U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigations Board

Business Meeting

April 29, 2020

CSB Headquarters Office - Washington, DC

U.S. CHEMICAL SAFETY BOARD MEMBERS PRESENT:

KATHERINE LEMOS, CHAIRMAN & CEO
KRISTEN KULINOWSKI, MEMBER
TOM GOONAN, GENERAL COUNSEL

STAFF PRESENT:

Tom Goonan, General Counsel
OPERATOR: Good morning and welcome to the Chemical Safety Board public business meeting conference call. My name is Zinara[?] and I’ll be the operator for today’s call. At this time, all participants are in a listen-only mode. Now I’ll turn the call over to Ms. Katherine Lemos. Katherine, you may begin.

CHAIR LEMOS: Thank you, Zinara. Good morning. We will now call to order this business meeting of the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, referred to as the CSB.

Before we begin, I’d like to introduce myself, Dr. Katherine Lemos, as the new Chairman and CEO for the agency. I am thrilled to serve both the agency and the American public in this capacity. Joining me today is Board Member Kristen Kulinowski and our General Counsel, Tom Goonan.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, this is an audio-only business meeting. Although all interested participants are able to join via the call-in line, you should know that there are only three of us here in the CSB’s headquarter offices in Washington, D.C. We are maintaining social distancing per CDC guidelines.

Today we meet in open session, as required by the Government in the Sunshine Act, to discuss operations and agency activities. The CSB is an independent, non-regulatory federal agency that investigates major chemical incidents at fixed facilities.
The investigations examine all aspects of chemical incidents, including physical causes related to equipment design, inadequacies in regulations, industry standards, and safety management systems. Ultimately, we issue safety recommendations for the purpose of preventing similar incidents or accidents in the future.

If you are on the phone and wish to make a public comment at the end of the meeting, please follow the operator’s cues and she will unmute your line. You may also submit public comments during the meeting or after, by email to meeting@csb.gov. Again, that’s meeting@csb.gov and those comments will be included in the official record.

I would now like to turn the first part of today’s meeting over to Dr. Kulinowski. I sincerely appreciate and thank her for her leadership as Interim Executive and wish her all the best as she transitions from the Board into a new position outside of government. I have truly appreciated her insight and candor over the last few days. And so, please, Dr. Kulinowski, continue.

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Thank you Chair Lemos. I am delighted to be here and pleased to participate in my last public business meeting, with, of course, some regret. I’ll have more to say on
that at the end of the meeting. For now, I will provide an update on the current investigations.

The CSB is currently operating with seven incident investigators and two supervisory investigators. And we have 13 open investigations. I will provide a brief description of the status of each.

There was one new deployment since the last business meeting on January 29, 2020. The CSB has 13 open investigations and the new one is the Wendland 1H well.

On January 29th, a blowout and fire occurred at the Daniel H. Wendland 1H natural gas well in Burleson County, Texas. Three workers were fatally injured, and one worker was seriously injured. The investigation team is performing on-scene activities, interviewing personnel, and reviewing relevant documents.

As for our open investigations, I’ll begin with the Watson Manufacturing and Grinding. On January 24th, 2020, an explosion and fire event occurred at the Watson Manufacturing and Grinding Company in Houston, Texas. The incident resulted in the fatal injury of two employees, one employee was seriously injured, and there was significant commercial and residential property damage in the surrounding area. The Watson Company’s operation included
the powder coating of metal equipment primarily for the oil and mining industries. The powder coating process utilized poly...utilized propylene that was stored on-site in a bulk storage tank.

The investigation team is performing investigative activities, interviewing personnel, and continuing to review relevant documents.

The TPC Group facility in Port Neches, Texas, experienced a release of hydrocarbons on November 27th, 2019, that resulted in a fire event and multiple explosions. The release occurred in the South Unit of the facility, used in the production of 1,3-butadiene which is primarily used as a monomer in the production of a wide range of polymers and copolymers. The incident resulted in multiple injuries and property damage to both the facility and the surrounding area.

And the investigation team is continuing to perform investigative activities, interview personnel, and review relevant documents.

On October 26, 2019, Aghorn Operating Incorporated in Odessa, Texas, experienced a loss of containment at a pump station that resulted in the release of hydrogen sulfide. One worker and
one member of the public were fatally injured as a result of the release. This investigation is also ongoing.

On June 21, 2019, a major process loss of containment resulted in a fire and several explosions at the Philadelphia Energy Solutions, or PES, refining complex in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The incident occurred in the PES hydrofluoric acid alkylation unit. The unit was significantly damaged from the fire and multiple explosions.

This draft investigation report is in the final stage of review.

On May 3rd, 2019, an explosion and fire that occurred during production of a silicon hydride emulsion at the AB Specialty Silicones facility in Waukegan, Illinois. The incident resulted in fatal injuries to four employees and the injury of at least one other employee. The explosion severely damaged the production facility and impacted neighboring facilities.

The CSB’s investigation team is analyzing the factual information collected during the initial phase of the investigation.

On April 2nd, 2019, an explosion and fire occurred at the KMCO facility in Crosby, Texas. KMCO is a producer of specialty
chemical products. The company reported the release of
isobutylene prior to the incident. The incident resulted in the
crash injury of one employee. Two employees were seriously
injured and over 25 workers, both employees and contractors, were
injured.

The investigation team is developing the draft final
investigation report.

On March 17th, 2019, a large fire erupted at the
Intercontinental Terminals Company, LLC, or ITC, bulk liquid
storage terminal located in Deer Park, Texas. The fire
originated in the vicinity of Tank 80-8, an 80,000-barrel
aboveground atmospheric storage tank. The tank contained
naphtha, a flammable liquid typically used as a feedstock or
blend stock for production of gasoline. ITC was unable to
isolate or stop the release of naphtha from the tank and the fire
continued to burn, intensify, and progressively involve
additional storage tanks at the facility.

High levels of volatile organic compounds were present for
approximately 13 weeks after the incident, which delayed access
to the incident location by our investigators. The incident did
not result in any injuries to either ITC personnel or emergency
responders. But the local community was affected by the
incident, resulting in a shelter-in-place order and the closure of schools and businesses.

The investigation team is performing on-scene investigative activities, interviewing personnel, and reviewing relevant documents.

On Saturday, May 19th, 2018, an ethylene release and fire injured 23 workers at the Kuraray America Inc., or Kuraray, ethylene and vinyl alcohol copolymer plant, or EVAL Plant, in Pasadena, Texas. At the time of the incident, 266 employees and contract workers were on site. During the incident, 2,347 pounds of ethylene were released in less than three minutes.

The incident occurred during the startup of a chemical reactor system following a turnaround. High-pressure conditions developed inside the reactor, activating the reactor’s emergency pressure-relief system and discharging ethylene vapor into the atmosphere toward an area where many contractors were working. These workers were performing a variety of tasks that were not essential to the startup of the reactor, including hot work, which likely ignited the ethylene vapor, creating the fire.

The draft investigation report is in the final stage of review.
On April 26, 2018, an explosion and subsequent fire occurred at the Husky Superior Refinery in Superior, Wisconsin. The explosion occurred while workers were shutting down the Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit for periodic maintenance and inspection. 20 Husky employees and contract workers were injured, and a large portion of the town of Superior, Wisconsin, was evacuated.

The investigation team is reviewing documents and data collected during the initial phase of the investigation.

On May 31st, 2017, several explosions occurred at the Didion Milling facility in Cambria, Wisconsin. Didion performs corn milling at the Cambria facility. The dry corn milling process is a dust-producing operation and corn dust is known to be explosive under the right circumstances. Five employees were fatally injured, 14 workers injured, and there was significant damage to the facility as a result of this incident.

This investigation is currently on hold due to the lack of available investigative staff.

On April 3rd, 2017, a steam condensate, hot water, storage tank catastrophically failed at the Loy-Lange Box Company in St. Louis, Missouri. The force of the steam explosion ejected the storage tank from the facility, where it travelled approximately 500 feet and went through the roof of the Faultless Healthcare
Linen facility. One Loy-Lange employee and two Faultless Healthcare Linen employees were fatally injured. One Loy-Lange employee was seriously injured and there was significant damage to both facilities.

The investigation team is reviewing documents and data, in addition to testing a component involved in the incident.

On August 12, 2016, a flash fire occurred during a welding operation or hot work on a pipe manifold at Sunoco Logistics Partners terminal facility in Nederland, Texas. Seven contractors were injured as a result of this event.

This investigation is on hold due to the lack of available investigative staff.

Chair Lemos.

CHAIR LEMOS: Thank you, Dr. Kulinowski. What I’ll now turn to is an update of the status of the CSB Recommendations, followed by ongoing audits by the EPA Office of Inspector General, as well as a financial update.

In terms of recommendations, I’ll provide a summary first of our current open and closed and will follow by highlighting a recently released advocacy document.
The CSB currently has a ratio of 83% recommendations closed and 17% in open status. That equates to 697 closed recommendations and 144 open, for a total of 841.

A specific breakdown according to investigation can be found in the events portion of the CSB’s website, including the status of all recommendations.

Now let’s go back in time to April 20, 2010, the blowout and explosion from Macondo oil well. Many of you will recall this as if it were yesterday, and just last week, April 20th, was the ten-year anniversary.

This was a multiple-fatality incident that occurred approximately 50 miles off the coast of Louisiana, in the Gulf of Mexico, during temporary well-abandonment activities on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig. Control of the well was lost, resulting in a blowout, the uncontrolled release of oil and gas, in specific, hydrocarbons from the well. On the rig, the hydrocarbons found an ignition source.

The resulting explosions and fire led to the deaths of 11 individuals, serious physical injuries to 17 others, the evacuation of 115 individuals from the rig, the sinking of the Deepwater Horizon, and massive marine and coastal damage from approximately four million barrels of released hydrocarbons.
From the four-volume investigation report, the CSB issued 16 recommendations, nine of which were to the Department of Interior’s Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement. I’d like to highlight one of these recommendations in particular.

It states, "Drawing upon best available global standards and practices, develop guidance addressing the roles and responsibilities of corporate Boards of Directors and Executives for effective major accident prevention. Among other topics, this standard shall provide specific guidance on how Boards and Executives could best communicate major accident safety risks to their stakeholders, as well as corporate legal strategies to effectively manage those risks." That recommendation number, for the record, is 2010-10-I-OF-R7.

As a result, we released the CSB product entitled, “CSB Best Practice Guidance for Corporate Boards of Directors and Executives in the Offshore Oil and Industry…and Gas Industry for Major Accident Prevention”. We released this on the ten-year anniversary date.

For a company to avoid major accidents, Boards of Directors and Executives must be equipped with adequate and timely process safety-related information, and at least some members must have adequate levels of relevant education, training, and professional
experience to allow them to assess the information they receive to evaluate the actions, decisions, and strategies of executive management.

Boards influence corporate activity at the highest levels, including policies, communications, strategic goals, objectives, mergers and acquisitions, indicators, compensation, and incentive pay programs.

These decisions help to shape the corporation’s overall culture and the degree to which that culture is focused on safety and major accident prevention. This new guidance document is designed to help inform and guide decision making when it comes to safety and major accident prevention.

Moving on to The Office of Inspector General Audits. As of April 29th, 2020, the CSB is currently working with the Office of Inspector General on the Federal Information Security Management Act recommendation, and this will be completed by the deadline on April 30th, which is tomorrow.

Next, we have our Financial Update. Currently, the CSB is operating under appropriated funding totaling $12 million to support the agency’s mission. In February of this year, the agency submitted their budget request to Congress for Fiscal Year 2021 in the amount of $13.5 million. That represents a $1.5
million increase from FY2020. The CSB has requested these additional funds to satisfy increases in employment, as well as investigative costs.

The CSB would like to express its sincere gratitude towards Congress for continuously funding the agency so we can continue to keep our nation safe from chemical disasters.

At this time, I would like to open the floor for public comments related to the CSB’s activities. Please present your comments within a three-minute time period. And we’ll go now to the phone to see if we have any public comments.

OPERATOR: Thank you. We will now be in a public comments session. At this time, if you have a public comment, please press * then 1 on your touchtone phone. Please limit your comments to three minutes or less. There will be a slight delay before the first comment is announced.

Once again, if you have a public comment, please press * then 1 on your touchtone phone. And our first comment is from Steve Solomon. Please go ahead. Your line is open.

STEVE SOLOMON: Good morning and thank you for the opportunity to make a comment and ask a question. First of all, congratulations to Dr. Lemos on your new position. We look forward to working with you. And I also want to take a moment to
personally thank Dr. Kulinowski for your service to workers and especially those who have been lost due to tragic events. So thank you for all you’ve done.

My question is, on April 15th, there was a paper mill explosion in Jay, Maine. And I was wanting to know, is the CSB looking into this and, if you are looking into this, what are your plans going forward? Thank you.

CHAIR LEMOS: Thank you, Steve. This is Katherine. First of all, thank you so much for your congratulations and, again, I will also miss working with Dr. Kulinowski. I think she’s done a fantastic job. And we looking forward to working together.

In terms of your... your question regarding the 15th April event, I’ll put that... We’ll note that for the public comments. That is a question, a fair question. And we will address that through the public comment process.

OPERATOR: Thank you. Our next question comes from John Bresland. Please go ahead. Your line is open.

JOHN BRESLAND: Good morning. This is John Bresland, a former Board Member and Chair of the Chemical Safety Board. I left the Chemical Safety Board in 2012. It just doesn’t seem... my life has passed so quickly since then. But I did want to call in and congratulate Dr. Lemos...congratulate Katherine on her
appointment as the Chair and Board Member of the Chemical Safety Board and...and certainly wish her all the best. And also thank Dr. Kulinowski for her service over the years as well.

It’s...it’s interesting to listen to the...the list of incidents that you’re currently investigating or hoping to investigate with more staff. It doesn’t seem like the types of incidents are changing all that much and that’s a little disheartening. It’s not a...it’s not a criticism of the Chemical Safety Board. It’s just...it’s...it’s unfortunate that the incidents that we were investigating ten years ago are still happening today.

But I certainly enjoyed my time at the Chemical Safety Board. I was there for almost ten years. It was probably the most interesting job I had the whole time...in my working career.

So I just encourage you to keep on doing your investigations, doing them quickly, doing accurately and comprehensively, and getting the information out to the industry so that we can have a...an ongoing reduction in the number of incidents and the number of fatalities.

But again, congratulations and welcome aboard to Dr. Lemos. I know you’re really going to have a...a very interesting time over the...the next five years. Thank you.
CHAIR LEMOS: Thank you, Mr. Bresland. What an honor to have you call in and...and provide such encouraging comments and congratulations. I am certainly looking forward to an interesting time.

Your observation regarding the fact that the similar events are occurring is...is noteworthy and something, of course, that we hope to impact...you know, moving forward. So thank you so much for...for calling in and...and your comments of encouragement.

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: And I wanted to add my...my thanks also to...to you, John, for your...for your comments directed to me, Dr. Kulinowski.

OPERATOR: Thank you. Our next comment comes from Richard Rosera. Please go ahead. You line is open.

RICHARD ROSERA: I just wanted to congratulate Dr. Lemos and also thank Dr. Kulinowski for her service over...well, almost five years to the...to the Board and to the CSB.

And also wanted to check. I noted that some of the investigations are on hold because of lack of staff. How many investigators do you currently have? And what’s the status of...of hiring any additional staff as investigators?

CHAIR LEMOS: So I know that earlier in the... First of all, thank you, Richard. And your last name is Rosera?
RICHARD ROSERA: Correct.

CHAIR LEMOS: Correct. And are you with any particular agency or association?

RICHARD ROSERA: I’m with a company called EHS Grades, which includes two former investigators, Johnnie Banks and Samuel Oyewole and, you know, I have a continuing interest in the activities of the CSB. So that’s...that’s my background.

CHAIR LEMOS: Excellent. Thank you, Richard. So I’m just referring back to Dr. Kulinowski’s comments from earlier in this hour. The CSB is currently operating with seven incident investigators and two supervisory investigators. And there are 13 open investigations. I do know that there are a number of open requisitions for investigators. And I also know that we’re in the process of...of bringing on several others currently.

So I can’t...I can’t provide any details but we will note in the public record, you know, that...that question and potential concern, because I share that as well, in terms of our ability to close out on these...these issues...on these events.

RICHARD ROSERA: Thank you.

CHAIR LEMOS: Thank you.

OPERATOR: Thank you. Our next comment comes from Mahti Chindouri[?]. Please go ahead. Your line is open.
MAHTI CHINDOURI: Hi. My name is Mahti Chindouri Chininga and I'm with the American Chemistry Council.

Firstly, I’d like to join my peers in congratulating you, Dr. Lemos, on your new appointment. And, of course, thanking Dr. Kulinowski for your service.

My question is regarding the new accidental release reporting goal, which went into effect last month. I was wondering if you had any preliminary insights on its effect and the type of information it’s generating.

CHAIR LEMOS: So thank you, Mahti, I looking forward to working with you. I’m aware of the new reporting rule and I’ll put this...I will definitely note this interest and the specific questions for public comment.

I still have yet to be briefed on the...in its entirety, which is why I’m unable to answer any of those details right now. But certainly for public comment, I will...I’ll make sure that we do address those moving forward.

MAHTI CHINDOURI: Thank you.

CHAIR LEMOS: So we do have a question that came in from the e-mail address. This question is from Kevin Druley at the National Safety Council. And the question is, “What is CSB’s understanding of a possible timeline for bringing new members
onboard? With Dr. Kulinowski’s final meeting today, how will the agency proceed with only one Board Member going forward?”

So I have to say that that’s an excellent question. And I will...again, that will...that information will be in the public comment record for response and...and for our addressing it. If I had specific information today, we would provide it. But we are working through those details.

OPERATOR: Thank you. At this time, I’m not showing any further comments. I would like to turn the call back over to the host.

CHAIR LEMOS: Thank you, Zinara. We do have one other question that came in from... And I’m going to try to read this name appropriately, Michael Serafilia[?], and I’m not sure that there is a association for Michael, if he’s on the phone.

So the comments are, “Excellent update on the current status of open investigations. How does the CSB determine which incident they will respond to? There was an explosion at a papermill in Jay, Maine on the 15th of April 2020. While no fatalities were reported, there was significant damage and significant economic impacts to the plant, local community, as well as loggers and truckers.” The question is, “Will a team investigate this incident?”
And my assumption here is this is the same event that Steve
Solomon was referring to in the first question. Dr. Kulinowski,
would you like to answer that?

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Yes, thank you, Chair Lemos. I can
comment generically about the CSB’s decision making for whether
or not it’s deployed. And, as we’ve discussed before, the CSB
has multiple criteria that it uses to determine whether or not
it’s going to deploy to an incident.

First, of course, is whether it’s in our jurisdiction. And
then our criteria are largely consequence-based. Was the loss of
life, property damage, or significant injury that would warrant
us to deploy? Unfortunately, we also look at the available
resources for deployment. And during my time as Interim
Executive, I also had concerns about sending investigators into
the field during an active pandemic.

So when incidents come in to our screening department, we
weigh all of these factors and then make a go or no-go decision.
Even if we don’t deploy, we often collect information about the
incident and...and continue to monitor it for...for our...for our
internal purposes.

So that’s what I can tell you about our deployment decision
making.
CHAIR LEMOS: Thank you, Dr. Kulinowski. Zinara, there are no other questions from online?

OPERATOR: I am showing a few comments if you’d like to take them.

CHAIR LEMOS: Absolutely.

OPERATOR: Our next comment comes from Dave Sierra. Please go ahead. You line is open.

DAVE SIERRA: Hello, this is Dave Sierra. I had a question regarding the reporting rule. And is the CSB planning or do you all envision doing any sort of guidance on...on that rule? And, if so, do you envision any opportunity for stakeholders to provide comment, either through a virtual stakeholder meeting or some other forum to elicit input for...for that?

CHAIR LEMOS: So, thank you, Dave. I am familiar with the fact that we just did pass a reporting rule and there was public comment on the rule itself. And I know we did get this question also from an earlier caller.

In terms of guidance, I am aware...I was informed yesterday that we are going to be providing some guidance for this rule. And I’m not, you know, familiar with the details, which is why I would just say for the rest of this, let’s put it in the public comment to be addressed.
Typically, there...there is always stakeholder engagement in the products that we produce. So that’s a very general comment that I would...I would have to say I don’t know how it’s going to work with this...with the guidance materials in specific because I haven’t been briefed upon that yet.

DAVE SIERRA: Okay, thank you.

CHAIR LEMOS: Thank you, Dave.

OPERATOR: Thank you. Our next comment comes from Jeff Johnson. Please go ahead. Your line is open.

JEFF JOHNSON: Thank you and thanks for having this. I’m a reporter with Chemical & Engineering News. A number of the questions that I have have been already asked. Although some of the answers didn’t [inaudible] forward. Can you tell me...? I think you mentioned one that I think was Didion, one investigation that’s on hold because of lack of staff. Can you give me a sense of how many others there might be?

The other question, of course, is how many investigators are you actually short now? And do you have any idea when you might be able to fill them? Can you help me with that?

CHAIR LEMOS: So, yes, Dr. Kulinowski did mention several, and I don’t know the count of exactly how many that are open, but yet on hold due to a staffing shortage of investigators. Again,
we do have seven incident investigators with two supervisory
investigators. Obviously, that is short if we’re not able to
continue. But I don’t know the exact count at this moment. Dr.
Kulinowski, do you have any input for that?
MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Yeah, we’re looking to hire at least ten
more investigators. And we have an open action right now and
a...we’re...we’re vetting some of the candidates now.
CHAIR LEMOS: Got it. I do know that it’s active. We have,
you know, several offers currently pending. We just brought on
several more. So this is a high priority, top priority. So
hopefully that...that addressed that...that same question.
JEFF JOHNSON: Yeah. Thank you, thank you.
OPERATOR: Thank you. Our next comment comes from...comes
from David Miller. Please go ahead. Your line is open.
DAVID MILLER: Yes, thank you, operator. This is David
Miller with the American Petroleum Institute. Not a question,
just a comment. Of course, first and foremost, to congratulate
you, Dr. Lemos, on your appointment. We look forward to working
with you.
And then, of course, a comment to thank Dr. Kulinowski for
her service for these five years and to wish her all the best in
her future endeavors.
So really just two things there. And again, as others have said, thank you very much for having this business meeting. I appreciate the opportunity to call in. And while we can’t see you on screen, we’re glad to know that you’re social distancing. [laughter] the appropriate thing to do at this point, right? So, again, thank you very much.

CHAIR LEMOS: Thank you, David. Again, we really do appreciate the congratulations and it is no small investment for Dr. Kulinowski for five years and the staff. I have to say there are so many dedicated staff at this agency that I’m meeting and have interacted with just recently, that I’m so fortunate to...to be working with. And I know we’re going to accomplish, you know, significant improvements...continued improvements, I should say, as we move forward. Because I know there have already been quite a few.

So, in closing, I thank everyone here today and the staff, as well as my fellow Board Member, Dr. Kulinowski, for attending today’s meeting.

I urge you, all of you, to continue monitoring our website, and if you haven’t already done so, to sign up for CSB news alerts.
All of us share a strong interest in preventing chemical incidents in the future, and we need to work together as a community to do so.

So, Dr. Kulinowski, I believe you have some personal comments before we close.

MEMBER KULINOWSKI: Thank you, Chair Lemos. At the end of a...of a tenure like this, one gets retrospective. So if you’ll permit me to go back in time a little bit.

When I was first approached about being considered for a position on the Board, I was very excited about being able to contribute to its important mission. Much of my prior work in occupational and environmental health and safety was compelling, but largely anticipatory. That work was aimed at thinking about how to prevent human and environmental damage from engineered nanomaterials, a relatively novel class of materials used in many different industrial sectors.

So we were laying the foundation for an assessment of the risk, based on early research that showed potential areas of...of concern. But these risks had not yet emerged.

The risks of major industrial accidents, such as the ones investigated by the CSB, are not theoretical. Every day in the U.S. and around the world, people go to work in high-hazard
industries. These industries remain vitally important to contributing to the coronavirus response.

And nearly every day, as our incident screening data demonstrates, something does not go as planned. Usually the unplanned releases of hazardous substances reported to us are small and relatively harmless. But that’s not always the case.

Sometimes the magnitude and consequences are extreme. And when that happens, lives are lost, property destroyed, and communities left in tatters. Preventing these catastrophic events is the work of the CSB. It is important. It is compelling. And it has been my privilege to have contributed to it.

I have also appreciated the commitment of our staff, who dedicate their talents to this work and to my former Board Members for their service. I have learned much from all of you, for which I am grateful.

Finally, I would like to thank our many stakeholders for their unwavering support of the agency and its mission during some rather bleak times when our future seemed uncertain. And so I’m pleased but also farewell...but also sad to say farewell at this, my last public business meeting and last week at the agency.
But I am confident that the chair will thrive under your leadership, Chair Lemos, as you are an experienced safety professional, committed to its success. I will be cheering for you and the staff from the sidelines. And, like at least 100,000 subscribers, eagerly awaiting for that next safety video to be posted to the YouTube channel. [laughter]

Thank you all and let us continue to envision a nation safe from chemical catastrophe.

CHAIR LEMOS: Thank you, Dr. Kulinowski. What a wonderful way to close out this meeting. Thank you, everyone, for your attendance. And with that, this meeting is adjourned.

OPERATOR: Thank you. And thank you, ladies and gentlemen. This concludes today’s conference. Thank you for participating.

You may now disconnect.