Skip to Main Content

An independent federal agency investigating chemical accidents to protect workers, the public, and the environment.

Text Size AA
PRINT PAGE
BP Amoco Thermal Decomposition Incident
FINAL REPORT: Final Investigation Report
Location: Augusta, GA
Accident Occurred On: 03/13/2001
Final Report Released On: 05/20/2002
Accident Type: Oil and Refining - Reactive Incident
Company Name: BP Amoco

statistics

Total # of Recommendations
11
Total # of Open Recommendations
0
Total # of Closed Recommendations
11
Total % of Open 0 vs. Closed 100

investigation information

Image
Accident Description
On March 13, 2001, three people were killed as they opened a process vessel containing hot plastic at the BP Amoco Polymers plant in Augusta, Georgia. They were unaware that the vessel was pressurized. The workers were killed when the partially unbolted cover blew off the vessel, expelling hot plastic. The force of the release caused some nearby tubing to break. Hot fluid from the tubing ignited, resulting in a fire.
Investigation Status
The final report on this investigation was approved on May 20, 2002.


 

Recommendations

American Chemistry Council (ACC)
2001-03-I-GA-10

Communicate the findings of this report to your membership.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

BP Chemicals Group
2001-03-I-GA-9

Communicate the findings of this report to your chemical and plastics manufacturing facilities in North America.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

Society of Plastics Engineers (SPE)
2009-03-I-GA-11

Communicate the findings of this report to your membership.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

Solvay Advanced Polymers, LLC
2001-03-I-GA-1

Examine the manufacturing businesses acquired from BP Amoco Performance Polymers and ensure that a systematic safety review procedure is developed and implemented for identifying and controlling hazards from unintended chemical reactions. Additionally, ensure that reactive hazards are identified and evaluated: - During product R&D, during conceptual design of a new process, and during detailed design of a new process. - Before changes are made to existing equipment or process chemistry. - Communicate the results of this review to the workforce.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

2001-03-I-GA-2

Ensure that a program is in place at facilities acquired from BP Amoco Performance Polymers to systematically review the hazards associated with new and modified processes and equipment as operating experience accrues. Ensure that facilities correct all identified design, operation, and maintenance deficiencies. Verify that operating experience does not invalidate the design basis for equipment.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

2001-03-I-GA-3

Revise the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for Amodel to warn of the hazards of accumulating large masses of molten polymer. Communicate the MSDS changes to current and past customers (who may retain inventories of this product).

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

2001-03-I-GA-4

Implement a program to conduct periodic management reviews of incidents and near-miss incidents. Look for trends and patterns among incidents. Address root causes and implement and track corrective measures.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

2001-03-I-GA-5

Revise process safety information to include: - Information regarding the decomposition reactions of Amodel. - Design intent, basis, capacity, and limitations of equipment. - Hazards and consequences of deviations from design intent and operating limits.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

2001-03-I-GA-6

Revalidate hazard analyses for the Amodel process to address: - Credible deviations from process intent and their consequences. - Hazards associated with startup and shutdown operations. - Prevention of accumulations of potentially hazardous masses of polymer.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

2001-03-I-GA-7

Revise your lockout/tagout program to ensure that equipment is rendered safe prior to opening for maintenance. At a minimum, ensure that equipment opening procedures contain a stop work provision that requires higher levels of management review and approval when safe opening conditions, such as equipment depressurization, cannot be verified.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

2001-03-I-GA-8

Ensure that your management of change policy applies to operational and procedural modifications.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

 
 

Related Video

Reactive Hazards
7/31/2007 4:00:00 AM
Four major accidents illustrate the dangers from uncontrolled chemical accidents. read more

Download QuickTime Video

Related News

Dscn0332
Hazard of Chemical Reaction "Not Recognized" At Former BP Amoco; CSB Recommends Safety Improvements
5/23/2002
(Washington, DC - May 23, 2002) - The molten plastic that was involved in last year's fatal accident at the former BP Amoco plant in Augusta, Ga., was known by company researchers to undergo a gas-producing reaction at high temperatures, but the resulting dangers to workers were not adequately recognized or controlled in the plant design or operating procedures, federal accident investigators said today.
read more
MVC-006L
CSB to Investigate Fatal BP Amoco Explosion
3/21/2001
(Washington, DC - March 21, 2001): The U.S. Chemical Safety & Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) has dispatched a second investigative team to the site of a fatal explosion at a Georgia plastics manufacturing facility. The team will carry on work begun shortly after the incident by a CSB preliminary assessment team. The blast early on the morning of March 13 left three dead at the BP Amoco Polymers plant in Augusta. The explosion initiated a secondary chemical fire that took five hours to bring under control.
read more
 
 
© csb.gov. All rights reserved