



U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board

OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL

Memorandum

To: Board Members

From: Steven Messer
Acting General Counsel

Cc: Leadership Team
Adam Henson

Subject: Board Action Report – Notation Item 2025-41 | Recommendation to the International Society of Automation (ISA) (2022-01-I-OH-R7) from the BP – Husky Oregon Chemical Release and Fire investigation (2022-01-I-OH)

Date: May 15, 2025

On May 13, 2025, the Board approved Notation Item 2025-41, thereby designating Recommendation 2022-01-I-OH-R7 with the status of Open – Acceptable Response or Alternate Response and authorizing the publication of the Recommendations Status Change Summary for this change on the CSB's website.

Voting Summary – Notation Item 2025-41

Disposition: APPROVED

Disposition date: May 13, 2025

	Approve	Disapprove	Calendar	Not Participating	Date
S. Johnson	X				5/12/2025
S. Owens	X				5/12/2025
C. Sandoval	X				5/13/2025



U. S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board

RECOMMENDATION STATUS CHANGE SUMMARY

Report:	BP – Husky Oregon Chemical Release and Fire
Recommendation Number:	2022-01-I-OH-R7
Date Issued:	June 24, 2024
Recipient:	International Society of Automation (ISA)
New Status:	Open – Acceptable Response or Alternate Response
Date of Status Change:	May 13, 2025

Recommendation Text:

Revise American National Standard ANSI/ISA 18.2-2016, Management of Alarm Systems for the Process Industries, to include performance targets for short-term alarm flood analysis so that users can evaluate alarm flood performance for a single alarm flood event. The performance targets should include:

- a) number of alarm floods,*
- b) duration of each flood,*
- c) alarm count in each flood, and*
- d) peak alarm rate for each flood.*

At a minimum, a target peak alarm flood rate should be defined, such as in the guidance provided by the ASM Consortium or Engineering Equipment and Materials Users Association (EEMUA), to establish trigger points that require alarm performance improvement actions

Board Status Change Decision:

A. Rationale for Recommendation

On September 20, 2022, a vapor cloud ignited at the BP-Husky Refining LLC (“BP Husky”) refinery in Oregon, Ohio. The vapor cloud formed when flammable liquid naphtha was intentionally released from a pressurized vessel to the ground in response to an abnormal situation. Two employees were fatally injured. BP Husky estimated that over 23, 000 pounds of naphtha was released during the event, and that \$597 million in damage was incurred.

The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) investigated the incident and found several safety issues including inadequate safeguarding to prevent liquid overflow, ineffective abnormal situation management, and failure to learn from previous incidents. As a result of these findings, the CSB issued one recommendation to the International Society of Automation (ISA). This status change summary addresses CSB Recommendation No. 2022-01-I-OH-R7.

B. Response to the Recommendation

ISA has notified the CSB that they intend to implement the recommendation. They have provided a plan of action that appears to satisfy the objectives of the recommendation. Additionally, they have provided a timetable for completion.

C. Board Analysis and Decision

Based upon the information above, the Board voted to change CSB Recommendation No. 2022-01- I-OH-R7 to: “Open – Acceptable Response or Alternate Response.”