



## Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board

OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL

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### Memorandum

To: Board Members

From: Richard C. Loeb *RC*

Cc: Leadership Team  
Mark Kaszniak  
Christina Morgan

Subject: Board Action Report – Notation Item 2013-18

Date: February 26, 2013

On February 14, 2013, the Board approved Notation Item 2013-18, thereby designating Recommendations 2003-13-I-LA-R10 and R16, to the Honeywell Baton Rouge Facility (from the Honeywell Chemical Incidents investigation), with the status of Closed – Acceptable Action.

### Voting Summary – Notation Item 2013-18

**Disposition: APPROVED**

**Disposition date: February 14, 2013**

	Approve	Disapprove	Calendar	Not Participating	Date
R. Moure-Eraso	X				2/05/2013
M. Griffon	X				2/20/2013
B. Rosenberg	X				2/14/2013



## U. S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board RECOMMENDATIONS STATUS CHANGE SUMMARY

<b>Report:</b>	<b>Honeywell Chemical Incidents</b>
<b>Recommendation Number:</b>	<b>2003-13-I-LA-R10 and 16</b>
<b>Date Issued:</b>	<b>August 8, 2005</b>
<b>Recipient:</b>	<b>R10: Honeywell International, Inc. Baton Rouge Facility R16: Honeywell International, Inc.</b>
<b>New Status:</b>	<b>Closed- Acceptable Action</b>
<b>Date of Status Change:</b>	<b>February 14, 2013</b>

### Recommendation Text:

*R10: Revise the personal protective equipment matrix to include requirements for specific activities, such as draining [hydrogen fluoride] equipment. Refer to the [Hydrogen Fluoride Industry Practices Institute] guidelines as appropriate.*

*R16: Develop and implement corporate standards for safely handling hydrogen fluoride.*

### Board Status Change Decision:

#### A. Rationale for Recommendation

These recommendations were issued pursuant to CSB's investigation of the August 13, 2003 hydrogen fluoride release incident at the Honeywell International, Inc. Baton Rouge facility, which exposed two workers. Neither worker was wearing appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) during a non-routine operation to drain liquid hydrogen fluoride from a vaporizer. The CSB found that the Baton Rouge facility's PPE matrix did not specify the PPE required for specific activities, such as draining HF equipment, and that this contrasted with guidance published by the Hydrogen Fluoride Industry Practices Institute (HFIPI). The CSB also found that HF handling practices varied across different Honeywell facilities.

#### B. Response to the Recommendation

Honeywell reported to the CSB that it issued corporate-level HF-handling standards, including a revised PPE matrix, based in part upon HFIPI guidelines. Honeywell's revised PPE matrix gives examples of activities that would require different levels of PPE; Honeywell also explicitly clarified that employees would be required to use Level B PPE for operations involving the draining of HF equipment into an open system where there is a potential for splashing.

#### C. Board Analysis and Decision

Because Honeywell reported actions consistent with the intent of the CSB's recommendations, the Board voted to change the status of these recommendations to "Closed- Acceptable Action."