

U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board

OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL

Memorandum

To: Board Members

From: Steven Messer

Acting General Counsel

Cc: Leadership Team

Adam Henson

Subject: Board Action Report – Notation Item 2025-39 | Recommendation to the American

Petroleum Institute (API) (2018-01-I-OK-R4) from the Pryor Trust Fatal Gas Well

Blowout and Fire investigation (2018-01-I-OK)

Date: May 15, 2025

On May 13, 2025, the Board approved Notation Item 2025-39, thereby designating Recommendation 2018-01-I-OK-R4 with the status of Closed – Acceptable Alternative Action and authorizing the publication of the Recommendations Status Change Summary for this change on the CSB's website.

Voting Summary – Notation Item 2025-39

Disposition: APPROVED

Disposition date: May 13, 2025

	Approve	Disapprove	Calendar Not Participating	Date
S. Johnson	X			5/12/2025
S. Owens	X			5/12/2025
C. Sandoval	X			5/13/2025



U. S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board RECOMMENDATION STATUS CHANGE SUMMARY

Report:	Pryor Trust Fatal Gas Well Blowout and Fire		
Recommendation Number:	2018-01-I-OK-R4		
Date Issued:	June 12, 2019		
Recipient:	American Petroleum Institute		
New Status:	Closed – Acceptable Alternative Action		
Date of Status Change:	May 13, 2025		

Recommendation Text:

Develop a recommended practice on alarm management specifically for the drilling industry based on guidance in ANSI/ISA 18.2 Management of Alarm Systems for the Process Industries. The recommended practice will address the unique dynamic environment of the drilling industry and provide guidance on implementing a state-based alarm system for different operating modes (e.g., drilling, circulating, tripping, etc.). Include International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) in the development of this recommended practice.

Board Status Change Decision:

A. Rationale for Recommendation

On January 22, 2018, a blowout and rig fire occurred at Pryor Trust 0718 gas well number 1H-9, located in Pittsburg County, Oklahoma. The fire killed five workers, who were inside the driller's cabin on the rig floor. They died from thermal burn injuries and smoke and soot ("tripping") out of the well.

The cause of the blowout and rig fire was the failure of both the primary barrier—hydrostatic pressure produced by drilling mud—and the secondary barrier—human detection of influx and activation of the blowout preventer—which were intended to be in place to prevent a blowout.

As a result of these findings, the CSB issued five recommendations to the American Petroleum Institute (API). This status change summary addresses CSB Recommendation Nos. 2018-01-I-OK-R4.

B. Response to the Recommendation

The IADC published *IADC Drilling Control Alarm Management Guidelines* V2.0. This publication was developed in participation with the American Petroleum Institute (API) in response to the recommendation. This publication contains information on alarm management for the drilling industry including information from ANSI/ISA 18.2. There is also guidance on implementing a state based alarm system for different operating modes.

C. Board Analysis and Decision

Board Order 022, Recommendations Program, states that a status of "Closed – Acceptable Alternative Action" may be applied if a recommendation is successfully implemented by an entity other than the recommendation recipient. As stated above, the IADC publication meets the intent of this recommendation. Although API did not lead the effort to implement this recommendation as originally contemplated, they did participate in the process of developing this excellent resource which we appreciate. Based on the information above, the Board voted to change the status of CSB Recommendation No. 2018-01-I-OK-R4 to: "Closed – Acceptable Alternative Action."