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Bethlehem Steel Corporation Gas Condensate Fire
FINAL REPORT: Final Investigation Report
Location: Chesterton, IN
Accident Occurred On: 02/02/2001
Final Report Released On: 12/06/2001
Accident Type: Chemical Manufacturing - Fire and Explosion
Company Name: Bethlehem Steel Corporation

statistics

Total # of Recommendations
13
Total # of Open Recommendations
0
Total # of Closed Recommendations
13
Total % of Open 0 vs. Closed 100

investigation information

Image
Accident Description
On February 2, 2001, a fire occurred at Bethlehem Steel Corporation's Burns Harbor mill in Chesterton, Indiana. One Bethlehem Steel millwright and one contractor supervisor died. Four Bethlehem Steel millwrights were injured, one seriously. Workers were attempting to remove a slip blind and a cracked valve from a coke oven gas line leading to a decommissioned furnace. During removal of the valve, flammable liquid was released and ignited.
Investigation Status
The final report on this investigation was approved on December 6, 2001.


 

Recommendations

AFL-CIO Building Trades Council
2001-02-I-IN-10

Communicate findings of this report to your membership.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI)
2001-02-I-IN-10

Communicate findings of this report to your membership.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

Association of Iron and Steel Engineers
2001-02-I-IN-10

Communicate findings of this report to your membership.

URGENT!
Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

Bethlehem Steel Corporation
2001-02-I-IN-7

Conduct periodic audits of work authorization, line and equipment opening, deadleg management programs, and decommissioning and demolition activities at your steelmaking facilities. Share findings with the workforce.

Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action/No Response Received
Closed - Unacceptable Action/No Response Received (C - UA/NRR) - Recipient responds by expressing disagreement with the need outlined in the recommendation and the Board concludes that further correspondence on, or discussion of, the matter would not change the recipient?s position.
 

2001-02-I-IN-8

Revise the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for COG condensate to highlight the potential flammability hazard. Ensure that management at your steelmaking facilities trains employees and informs contractors with regard to the potential presence of flammable liquids when working with or opening COG condensate piping and equipment.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

2001-02-I-IN-9

Communicate findings of this report to the workforce and contractors at Bethlehem Steel's steelmaking facilities.

Status: Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded
Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded (C - R/S) - Recipient rejects the recommendation and also supports the rejection with a rationale with which the Board concurs. This designation may apply when later facts indicate that the concerns expressed in the recommendation were actually addressed prior to the incident, or when a recommendation is superseded by a new, more appropriate recommendation.
 

Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Burns Harbor Mill
2001-02-I-IN-1

Implement a work authorization program that requires higher levels of management review, approval, and oversight for jobs that present higher levels of risk, such as opening lines potentially containing flammable liquids where there is no low point drain.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

2001-02-I-IN-2

Monitor the accumulation and flammability of COG condensate throughout the mill. Address potentially hazardous changes in condensate accumulation rates and flammability.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

2001-02-I-IN-3

Survey the mill for deadlegs and implement a program for resolving the hazards. Develop guidance for plant personnel on the risks of deadlegs and their prevention. Include deadlegs in plant winterization planning.

Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action/No Response Received
Closed - Unacceptable Action/No Response Received (C - UA/NRR) - Recipient responds by expressing disagreement with the need outlined in the recommendation and the Board concludes that further correspondence on, or discussion of, the matter would not change the recipient?s position.
 

2001-02-I-IN-4

Provide drains at low points in piping to allow for the safe draining of potentially flammable material.

Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action/No Response Received
Closed - Unacceptable Action/No Response Received (C - UA/NRR) - Recipient responds by expressing disagreement with the need outlined in the recommendation and the Board concludes that further correspondence on, or discussion of, the matter would not change the recipient?s position.
 

2001-02-I-IN-5

Ensure that Burns Harbor and contractor employees are trained with regard to the potential presence of flammable liquids when working with or opening COG or condensate piping and equipment.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

2001-02-I-IN-6

Establish procedures to ensure that insulation is replaced when removed for maintenance.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

United Steelworkers of America (USWA)
2001-02-I-IN-10

Communicate findings of this report to your membership.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

 
 

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