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American Forest and Paper Association (AFPA)
Georgia-Pacific Corp. Hydrogen Sulfide Poisoning
Open: 0%  |  Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: November 20, 2002

2002-01-I-AL-13

Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to your membership.


Status: C-AA
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

American Gas Association (AGA)
ConAgra Natural Gas Explosion and Ammonia Release
Open: 0%  |  Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: February 04, 2010

2010-12-I-NC-1

Enact a Tentative Interim Amendment as well as permanent changes to the National Fuel Gas Code (NFPA 54/ANSI Z223.1) to require that during the purging of fuel gas piping at industrial, commercial, and public facilities: (a) Purged fuel gases shall be directly vented to a safe location outdoors, away from personnel and ignition sources 

(b) If it is not possible to vent purged gases outdoors, purging gas to the inside of a building shall be allowed only upon approval by the authority having jurisdiction of a documented risk evaluation and hazard control plan. The evaluation and plan shall establish that indoor purging is necessary and that adequate safeguards are in place such as:

     • Evacuating nonessential personnel from the vicinity of the purging;      • Providing adequate ventilation to maintain the gas concentration at an established safe level, substantially below   
     the lower explosive limit; and

     • Controlling or eliminating potential ignition sources
(c) Combustible gas detectors are used to continuously monitor the gas concentration at appropriate locations in the vicinity where purged gases are released

(d) Personnel are trained about the problems of odor fade and odor fatigue and warned against relying on odor alone for detecting releases of fuel gases


Status: C-AA
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

PDF Document Download

American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA)
Improving Reactive Hazard Management
Open: 42%  |  Closed: 58%

Final Report Released On: September 17, 2002

2001-01-H-24

Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to your membership.


Status: C-AA
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

Technic Inc. Ventilation System Explosion
Open: 57%  |  Closed: 43%

Final Report Released On: August 20, 2004

2003-08-I-RI-6

Revise the appendix of ANSI Z9.2, American National Standard Fundamentals Governing the Design and Operation of Local Exhaust Systems, emphasizing the need to evaluate potential incompatibilities when dusts, fumes, or vapors are intermixed in local exhaust ventilation systems with common headers to ensure that they do not result in fire or explosion hazards, or destructive corrosion. Reference appropriate methods for such evaluations, such as the ASTM E 2012-00 standard.


Status: C-AA
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE)
T2 Laboratories Inc. Reactive Chemical Explosion
Open: 0%  |  Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: September 15, 2009

2008-03-I-FL-1

Work with the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology, Inc. to add reactive hazard awareness to baccalaureate chemical engineering curricula requirements.


Status: C-ERA
Closed - Exceeds Recommended Action (C - ERA) - Action on the recommendation meets and surpasses the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

2008-03-I-FL-2

Inform all student members about the Process Safety Certificate Program and encourage program participation.


Status: C-AA
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI)
Bethlehem Steel Corporation Gas Condensate Fire
Open: 0%  |  Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: December 06, 2001

2001-02-I-IN-10

Communicate findings of this report to your membership.


Status: C-AA
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Z400.1 Committee
Barton Solvents Explosions and Fire
Open: 22%  |  Closed: 78%

Final Report Released On: June 26, 2008

2007-6-I-KS-3

Revise ANSI Z400.1 to advise chemical manufacturers and importers that prepare MSDSs to: -Identify and include a warning for materials that are static-accumulators and that may form ignitable vapor-air mixtures in storage tanks; -Advise users that bonding and grounding may be insufficient to eliminate the hazard from static-accumulating flammable liquids, and provide examples of additional precautions and references to the relevant consensus guidance (e.g., NFPA 77, Recommended Practice on Static Electricity (2007), and API Recommended Practice 2003, Protection Against Ignitions Arising Out of Static, Lightning, and Stray Currents (2008)); and -Provide conductivity testing data for materials that are static accumulators and that may form ignitable vapor-air mixtures in storage tanks.


Status: C-AA
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

Combustible Dust Hazard Investigation
Open: 33%  |  Closed: 67%

Final Report Released On: November 09, 2006

2006-1-H-6

Modify ANSI Z400.1 American National Standard for Hazardous Industrial Chemicals--Material Safety Data Sheets to recommend that MSDSs include information on: - combustible dust hazards, safe handling practices, and references to relevant fire codes in MSDS; - hazard information about the by-products of materials that may generate combustible dusts due to processing or handling; - identification of combustible dust hazards and selection of physical properties to include in MSDS.


Status: C-AA
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

American Petroleum Institute (API)
Barton Solvents Explosions and Fire
Open: 22%  |  Closed: 78%

Final Report Released On: June 26, 2008

2007-6-I-KS-5

Recommend to your membership companies that prepare MSDSs to update the MSDSs to: -Identify and include a warning for materials that are static accumulators and that may form ignitable vapor-air mixtures in storage tanks. -Include a statement that bonding and grounding may be insufficient to eliminate the hazard from static-accumulating flammable liquids, and provide examples of additional precautions and references to the relevant consensus guidance (e.g., NFPA 77, Recommended Practice on Static Electricity (2007), and API Recommended Practice 2003, Protection Against Ignitions Arising Out of Static, Lightning, and Stray Currents (2008)). -Include conductivity testing data for the materials that are static accumulators and that may form ignitable vapor-air mixtures in storage tanks.


Status: C-AA
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

BLSR Operating Ltd. Vapor Cloud Fire
Open: 0%  |  Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: September 17, 2003

2003-06-I-TX-16

Revise API RP-2219, Safe Operation of Vacuum Trucks in Petroleum Service, and API Order No. G00004, Guidelines for Commercial Exploration and Production Waste Management Facilities, to discuss the hazards of unloading potentially flammable or flammable liquids onto an open unloading area, such as a concrete pad. Recommend other alternatives for minimizing vapor generation, such as unloading of flammable liquids into a closed piping system.


Status: C-AA
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

2003-06-I-TX-17

Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to your membership. Emphasize that basic sediment and water (BS&W) removed from crude oil and condensate storage tanks requires special handling, in addition to compliance with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) or U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations, if it contains sufficient hydrocarbons (either residual or mixed in during the removal process) to be classified a flammable liquid as defined by each regulation.


Status: C-AA
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

BP America Refinery Explosion
Open: 38%  |  Closed: 62%

Final Report Released On: March 20, 2007

2005-4-I-TX-2

In light of the findings concerning the March 23rd incident at BP's Texas City refinery, revise your Recommended Practice 752, Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Buildings or issue a new Recommended Practice to ensure the safe placement of occupied trailers and similar temporary structures away from hazardous areas of process plants. Ensure that the new recommended practice: - Protects occupants from accident hazards such as heat, blast overpressure, and projectiles; - Establishes minimum safe distances for trailers and similar temporary structures away from hazardous areas of process plants; - Evaluates the siting of trailers under a separate methodology from permanent structures, since trailers are more susceptible to damage, are more readily relocated, and likely do not need to be placed near hazardous areas.


Status: C-AA
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

2005-4-I-TX-3

Issue a safety alert to your membership to take prompt action to ensure the safe placement of occupied trailers away from hazardous areas of process plants.


Status: C-AA
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

2005-4-I-TX-4

Revise API Recommended Practice 521, Guide for Pressure Relieving and Depressurizing Systems to ensure that the guidelines: - Identifies overfilling vessels as a potential hazard for evaluation in selecting and designing pressure relief and disposal systems; - Addresses the need to adequately size disposal drums for credible worse-case liquid relief scenarios, based on accurate relief valve and disposal collection piping studies; - Warns against the use of atmospheric blowdown drums and stacks attached to collection piping systems that receive flammable discharges from multiple relief valves and urges the use of appropriate inherently safer alternatives such as a flare system


Status: O-ARE/AR
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.
 

2005-4-I-TX-6

Work together to develop two new consensus American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards. a. In the first standard, create performance indicators for process safety in the refinery and petrochemical industries. Ensure that the standard identifies leading and lagging indicators for nationwide public reporting as well as indicators for use at individual facilities. Include methods for the development and use of the performance indicators. (CSB2005-04-I-TX-R6A) In the development of each standard, ensure that a. the committees are accredited and conform to ANSI principles of openness, balance, due process, and consensus; b. include representation of diverse sectors such as industry, labor, government, public interest and environmental organizations and experts from relevant scientific organizations and disciplines.


Status: O-ARAR
Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response (O - ARAR) - Response from recipient indicates a planned action that would satisfy the objective of the recommendation when implemented.
 

2005-4-I-TX-7

Work together to develop two new consensus American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards. b. In the second standard, develop fatigue prevention guidelines for the refining and petrochemical industries that, at a minimum, limit hours and days of work and address shift work. (CSB2005-04-I-TX-R7a) In the development of each standard, ensure that the committees a. are accredited and conform to ANSI principles of openness, balance, due process, and consensus; b. include representation of diverse sectors such as industry, labor, government, public interest and environmental organizations and experts from relevant scientific organizations and disciplines.


Status: O-ARE/AR
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.
 

Motiva Enterprises Sulfuric Acid Tank Explosion
Open: 21%  |  Closed: 79%

Final Report Released On: August 28, 2002

2001-05-I-DE-10

Work with NACE International (National Association of Corrosion Engineers) to develop API guidelines to inspect storage tanks containing fresh or spent H2SO4 at frequencies at least as often as those recommended in the latest edition of NACE Standard RP 0294-94, Design, Fabrication, and Inspection of Tanks for the Storage of Concentrated Sulfuric Acid and Oleum at Ambient Temperatures.


Status: O-ARAR
Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response (O - ARAR) - Response from recipient indicates a planned action that would satisfy the objective of the recommendation when implemented.
 

2001-05-I-DE-11

Revise API tank inspection standards to emphasize that storage tanks with wall or roof holes or thinning beyond minimum acceptable thickness that may contain a flammable vapor are an imminent hazard and require immediate repair or removal from service.


Status: C-AA
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

2001-05-I-DE-12

Ensure that API recommended practices address the inerting of flammable storage tanks, such as spent H2SO4 tanks. Include the following: - Circumstances when inerting is recommended. - Design of inerting systems, such as proper sizing of inerting equipment, appropriate inerting medium, and instrumentation, including alarms.


Status: O-ARAR
Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response (O - ARAR) - Response from recipient indicates a planned action that would satisfy the objective of the recommendation when implemented.
 

2001-05-I-DE-13

Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to your membership.


Status: C-AA
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

Oil Site Safety
Open: 100%  |  Closed: 0%

Final Report Released On: October 27, 2011

2011-H-1-5

Create a new standard or amend existing standards covering exploration and production facilities to:

a) Warn that storage tanks at unmanned facilities may be subject to tampering or introduction of ignition sources by members of the public, which could result in a tank explosion or other accidental release to the environment.

b) Recommend the use inherently safer storage tank design features to reduce the likelihood of explosions, including restrictions on the use of open vents for flammable hydrocarbons, flame arrestors, pressure vacuum vent valves, floating roofs, vapor recovery systems or an equivalent alternative.

c) Require security measures at least as protective as API 2610 to prevent non-employee access to flammable storage tanks at upstream E&P sites, including such measures as a full fence surrounding the tank(s) with a locked gate, hatch locks on tank manways, and barriers securely attached to tank external ladders or stairways.

d) Require that hazard signs or placards be displayed on or near tanks to identify the fire and explosion hazards using words and symbols recognizable by the general public.

e) Recommend that new or revised mineral leasing agreements include security and signage requirements as described above.


Status: O-ARE/AR
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.
 

Sonat Exploration Co. Catastrophic Vessel Overpressurization
Open: 0%  |  Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: September 21, 2000

1998-002-I-LA-4

Develop and issue recommended practice guidelines governing the safe start-up and operation of oil and gas production facilities. Ensure that the guidelines address, at a minimum, the following: project design review processes, including hazard analyses; written operating procedures; employee and contractor training; and pressure-relief requirements for all equipment exposed to pressure hazards.


Status: C-AA
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

1998-002-I-LA-5

Communicate the findings of this report to your membership.


Status: C-AA
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

Third Coast Industries Petroleum Products Facility Fire
Open: 15%  |  Closed: 85%

Final Report Released On: March 06, 2003

2009-03-I-TX-7

Communicate the findings of this report to your membership.


Status: C-AA
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

Tosco Avon Refinery Petroleum Naphtha Fire
Open: 0%  |  Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: March 21, 2001

1999-014-I-CA-5

Communicate the findings of this report to your membership.


Status: C-AA
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

Valero Refinery Asphyxiation Incident
Open: 25%  |  Closed: 75%

Final Report Released On: November 02, 2006

2006-2-I-DE-6

Revise Guidelines for Safe Work in Inert Confined Spaces in the Petroleum and Petrochemical Industries (API, 2005) to clearly address the following: - An oxygen-deficient atmosphere rapidly overcomes the victim. - There is no warning before being overcome. - An oxygen-deficient atmosphere might exist outside a confined space opening. - Rescuers must strictly follow safe rescue procedures.


Status: O-ARE/AR
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.
 

Valero Refinery Propane Fire
Open: 83%  |  Closed: 17%

Final Report Released On: July 09, 2008

2007-5-I-TX-1

Issue API-recommended practices for freeze protection in oil refinery process units that include, as a minimum: -the establishment of a written program; -periodic inspections to identify freeze hazards in dead-legs or infrequently used piping and equipment where water could collect; -specific approaches to eliminate or protect against such freeze hazards; and -identification of infrequently used piping or equipment subject to freezing as a trigger for Management Of Change (MOC) reviews.


Status: C-AA
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

PDF Document Download

2007-5-I-TX-2

Revise API 2218, Fireproofing Practices in Petroleum and Petrochemical Processing Plants, so that conformance with the standard addresses jet fire scenarios, and requires more protective fireproofing radii and other measures (e.g., emergency isolation valves, depressuring systems) for pipe rack support steel near process units containing highly pressurized flammables.


Status: O-ARAR
Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response (O - ARAR) - Response from recipient indicates a planned action that would satisfy the objective of the recommendation when implemented.
 

2007-5-I-TX-3

Revise API Recommended Practice 2001, Fire Protection in Refineries, and API 2030, Application of Fixed Water Spray Systems for Fire Protection in the Petroleum Industry, so that conformance with these recommended practices includes the design, installation, and use of ROSOVs and interlocked equipment controls to enable the safe and rapid emergency isolation of process equipment containing highly pressurized flammables.


Status: O-ARAR
Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response (O - ARAR) - Response from recipient indicates a planned action that would satisfy the objective of the recommendation when implemented.
 

2007-5-I-TX-4

Revise API Standard 2510, Design and Construction of LPG Installations, and API Publication 2510A, Fire-Protection Considerations for the Design and Operation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Storage Facilities, to address effective deluge system activation during emergencies originating in nearby process units.


Status: O-ARAR
Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response (O - ARAR) - Response from recipient indicates a planned action that would satisfy the objective of the recommendation when implemented.
 

 
 
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