Recommendations

Open: 22%  |  Closed: 78%

Final Report Released On: June 26, 2008

2007-6-I-KS-5

Recommend to your membership companies that prepare MSDSs to update the MSDSs to: -Identify and include a warning for materials that are static accumulators and that may form ignitable vapor-air mixtures in storage tanks. -Include a statement that bonding and grounding may be insufficient to eliminate the hazard from static-accumulating flammable liquids, and provide examples of additional precautions and references to the relevant consensus guidance (e.g., NFPA 77, Recommended Practice on Static Electricity (2007), and API Recommended Practice 2003, Protection Against Ignitions Arising Out of Static, Lightning, and Stray Currents (2008)). -Include conductivity testing data for the materials that are static accumulators and that may form ignitable vapor-air mixtures in storage tanks.

Status: C-AA

Open: 0%  |  Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: September 17, 2003

2003-06-I-TX-16

Revise API RP-2219, Safe Operation of Vacuum Trucks in Petroleum Service, and API Order No. G00004, Guidelines for Commercial Exploration and Production Waste Management Facilities, to discuss the hazards of unloading potentially flammable or flammable liquids onto an open unloading area, such as a concrete pad. Recommend other alternatives for minimizing vapor generation, such as unloading of flammable liquids into a closed piping system.

Status: C-AA

2003-06-I-TX-17

Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to your membership. Emphasize that basic sediment and water (BS&W) removed from crude oil and condensate storage tanks requires special handling, in addition to compliance with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) or U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations, if it contains sufficient hydrocarbons (either residual or mixed in during the removal process) to be classified a flammable liquid as defined by each regulation.

Status: C-AA

Open: 38%  |  Closed: 62%

Final Report Released On: March 20, 2007

2005-4-I-TX-2

In light of the findings concerning the March 23rd incident at BP's Texas City refinery, revise your Recommended Practice 752, Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Buildings or issue a new Recommended Practice to ensure the safe placement of occupied trailers and similar temporary structures away from hazardous areas of process plants. Ensure that the new recommended practice: - Protects occupants from accident hazards such as heat, blast overpressure, and projectiles; - Establishes minimum safe distances for trailers and similar temporary structures away from hazardous areas of process plants; - Evaluates the siting of trailers under a separate methodology from permanent structures, since trailers are more susceptible to damage, are more readily relocated, and likely do not need to be placed near hazardous areas.

Status: C-AA

2005-4-I-TX-3

Issue a safety alert to your membership to take prompt action to ensure the safe placement of occupied trailers away from hazardous areas of process plants.

Status: C-AA

2005-4-I-TX-4

Revise API Recommended Practice 521, Guide for Pressure Relieving and Depressurizing Systems to ensure that the guidelines: - Identifies overfilling vessels as a potential hazard for evaluation in selecting and designing pressure relief and disposal systems; - Addresses the need to adequately size disposal drums for credible worse-case liquid relief scenarios, based on accurate relief valve and disposal collection piping studies; - Warns against the use of atmospheric blowdown drums and stacks attached to collection piping systems that receive flammable discharges from multiple relief valves and urges the use of appropriate inherently safer alternatives such as a flare system

Status: O-ARE/AR

2005-4-I-TX-6

Work together to develop two new consensus American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards. a. In the first standard, create performance indicators for process safety in the refinery and petrochemical industries. Ensure that the standard identifies leading and lagging indicators for nationwide public reporting as well as indicators for use at individual facilities. Include methods for the development and use of the performance indicators. (CSB2005-04-I-TX-R6A) In the development of each standard, ensure that a. the committees are accredited and conform to ANSI principles of openness, balance, due process, and consensus; b. include representation of diverse sectors such as industry, labor, government, public interest and environmental organizations and experts from relevant scientific organizations and disciplines.

Status: O-ARAR

2005-4-I-TX-7

Work together to develop two new consensus American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards. b. In the second standard, develop fatigue prevention guidelines for the refining and petrochemical industries that, at a minimum, limit hours and days of work and address shift work. (CSB2005-04-I-TX-R7a) In the development of each standard, ensure that the committees a. are accredited and conform to ANSI principles of openness, balance, due process, and consensus; b. include representation of diverse sectors such as industry, labor, government, public interest and environmental organizations and experts from relevant scientific organizations and disciplines.

Status: O-ARE/AR

Open: 21%  |  Closed: 79%

Final Report Released On: August 28, 2002

2001-05-I-DE-10

Work with NACE International (National Association of Corrosion Engineers) to develop API guidelines to inspect storage tanks containing fresh or spent H2SO4 at frequencies at least as often as those recommended in the latest edition of NACE Standard RP 0294-94, Design, Fabrication, and Inspection of Tanks for the Storage of Concentrated Sulfuric Acid and Oleum at Ambient Temperatures.

Status: O-ARAR

2001-05-I-DE-11

Revise API tank inspection standards to emphasize that storage tanks with wall or roof holes or thinning beyond minimum acceptable thickness that may contain a flammable vapor are an imminent hazard and require immediate repair or removal from service.

Status: C-AA

2001-05-I-DE-12

Ensure that API recommended practices address the inerting of flammable storage tanks, such as spent H2SO4 tanks. Include the following: - Circumstances when inerting is recommended. - Design of inerting systems, such as proper sizing of inerting equipment, appropriate inerting medium, and instrumentation, including alarms.

Status: O-ARAR

2001-05-I-DE-13

Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to your membership.

Status: C-AA

Open: 100%  |  Closed: 0%

Final Report Released On: October 27, 2011

2011-H-1-5

Create a new standard or amend existing standards covering exploration and production facilities to:

a) Warn that storage tanks at unmanned facilities may be subject to tampering or introduction of ignition sources by members of the public, which could result in a tank explosion or other accidental release to the environment.

b) Recommend the use inherently safer storage tank design features to reduce the likelihood of explosions, including restrictions on the use of open vents for flammable hydrocarbons, flame arrestors, pressure vacuum vent valves, floating roofs, vapor recovery systems or an equivalent alternative.

c) Require security measures at least as protective as API 2610 to prevent non-employee access to flammable storage tanks at upstream E&P sites, including such measures as a full fence surrounding the tank(s) with a locked gate, hatch locks on tank manways, and barriers securely attached to tank external ladders or stairways.

d) Require that hazard signs or placards be displayed on or near tanks to identify the fire and explosion hazards using words and symbols recognizable by the general public.

e) Recommend that new or revised mineral leasing agreements include security and signage requirements as described above.

Status: O-ARE/AR

Open: 0%  |  Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: September 21, 2000

1998-002-I-LA-4

Develop and issue recommended practice guidelines governing the safe start-up and operation of oil and gas production facilities. Ensure that the guidelines address, at a minimum, the following: project design review processes, including hazard analyses; written operating procedures; employee and contractor training; and pressure-relief requirements for all equipment exposed to pressure hazards.

Status: C-AA

1998-002-I-LA-5

Communicate the findings of this report to your membership.

Status: C-AA

Open: 15%  |  Closed: 85%

Final Report Released On: March 06, 2003

2009-03-I-TX-7

Communicate the findings of this report to your membership.

Status: C-AA

Open: 0%  |  Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: March 21, 2001

1999-014-I-CA-5

Communicate the findings of this report to your membership.

Status: C-AA

Open: 25%  |  Closed: 75%

Final Report Released On: November 02, 2006

2006-2-I-DE-6

Revise Guidelines for Safe Work in Inert Confined Spaces in the Petroleum and Petrochemical Industries (API, 2005) to clearly address the following: - An oxygen-deficient atmosphere rapidly overcomes the victim. - There is no warning before being overcome. - An oxygen-deficient atmosphere might exist outside a confined space opening. - Rescuers must strictly follow safe rescue procedures.

Status: O-ARE/AR

Open: 83%  |  Closed: 17%

Final Report Released On: July 09, 2008

2007-5-I-TX-1

Issue API-recommended practices for freeze protection in oil refinery process units that include, as a minimum: -the establishment of a written program; -periodic inspections to identify freeze hazards in dead-legs or infrequently used piping and equipment where water could collect; -specific approaches to eliminate or protect against such freeze hazards; and -identification of infrequently used piping or equipment subject to freezing as a trigger for Management Of Change (MOC) reviews.

Status: C-AA
Download

2007-5-I-TX-2

Revise API 2218, Fireproofing Practices in Petroleum and Petrochemical Processing Plants, so that conformance with the standard addresses jet fire scenarios, and requires more protective fireproofing radii and other measures (e.g., emergency isolation valves, depressuring systems) for pipe rack support steel near process units containing highly pressurized flammables.

Status: O-ARAR

2007-5-I-TX-3

Revise API Recommended Practice 2001, Fire Protection in Refineries, and API 2030, Application of Fixed Water Spray Systems for Fire Protection in the Petroleum Industry, so that conformance with these recommended practices includes the design, installation, and use of ROSOVs and interlocked equipment controls to enable the safe and rapid emergency isolation of process equipment containing highly pressurized flammables.

Status: O-ARAR

2007-5-I-TX-4

Revise API Standard 2510, Design and Construction of LPG Installations, and API Publication 2510A, Fire-Protection Considerations for the Design and Operation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Storage Facilities, to address effective deluge system activation during emergencies originating in nearby process units.

Status: O-ARAR

Open: 55%  |  Closed: 45%

Final Report Released On: August 25, 2010

2008-01-I-CO-17

Publish safety guidance addressing the hazards and controls for using hazardous materials including flammables in confined spaces and the unique hazards of penstocks. At a minimum

a. In controlling hazards in confined spaces, implement a hierarchy of controls by first attempting to eliminate hazards or substitute with a less hazardous material(s) or method(s). Examples include performing work outside of a confined space where reasonably practicable or substituting a flammable material with a non-flammable one.

b. Establish a maximum permissible percentage substantially below the LEL for safe entry and occupancy of permit-required confined spaces.

c. Recommend that confined spaces that are large, or part of a continuous system such as a penstock, always be managed as permit-required as defined in the OSHA Confined Space Standard, and that such spaces always be monitored for hazardous atmospheres both prior to entry and continuously in areas where work is being performed.

d. Ensure that evacuation plans for penstocks that have only one egress point provide for alternative escape routes or refuge chambers.

e. Provide guidance for implementing a written confined space rescue plan. Address staging and methods of rescue for each designated permit space including whether a rescue team is required to stand by outside the space. Require that confined space rescue teams be standing by at the permit spaces where the hazards pose an immediate threat to life or health, including the hazard of a potential flammable atmosphere.

Status: O-ARAR

Open: 13%  |  Closed: 87%

Final Report Released On: August 08, 2005

2003-13-I-LA-28

Communicate the findings and recommendations from the July 20 incident to your membership. Emphasize the need to evaluate test methods for appropriateness in the given equipment.

Status: C-AA

Open: 13%  |  Closed: 87%

Final Report Released On: August 08, 2005

2003-13-I-LA-22

Develop guidance on the effective design and maintenance of HVAC systems and other necessary control room components designed to protect employees and equipment in the event of a release of hazardous materials.

Status: O-ARE/AR

Open: 33%  |  Closed: 67%

Final Report Released On: June 28, 2010

2010-07-I-CT-3

Make appropriate changes to the 2012 version of Power Piping, ASME B31.1, to require the use of inherently safer fuel gas piping cleaning methodologies rather than natural gas blows. At a minimum, for the cleaning or flushing methods discussed in B31.1 paragraph 122.10, require the use of inherently safer alternatives such as air blows and pigging with air as the motive force in lieu of flammable gas.

Status: O-ARE/AR
Download

Open: 42%  |  Closed: 58%

Final Report Released On: September 17, 2002

2001-01-H-23

Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to your membership.

Status: C-AA

Open: 25%  |  Closed: 75%

Final Report Released On: November 02, 2006

2006-2-I-DE-7

Revise Safety Requirements for Confined Spaces, ANSI/ASSE Z117.1 to emphasize that: - An oxygen-deficient atmosphere rapidly overcomes the victim. - There is no warning before being overcome. - An oxygen-deficient atmosphere might exist outside a confined space opening. - Rescuers must strictly follow safe rescue procedures.

Status: O-ARE/AR

Open: 0%  |  Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: December 06, 2001

2001-02-I-IN-10

Communicate findings of this report to your membership.

Status: C-AA

Open: 17%  |  Closed: 83%

Final Report Released On: September 25, 2008

2007-4-I-WV-6

Develop a guide card for propane emergencies to assist 911 operators in the collection of pertinent information on propane emergencies. The questionnaire in Section 1.9.1 in the Propane Education and Research Council's Certified Employee Training Program may be used as a model.

Status: C-AA

Open: 0%  |  Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: September 30, 2003

2009-02-I-NY-11

Communicate the findings of this report to your membership.

Status: C-AA

Open: 13%  |  Closed: 87%

Final Report Released On: August 08, 2005

2009-13-I-LA-23

Evaluate and update as necessary community notification procedures to include timely notification of residents in the event of a chemical release. Conduct periodic refresher training with staff on the requirements in the procedures.

Status: C-AA

Open: 31%  |  Closed: 69%

Final Report Released On: January 20, 2011

2008-08-I-WV-2

Review and revise, as necessary, all Bayer production unit standard operating procedures to ensure they address all operating modes (startup, normal operation, temporary operations, emergency shutdown, emergency operations, normal shutdown, and startup following a turnaround or emergency shutdown), are accurate, and approved.

Status: C-AA

2008-08-I-WV-3

Ensure that all facility fire brigade members are trained in the National Incident Management System, consistent with municipal and state emergency response agencies.

Status: C-AA

2008-08-I-WV-4

Evaluate the fenceline air monitor program against federal, state, and local regulations, and Bayer corporate policies, and upgrade and install air monitoring devices as necessary to ensure effective monitoring of potential releases of high-hazard chemicals at the perimeter of the facility.

Status: C-AA

2008-08-I-WV-5

Commission an independent human factors and ergonomics study of all Institute site PSM/RMP covered process control rooms to evaluate the human-control system interface, operator fatigue, and control system familiarity and training. Develop and implement a plan to resolve all recommendations identified in the study that includes assigned responsibilities, required corrective actions, and completion dates.

Status: C-AA

Open: 31%  |  Closed: 69%

Final Report Released On: January 20, 2011

2008-08-I-WV-1

Revise the corporate PHA policies and procedures to require:
a. Validation of all PHA assumptions to ensure that risk analysis of each PHA scenario specifically examines the risk(s) of intentional bypassing or other nullifications of safeguards,
b. Addressing all phases of operation and special topics including those cited in chapter 9 of "Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures" (CCPS, 2008), and
c. Training all PHA facilitators on the revised policies and procedures prior to assigning the facilitator to a PHA team.
Ensure all PHAs are updated to conform to the revised procedures.

Status: O-ARAR

Open: 0%  |  Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: December 06, 2001

2001-02-I-IN-7

Conduct periodic audits of work authorization, line and equipment opening, deadleg management programs, and decommissioning and demolition activities at your steelmaking facilities. Share findings with the workforce.

Status: C-UA/NRR

2001-02-I-IN-8

Revise the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for COG condensate to highlight the potential flammability hazard. Ensure that management at your steelmaking facilities trains employees and informs contractors with regard to the potential presence of flammable liquids when working with or opening COG condensate piping and equipment.

Status: C-AA

2001-02-I-IN-9

Communicate findings of this report to the workforce and contractors at Bethlehem Steel's steelmaking facilities.

Status: C-R/S

Open: 0%  |  Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: December 06, 2001

2001-02-I-IN-1

Implement a work authorization program that requires higher levels of management review, approval, and oversight for jobs that present higher levels of risk, such as opening lines potentially containing flammable liquids where there is no low point drain.

Status: C-AA

2001-02-I-IN-2

Monitor the accumulation and flammability of COG condensate throughout the mill. Address potentially hazardous changes in condensate accumulation rates and flammability.

Status: C-AA

2001-02-I-IN-3

Survey the mill for deadlegs and implement a program for resolving the hazards. Develop guidance for plant personnel on the risks of deadlegs and their prevention. Include deadlegs in plant winterization planning.

Status: C-UA/NRR

2001-02-I-IN-4

Provide drains at low points in piping to allow for the safe draining of potentially flammable material.

Status: C-UA/NRR

2001-02-I-IN-5

Ensure that Burns Harbor and contractor employees are trained with regard to the potential presence of flammable liquids when working with or opening COG or condensate piping and equipment.

Status: C-AA

2001-02-I-IN-6

Establish procedures to ensure that insulation is replaced when removed for maintenance.

Status: C-AA

Open: 0%  |  Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: September 17, 2003

2003-06-I-TX-8

Develop a written Waste Acceptance Plan as recommended by API Order No. G00004, Guidelines for Commercial Exploration and Production Waste Management Facilities. Require the shipper or carrier to properly classify the flammability hazard of exploration and production (E&P) waste liquids. Require the hauler to provide information that identifies the flammability hazard of the material before accepting the load, such as a material safety data sheet (MSDS).

Status: C-AA

2003-06-I-TX-9

Develop and implement written procedures and provide training to employees on the safe handling of all waste liquids delivered to the facility in accordance with API Order No. G00004, Guidelines for Commercial Exploration and Production Waste Management Facilities; and API RP-2219, Safe Operation of Vacuum Trucks in Petroleum Service. Include requirements for proper grounding of trucks and eliminating other sources of ignition (e.g., facility electrical equipment and smoking in unloading areas). Ensure that the material is presented in languages or formats that are clearly understood by all affected personnel.

Status: C-AA

2003-06-I-TX-10

Develop written procedures and provide training to employees on unloading all flammable or potentially flammable E&P waste liquids. Avoid unloading flammable liquids onto an open work area, such as the mud disposal and washout pad. Include alternative unloading method(s), such as using a closed piping system to minimize vapor generation. Ensure that the material is presented in languages or formats that are clearly understood by all affected personnel.

Status: C-AA

2003-06-I-TX-11

Develop written emergency procedures and provide training to employees on response to abnormal or emergency situations, including uncontrolled flammable vapor releases that can result in a fire or explosion hazard. Ensure that the material is presented in languages or formats that are clearly understood by all affected personnel.

Status: C-AA

Open: 100%  |  Closed: 0%

Date of Accident: August 06, 2012

2012-03-I-CA-6

Revise the Industrial Safety Ordinance (ISO) to require that Process Hazard Analyses include documentation of the recognized methodologies, rationale and conclusions used to claim that safeguards intended to control hazards will be effective. This process shall use established qualitative, quantitative, and/or semi-quantitative methods such as Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA).

Status: O-ARE/AR

2012-03-I-CA-7

Revise the Industrial Safety Ordinance (ISO) to require the documented use of inherently safer systems analysis and the hierarchy of controls to the greatest extent feasible in establishing safeguards for identified process hazards. The goal shall be to drive the risk of major accidents to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). Include requirements for inherently safer systems analysis to be automatically triggered for all Management of Change and Process Hazard Analysis reviews, prior to the construction of new processes, process unit rebuilds, significant process repairs, and in the development of corrective actions from incident investigation recommendations.

Status: O-ARE/AR

2012-03-I-CA-8

Monitor and confirm the effective implementation of the damage mechanism hazard review program (2012-03-I-CA-R1 and 2012-03-I-CA-R2), so that all necessary mechanical integrity work at the Chevron Richmond Refinery is identified and recommendations are completed in a timely way.

Status: O-ARE/AR

2012-03-I-CA-16

Participate in the joint regulatory program described in recommendation 2012-03-I-CA-R11. This participation shall include contributing relevant data to the repository of investigation and inspection data created by the California Department of Industrial Relations and jointly coordinating activities.

Status: O-ARE/AR