Recommendation Text:

Implement one of the three following options regarding regulatory changes:

(a) **OPTION 1:** Apply the Process Safety Management (PSM) standard (29 CFR 1910.119) to the drilling of oil and gas wells; or

(b) **OPTION 2:** Apply the Process Safety Management (PSM) standard (29 CFR 1910.119) to the drilling of oil and gas wells as in OPTION 1, and make the necessary modifications to customize it to oil and gas drilling operations; or

(c) **OPTION 3:** Develop a new standard with a safety management system framework similar to PSM that applies only to the drilling of onshore oil and gas wells that includes but is not limited to the following:

   (1) Detailed written operating procedures with specified steps and equipment alignment for all operations;
   (2) Written procedures for the management of changes (except replacements in kind) in procedures, the well plan, and equipment;
   (3) A risk assessment of hazards associated with the drilling plan;
   (4) A requirement to follow Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP);
   (5) Development of a Well Construction Interface Document between the operator and the drilling contractor prior to the commencement of drilling activities which at a minimum includes a bridging document and well plan specifying barriers and how to manage them;
   (6) The performance and documentation of flow checks using acceptable methods at defined points during the operation for a specified duration; and
   (7) A requirement for employee participation, similar to the Employee Participation requirement in the OSHA PSM standard.

Board Status Change Decision:

A. **Rationale for Recommendation**
On January 22, 2018, a blowout and rig fire occurred at Pryor Trust 0718 gas well number 1H-9, located in Pittsburg County, Oklahoma. The fire killed five workers, who were inside the driller’s cabin on the rig floor. They died from thermal burn injuries and smoke and soot inhalation. The blowout occurred about three-and-a-half hours after removing drill pipe (“tripping”) out of the well.

The cause of the blowout and rig fire was the failure of both the primary barrier—hydrostatic pressure produced by drilling mud—and the secondary barrier—human detection of influx and activation of the blowout preventer—which were intended to be in place to prevent a blowout.