any alarms in the central control room. Additionally, ITC personnel were unaware of any release of product prior to the fire erupting.

As mentioned, the fire initially erupted at roughly 10:00 a.m. on March 17th, in the vicinity of Tank 80-8. Within minutes, members of ITC’s emergency response team were responding to the blaze. Initial response efforts were mainly focused at directing several water sources towards the tank and its piping manifold.

ITC’s a member of Channel Industries Mutual Aid, or CIMA, which is a non-profit organization that combines firefighting, as
well as other emergency response capabilities of the refining and petrochemical industries in the greater Houston area. As a result of its CIMA...CIMA membership, several neighboring companies who are also members of CIMA responded to the ITC tank fire with various emergency response resources, including personnel, firefighting equipment, and firefighting supplies.

A unified command was set up to oversee the coordinated response. The unified command included representatives from ITC, the EPA, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, and the Harris County Fire Marshall’s office.

Tank 80-8 was situated in the center of the facility’s first and second 80s tank farm, as you can see here, pictured on this slide. It was surrounded by 14 other 80,000-barrel aboveground atmospheric storage tanks. This image shows an excerpt from the overall plot plan for the ITC Deer Park terminal. It shows you the location of that tank farm and where Tank 80-8 was situated in that farm...within that tank farm.

As mentioned, ITC was unable to stop the release of naphtha product from Tank 80-8 so the fire continued to rage and intensify. As a result, on the evening of March 17th, an adjacent tank located west of Tank 80-8 became fully engulfed in the fire. You can see
this in red on this slide. And you’ll see as additional tanks become involved, you’ll see more red pop up on the slide.

Firefighters continued to apply water and firefighting foam to try to control the fire. However, several wind changes caused the fire to continue to spread, and by the morning of March 18th, four additional tanks located also to the west of Tank 80-8 had caught fire.

At this point, ITC reached out to a third-party emergency services provider for assistance with extinguishing the fire. Later that same evening, two more tanks caught fire.

Emergency responders continued forward with their efforts to try to control the fire by continuing to apply water and foam. On March 19th, ITC signed an emergency response agreement with U.S. Fire Pumps, at which time U.S. Fire Pumps began mobilizing resources from its headquarters in Louisiana to the ITC Deer Park terminal.

Later that same morning, on March 19th, a temporary reduction in water pressure was experienced due to extreme demand. And, as a result, two additional tanks became involved in the massive fire.

U.S. Fire Pump arrived on-scene that morning. They completed initial scene assessment, developed a response plan, and by around 1:00 p.m. that day, commenced firefighting activities.
The next morning, by roughly 3:00 a.m. on Wednesday, March 20\textsuperscript{th}, the fire at the ITC Deer Park terminal was extinguished. This photo shows the fire on Tuesday, March 19\textsuperscript{th}, as it was still burning, and then the bottom photo shows the first and second 80s tank farm on Wednesday, March 20\textsuperscript{th}, when the fire...after the fire had been fully extinguished.

Two days later, on Friday, March 22\textsuperscript{nd}, at around 12:15 p.m., a second of this tank farm containment wall failed, releasing a mixture of chemicals from the tanks, water, and firefighting foam to the surrounding waterways. Additionally, even though the initial fire had been fully extinguished two days early...earlier, a small secondary fire erupted in the tank farm that afternoon. That fire was extinguished within a couple hours. Now this photo shows the Tank 80-8 piping manifold post-fire.

As previously mentioned, there were no injuries to ITC personnel or emergency responders. However, the local community was impacted as a result of this incident in several ways. On this slide, we’ll see a list of some of the ways that the local community was impacted. There were several shelter-in-place notifications issued. Additionally, there were some highway closures that occurred within the area. Multiple school districts cancelled school on multiple days in that first week.
Additionally, after the containment wall failed and the chemicals were released, U.S. Coast Guard closed the Houston Ship Channel. Going with that, Harris County also closed several waterfront parks. This included the San Jacinto Monument and the Battleship Texas State Park. Additionally, the Lynchburg ferry, which was in the vicinity of this facility, was also closed as a result of this incident.

The CSB is continuing to conduct investigation of this incident. Components of the Tank 80-8 piping manifold were taken to a secure storage facility where the CSB completed an initial visual inspection of the piping, as well as the pump. Further testing will be conducted.

Among the areas of interest, the CSB plans to identify potential naphtha product release points and ignition sources, determine why the naphtha product release was not detected prior to ignition, and why the release was not isolated post-fire.

So we will also look into the emergency response to determine why prolonged efforts were needed in order to control and ultimately extinguish the fire. In order to accomplish this, CSB needs to collect some additional emergency response evidence, including incident command records, photos, videos, and drone footage.
We also plan to look into the impact that this incident had on the local community. A detailed final report will be published at the conclusion of our investigation. And this will include additional information, analysis, findings, and safety recommendations as appropriate.

And at this point, I will turn it over to our Board Members for questions.

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Thank you, Investigator Thomas. I would like to begin with a question of my own. First of all, you obviously were in the middle of this investigation, but do you have a sense of, assuming no additional deployments take you back into the field, what your timeline is for completing this investigation?

CRYSTAL THOMAS: I’d like to get the investigation completed within... I’d like to get the investigation completed within a year of the event, would be my goal.

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Thank you.

CRYSTAL THOMAS: However, I can’t assure...

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Of course.

CRYSTAL THOMAS: ...that that will happen. It depends on the further testing that we do, as well as several other factors. Depending what we find during testing, that could definitely extend that effort, as well as looking at some other areas and scoping...
out the investigation. So, ideally. However, that might not be the case.

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Understood. I’m interested in whether your investigation is going to look at the adequacy of the dike for...because such a high volume of material was released and it was the failure of the dike that released the compound into the ship channel.

And the closure of the Houston ship channel, for those of you who are not aware, is a big deal. It...there’s a tremendous amount of commerce that flows through that ship channel every day and it was closed for several days. So that’s a significant off-site impact, as you noted in your briefing.

So is that...you know, are there...are you going to be looking at whether there are standards for the construction of those dikes and whether the...they were constructed to adequately hold the volume of material released?

CRYSTAL THOMAS: Yes, as part of our investigation, we plan to look at that containment area and look at the spacing of everything and the construction of the containment wall and the adequacy, based on the standards that exist.

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: I would now like to recognize Member Ehrlich for any questions or comments.
MEMBER EHRLICH: First of all, I told you this this morning. You did a good job on...on this report. It’s not an easy one. I’d be interested in knowing what the outcome of it is as well. But I don’t have any additional questions beyond what we discussed yesterday.

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Thank you. Member Engler?

MEMBER ENGLER: Thank you. Thank you for the report. It...and the fact that...specifically the factual update. It looked, just from looking at the site map, that the tanks appear to be in very close proximity. Is the spacing of...of these tanks an area which will be followed up in some detail? Because, obviously, the mitigation efforts were challenged and it seems like spacing...just from looking and drawing a sense of...I don’t want to say conclusions but just from looking at the site map, it looked like the tanks were in very close proximity.

CRYSTAL THOMAS: As part of our investigation, we do intend to look at the tank spacing and compare it with the...with standards that currently exist, to determine whether the spacing was appropriate in that area. So we do plan to look at that. We have requested documentation on actual tank spacing between each tank within that...within that tank farm. We’ve requested that information. We’ve done some measurements in the field earlier on
in the investigation. But at that point, some of the tanks had already been removed so we weren’t able to get everything during those… So that information is requested and, yes, we do plan on looking at that.

MEMBER ENGLER: Another question is, as I was recently, in fact just last week, at the Mary Kay O’Connor Center for Process Safety in Texas, and there were quite a few presentations that focused on the underlying organizational factors that led to an event. So both a combination question and comment is that I would hope that, as part of this investigation, we can obtain the organizational chart for the firm to try to understand where responsibility for safety was, at what level. Was it diffused? Was it solely at one level? Was it their responsibility at the executive level or the board level, etc.? So perhaps you could comment on…on that.

CRYSTAL THOMAS: Sure, yes, as part of our investigation, we did request a copy of the ITC organizational chart from the company. And they did provide that information. And we can see…as part of that organizational chart, we can see the Vice President of Health…Healthy, Safety & Environmental and also regulatory compliance. That person would be in charge of the safety function. And that person would report directly to the Senior Vice President
of Operations, who would report up to the CEO. So we will be...we do have that information.

MEMBER ENGLER: Excellent. And then just...just one comment. The CSB has often been...so much of the time, not...not exclusively by any means, but associated with major explosions and fires and looking at the causes of the fires and explosions. And somewhat less so something that’s also within our mission, which is looking at the impacts of toxic chemicals on the community. We’ve certainly done that in...in a number of reports. But other times, more of the focus has been on immediate fire and explosion hazards.

And I would hope, in this case in particular, we could take a look at issues such as what efforts were made to accurately monitor benzene and other...which is a carcinogen, and other toxic additions and take a look at the adequacy of that monitoring in terms of its impact on the surrounding communities. And while it’s quite likely entirely unrealistic to expect CSB to do some form of a longer-term epidemiological study, I think looking at how, when there’s a incident which has direct impact and acute impacts on...on members of the community as well as emergency responders and others, that we took a...you know, a careful look, a focused look at those areas.

I know that’s within the parameters of some of the things we’ve discussed, but I wanted to emphasize it because I think,
particularly in this case, when there was so much discussion of...of where did...you know, the chemical impacts go... Did they just disappear? Were there... I know that some facilities in the area, I believe, were actually shuttered as a result of...of the management’s perception that there was going to be an exposure of very serious, toxic chemicals.

No need to respond unless you want to. But just to comment. And thank you again for your [inaudible].

MEMBER EHRLICH: Can I ask another question?

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Member Ehrlich.

MEMBER EHRLICH: I looked at the video, the YouTube video and some of the videos that you have on this particular investigation, and when I presented to API in Denver two weeks ago and... I had the chance to talk to some of their tank people about it.

The thing that struck me about that tank, that’s a floating roof tank, isn’t it?

CRYSTAL THOMAS: That’s correct.

MEMBER EHRLICH: It’s the way that the flames were coming out underneath of the roof in very selected spaces. Okay? And inasmuch as you’re pumping a lighter fluid, butane, on top of a naphtha, which is heavier fluid, I wondered if that in and of itself caused that. And I guess my thought is maybe it would make
sense...it would make sense to talk to API about...about what they know about those kinds of tank fires. And they may be able to shed some light on it. A thought I had.

CRYSTAL THOMAS: Thank you.

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Any final comments or questions? Okay. Thank you very much, Investigator Thomas. And stay tuned for more as she works to bring this investigation to a close.

Our next order of new business involves the release of the CSB’s latest safety video entitled “Blowout in Oklahoma,” which focuses on the blowout at the Pryor Trust gas well located in Pittsburgh County, Oklahoma, that fatally injured five workers.

The CSB’s final report into this incident, released on June 12, 2019, identified a lack of regulations governing onshore drilling safety as well as shortcomings in safety management systems and industry standards utilized by the industry. The report calls on regulators, industry groups, the State of Oklahoma and companies to address such gaps.

We released a preliminary animation of the incident last year, in conjunction with our release of the report, and are pleased to follow that up today with a full 20-minute video. The CSB foresees this video playing an important role in training at well control schools across the country.
I’m not going to play the entire 20-minute video for you today, but we are presenting a short two-minute excerpt of our new animation. And encourage you to go to view the rest of the video at our website, csb.gov, and on our YouTube channel.

[VIDEO PLAYS]

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Again, the rest of the 20-minute video, which includes some [inaudible], as well as the full animation, is available at csb.gov and our YouTube channel.

MEMBER EHRLICH: I have one comment.

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Member Ehrlich.

MEMBER EHRLICH: I watched the whole thing last night and I would just like the record to show that this was probably one of the most complicated videos that our folks have ever made. And, from a technical perspective of the subject matter they’re trying to convey and the manner in which the graphics are done is just outstanding. And I think they should get kudos for that. It is a very, very good job.

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Thank you. And I agree. At this time, I would like to open the floor for public comment related to the CSB’s activities. Please identify yourself and present your comments within three minutes. We will begin with any comments from those in the room and then go to the phones. So if anyone in
the room has a comment, please speak now. No comments in the room. Operator, do we have any comments on the line?

MEMBER EHRlich: Do we have an operator?

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Operator, can you respond, please? Okay, let’s take a brief break and see if we can get the operator back on the line. We will reconvene at 11:50.

[BREAK]

OPERATOR: Thank you. We will now begin the question and answer session. If you have a question, please press 1 on your touchtone phone. If you wish to be removed from the queue, please press the pound sign or the hash key. Again, if you have an audio question, please press * then 1 on your touchtone phone. We’ll standby for questions. Again, it’s *1 if you have a question.

And we have Richard Rosera with a question. Your line is open. And Richard has dropped from the queue. Again, if you have a question, please press * then 1 on your touchtone phone. Again, that’s *1. And, Richard, you line is open. Richard, if you’re on mute, can you please unmute your phone?

This is the operator. Can you guys hear me?

RICHARD ROSERA: Okay?

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Here we go. Yes.

RICHARD ROSERA: Okay, can you hear me?
MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Yes.

RICHARD ROSERA: Okay, good. Just had a couple of questions on the website. First of all, I haven’t seen any updates on the transcripts of past business meetings since March 12th, 2019. And if you could update that, I think there’s been two meetings prior…prior to this one.

And then I also saw that the… You still have posted the…the jobs that were...were open back in the end of...of July, beginning of August. That...are these jobs still open or are they...have they been closed?

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: We are currently working through the candidates that applied for that but are not taking any new applications at this time.

RICHARD ROSERA: Okay. It’s...it’s a little confusing to see that the…the jobs are still posted. That’s all. Those...those were the two questions I had. Thank you.

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Thank you.

OPERATOR: And, as a reminder, if you’d like to enter the queue to ask a question, please press *1. And currently we have no questions in the queue.

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Thank you. One final call for questions in the room. Comments?
OPERATOR: And, as a reminder, to participate on the phone, please press *1.

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Operator, are there any additional calls on the line? Comments?

OPERATOR: We have no additional questions at this time.

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Okay, thank you. I will close the public comment period and thank you, Mr. Rosera, for providing a comment today.

I will now recognize my fellow Members for any closing remarks. Member Ehrlich?

MEMBER EHRLICH: Beyond what I read in my statement, no. I am very grateful for the people that have given me support, both inside and outside the agency. I am glad that at my point in life, I’ve been able to serve the people of this country well. And even though I’m leaving the employ of the government, I’m not leaving employment. Thank you.

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Member Engler? No, okay, thank you. I want to thank everyone here today and staff, as well as my fellow Board Members for attending today’s meeting, either in person or on the phone. I appreciate everyone’s comments and look forward to our next meeting on January 29, 2020.
We will be sending out an email noting the dates for all Fiscal Year 2020 public business meetings, as anticipated, in the next few weeks. I will note that those dates are subject to change until the final notice is listed in the Federal Register. But if you’d like to get the tentative dates on your calendar, we’ll be releasing those soon.

Please continue to monitor our website and sign up for CSB news alerts, and check our website, the Federal Register for additional details about the agenda for January’s meeting.

And with that, I thank you for your attendance and this meeting is adjourned.

OPERATOR: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. This concludes today’s conference call. [inaudible]