Recommendations

Open: 33% | Closed: 67%

Final Report Released On: January 28, 2015

2012-03-I-CA-26

Revise API RP 939-C: Guidelines for Avoiding Sulfidation (Sulfidic) Corrosion Failures in Oil Refineries to establish minimum requirements for preventing catastrophic rupture of low-silicon carbon steel piping.  At a minimum: 

a.       Require users to identify carbon steel piping circuits susceptible to sulfidation corrosion that may contain low-silicon components.  These circuits have the potential to contain carbon steel components that were not manufactured to the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) A106 specification and may contain less than 0.10 weight percent silicon content. 

b.      For piping circuits identified to meet the specifications detailed in 2012-03-I-CA-R26(a), require users to either (1) enact a program to inspect every component within the piping circuit once, known as 100 percent component inspection (per the requirements established pursuant to recommendation 2012-03-I-CA-R28(c)), or (2) replace the identified at-risk carbon steel piping with a steel alloy that is more resistant to sulfidation corrosion. 

c.       If low-silicon components or components with accelerated corrosion are identified in a carbon steel piping circuit meeting the specifications detailed in 2012-03-I-CA-R26(a), require designation of these components as permanent Condition Monitoring Locations (CMLs) until the piping components are replaced.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action
Recommendation Status Change

2012-03-I-CA-27

Revise API RP 571: Damage Mechanisms Affecting Fixed Equipment in the Refining Industry to:

a.       Describe the potential for increased rates of sulfidation corrosion occurring in low-silicon carbon steel in Section 4.4.2.3 Critical Factors; 

b.      Specify that sulfidation corrosion rates in carbon steel piping can be significantly faster in a few, individual piping components in section 4.4.2.5 Appearance or Morphology of Damage; and

c.       Refer the reader to the 100 percent component inspection or pipe replacement requirements detailed in API RP 939-C: Guidelines for Avoiding Sulfidation (Sulfidic) Corrosion Failures in Oil Refineries (pursuant to recommendation 2012-03-I-CA-R26)  and API 570: Piping Inspection Code:  In-service Inspection, Rating, Repair, and Alteration of Piping Systems (pursuant to 2012-03-I-CA-R28(c)) for carbon steel piping circuits susceptible to sulfidation corrosion that may contain low-silicon components.  

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recommendation Status Change Summary

2012-03-I-CA-28

Revise API 570: Piping Inspection Code:  In-service Inspection, Rating, Repair, and Alteration of Piping Systems to:   

 

a.       Use terminology consistent with API RP 939-C: Guidelines for Avoiding Sulfidation (Sulfidic) Corrosion Failures in Oil Refineries and other API standards and recommended practices discussed in this report.  Replace the terminology “high-temperature sulfur corrosion” with “sulfidation corrosion”;

b.      Specify that sulfidation corrosion rates in carbon steel piping can be significantly faster in some individual piping components than in others;

c.       Establish a new section that details inspection requirements to identify low-silicon piping components in carbon steel circuits susceptible to sulfidation corrosion.  This section shall require users to identify carbon steel piping circuits at risk to contain low-silicon components by following the requirements detailed in API RP 939-C: Guidelines for Avoiding Sulfidation (Sulfidic) Corrosion Failures in Oil Refineries (pursuant to 2012-03-I-CA-R26(a)) and API RP 578: Material Verification Program for New and Existing Alloy Piping Systems (pursuant to 2012-03-I-CA-R29).  At a minimum, require users to either:

                                                              i.      Inspect every component within all carbon steel piping circuits susceptible to sulfidation corrosion that may contain low-silicon components once.  The purpose of this practice is to identify any low-silicon components that are corroding at accelerated rates.  Inspection may be performed through ultrasonic thickness measurements to establish corrosion rates for each component, destructive laboratory analysis, or other methods.  Following the inspection, require users to follow the low-silicon corrosion rate monitoring requirements established in 2012-03-I-CA-R26(c); or    

                                                            ii.      Replace the identified at-risk carbon steel piping with a steel alloy that is more resistant to sulfidation corrosion.

 

d.      Incorporate as a “normative reference” API RP 939-C: Guidelines for Avoiding Sulfidation (Sulfidic) Corrosion Failures in Oil Refineries; and

e.       Require users to follow the minimum leak response guidance establishedinAPI RP 2001: Fire Protection in Refineries, developed in response to recommendation 2012-03-I-CA-R31.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Download

2012-03-I-CA-29

Revise API RP 578: Material Verification Program for New and Existing Alloy Piping Systems, to require users to establish and implement a program to identify carbon steel piping circuits that are susceptible to sulfidation corrosionand may contain low-silicon components.  These circuits have the potential to contain carbon steel components that were not manufactured to the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) A106 specification and may contain less than 0.10 weight percent silicon content.  Refer the reader to the 100 percent component inspection or pipe replacement requirements detailed in API RP 939-C: Guidelines for Avoiding Sulfidation (Sulfidic) Corrosion Failures in Oil Refineries (pursuant to recommendation 2012-03-I-CA-26(b))  and API 570: Piping Inspection Code:  In-service Inspection, Rating, Repair, and Alteration of Piping Systems (pursuant to 2012-03-I-CA-28(c)) for carbon steel piping circuits susceptible to sulfidation corrosion that may contain low-silicon components.

Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response

2012-03-I-CA-30

Revise API RP 574: Inspection Practices for Piping System Components (3rd edition) to: 

a.       Incorporate as a normative reference API RP 939-C: Guidelines for Avoiding Sulfidation (Sulfidic) Corrosion Failures in Oil Refineries;

b.      Reference API RP 939-C: Guidelines for Avoiding Sulfidation (Sulfidic) Corrosion Failures in Oil Refineries when discussing that nonsilicon-killed carbon steel is susceptible to sulfidation corrosion; and

c.       In Section 9.3 Investigation of Leaks, require users to follow the leak response protocol requirements established in API RP 2001: Fire Protection in Refineries (pursuant to 2012-03-I-CA-R31).

Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action
Recommendations Status Change Summary

2012-03-I-CA-31

Revise API RP 2001: Fire Protection in Refineries to require users to develop a process fluid leak response protocol specific to their own facility that must be followed when a process fluid leak is discovered.  Recommend users to incorporate the following actions into their leak response protocol: 

a.       Establish an Incident Command structure upon identification of a process fluid leak;

b.      Conduct a pre-response meeting with personnel with specific technical expertise (e.g., inspectors, operators, metallurgists, engineers, and management) and the Incident Commander to determine pressure, temperature, remaining inventory of process fluids, potential damage mechanisms that caused the leak, and worst-case leak scenario;

c.       Establish a hot zone that identifies the area of risk of exposure or injuries due to flame contact, radiant heat, or contact to hazardous materials, taking into consideration the worst-case leak scenario;

d.      Limit site access around leak location to essential personnel only;

e.       Isolate the leaking piping or vessel, or if isolation is not possible, shutdown of the unit when the leaking process fluid poses immediate danger to safety, health, or the environment—such as piping fluid that is toxic or near the autoignition temperature.

Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response

Open: 100% | Closed: 0%

Final Report Released On: January 28, 2015

2012-03-I-CA-32

Revise ASME PCC-2-2011: Repair of Pressure Equipment and Piping to require users to follow the minimum process fluid leak response requirements established in API RP 2001: Fire Protection in Refineries, developed in response to recommendation 2012-03-I-CA-R31, before conducting process fluid leak repair.

Status: Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response
Recommendation Status Change Summary

Open: 0% | Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: January 28, 2015

2012-03-I-CA-6

Revise the Industrial Safety Ordinance (ISO) to require that Process Hazard Analyses include documentation of the recognized methodologies, rationale and conclusions used to claim that safeguards intended to control hazards will be effective. This process shall use established qualitative, quantitative, and/or semi-quantitative methods such as Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA).

Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action
Recommendations Status Change Summary

2012-03-I-CA-7

Revise the Industrial Safety Ordinance (ISO) to require the documented use of inherently safer systems analysis and the hierarchy of controls to the greatest extent feasible in establishing safeguards for identified process hazards. The goal shall be to drive the risk of major accidents to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). Include requirements for inherently safer systems analysis to be automatically triggered for all Management of Change and Process Hazard Analysis reviews, prior to the construction of new processes, process unit rebuilds, significant process repairs, and in the development of corrective actions from incident investigation recommendations.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action
Recommendations Status Change Summary

2012-03-I-CA-8

Monitor and confirm the effective implementation of the damage mechanism hazard review program (2012-03-I-CA-R1 and 2012-03-I-CA-R2), so that all necessary mechanical integrity work at the Chevron Richmond Refinery is identified and recommendations are completed in a timely way.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recommendation Status Change Summary

2012-03-I-CA-16

Participate in the joint regulatory program described in recommendation 2012-03-I-CA-R11. This participation shall include contributing relevant data to the repository of investigation and inspection data created by the California Department of Industrial Relations and jointly coordinating activities.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Status Change Summary

2012-03-I-CA-25

Implement a compensation system to ensure the regulator has the ability to attract and retain a sufficient number of employees with the necessary skills and experience to ensure regulator technical competency at all levels of process safety regulatory oversight and policy development in Contra Cost County, California. A market analysis and benchmarking review should be periodically conducted to ensure the compensation system remains competitive with California petroleum refineries.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recommendations Status Change Summary

2012-03-I-CA-36

Revise the Industrial Safety Ordinance (ISO) regulations for petroleum refineries to require a process safety culture continuous improvement program including a written procedure for periodic process safety culture surveys across the work force. Require an oversight committee comprised of the regulator, the company, the company’s workforce and their representatives, and community representatives. This oversight committee shall:

a. Select an expert third party that will administer a periodic process safety culture survey;

b. Review and comment on the third party expert report developed from the survey;

c. Oversee the development and effective implementation of action items to effectively address identified process safety culture issues; and

d. Develop process safety culture indicators to measure major accident prevention performance.

The periodic process safety culture report shall be made available to the plant workforce.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action
Recommendation Status Change Summary

Open: 0% | Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: January 28, 2015

2012-03-I-CA-18

Participate in the joint regulatory program described in recommendation 2012-03-I-CA-R11. This participation shall include contributing relevant data to the repository of investigation and inspection data created by the California Department of Industrial Relations and jointly coordinating activities.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Status Change Summary

Open: 0% | Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: January 28, 2015

2012-03-I-CA-20

Participate in the joint regulatory program described in recommendation 2012-03-I-CA-R11. This participation shall include contributing relevant data to the repository of investigation and inspection data created by the California Department of Industrial Relations and jointly coordinating activities.

Status: Closed - Exceeds Recommended Action
Status Change Summary

Open: 0% | Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: January 28, 2015

2012-03-I-CA-1 URGENT!

At all Chevron U.S. refineries, engage a diverse team of qualified personnel to perform a documented damage mechanism hazard review. This review shall be an integral part of the Process Hazard Analysis cycle and shall be conducted on all PSM-covered process piping circuits and process equipment. The damage mechanism hazard review shall identify potential process damage mechanisms and consequences of failure, and shall ensure safeguards are in place to control hazards presented by those damage mechanisms. Analyze and incorporate into this review applicable industry best practices, Chevron Energy Technology Company findings and recommendations, and inherently safer systems to the greatest extent feasible.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recommendations Status Change Summary

2012-03-I-CA-2 URGENT!

At all California Chevron U.S. refineries, report leading and lagging process safety indicators, such as the action item completion status of recommendations from damage mechanism hazard reviews, to the federal, state, and local regulatory agencies that have chemical release prevention authority.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action
Recommendation Status Change

2012-03-I-CA-33

Develop a method to assign accountability at Chevron to determine whether any whether any new Energy Technology Company (ETC) recommended program or industry best practice, such as API guidance must be followed to ensure process safety or employee personal safety.  This method shall include monitoring of these practices and guidance at a refining system level and at the refinery level.  Develop a tracking system to monitor the progress of implementing these selected practices and guidance to completion.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recommendations Status Change Summary

2012-03-I-CA-34

Develop an auditable process to be available for all recommended turnaround work items necessary to address mechanical integrity deficiencies or inspection recommendations that are denied or deferred.  This process shall provide the submitter of the denied or deferred recommendation with the option to seek further review by his or her manager, who can further elevate and discuss the recommendation with higher level management, such as the Area Business Unit Manager.  Maintain an auditable log of each of these potential turnaround work items, including the ultimate determination of approval, deferral, or rejection, justification determination, and the person or team responsible for that decision.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recommendations Status Change Summary

2012-03-I-CA-35

Develop an approval process that includes a technical review that must be implemented prior to resetting the minimum alert thickness to a lower value in the inspection database.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recommendations Status Change Summary

Open: 0% | Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: January 28, 2015

2012-03-I-CA-15

Jointly plan and conduct inspections with Cal/OSHA, California EPA and other state and local regulatory agencies with chemical accident prevention responsibilities to monitor the effective implementation of the damage mechanism hazard review and disclosure requirements under 2012-03-I-CA-R9 and R10 above.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action
Recommendation Status Change Summary

2012-03-I-CA-19

Participate in the joint regulatory program described in recommendation 2012-03-I-CA-R11. This participation shall include contributing relevant data to the repository of investigation and inspection data created by the California Department of Industrial Relations and jointly coordinating activities.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Status Change Summary

Open: 11% | Closed: 89%

Final Report Released On: January 28, 2015

2012-03-I-CA-9

Revise the California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Section 5189, Process Safety Management of Acutely Hazardous Materials, to require improvements to mechanical integrity and process hazard analysis programs for all California oil refineries. These improvements shall include engaging a diverse team of qualified personnel to perform a documented damage mechanism hazard review. This review shall be an integral part of the Process Hazard Analysis cycle and shall be conducted on all PSM-covered process piping circuits and process equipment. The damage mechanism hazard review shall identify potential process damage mechanisms and consequences of failure, and shall ensure safeguards are in place to control hazards presented by those damage mechanisms. Require the analysis and incorporation of applicable industry best practices and inherently safety systems to the greatest extent feasible into this review.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recommendations Status Change Summary

2012-03-I-CA-10

For all California oil refineries, identify and require the reporting of leading and lagging process safety indicators, such as the action item completion status of recommendations from damage mechanism hazard reviews, to state and local regulatory agencies that have chemical release prevention authority. These indicators shall be used to ensure that requirements described in 2012-03-I-CA-R9 are effective at improving mechanical integrity and process hazard analysis performance at all California oil refineries and preventing major chemical incidents.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action
Recommendations Status Change Summary

2012-03-I-CA-11

Establish a multi-agency process safety regulatory program for all California oil refineries to improve the public accountability, transparency, and performance of chemical accident prevention and mechanical integrity programs. This program shall:

1. Establish a system to report to the regulator the recognized methodologies, findings, conclusions and corrective actions related to refinery mechanical integrity inspection and repair work arising from Process Hazard Analyses, California oil refinery turnarounds and maintenance-related shutdowns;
2. Require reporting of information such as damage mechanism hazard reviews, notice of upcoming maintenance-related shutdowns, records related to proposed and completed mechanical integrity work lists, and the technical rationale for any delay in work proposed but not yet completed;
3. Establish procedures for greater workforce and public participation including the public reporting of information; and
4. Provide mechanisms for federal, state and local agency operational coordination, sharing of data (including safety indicator data), and joint accident prevention activities. The California Department of Industrial Relations will be designated as the lead state agency for establishing a repository of joint investigative and inspection data, coordinating the sharing of data and joint accident prevention activities.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action
Recommendations Status Change Summary

2012-03-I-CA-12

Require that Process Hazard Analyses required under California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Section 5189 Section (e) include documentation of the recognized methodologies, rationale and conclusions used to claim that safeguards intended to control hazards will be effective. This process shall use established qualitative, quantitative, and/or semi-quantitative methods such as Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA).

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recommendations Status Change Summary

2012-03-I-CA-13

Require the documented use of inherently safer systems analysis and the hierarchy of controls to the greatest extent feasible in establishing safeguards for identified process hazards. The goal shall be to drive the risk of major accidents to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). Include requirements for inherently safer systems analysis to be automatically triggered for all Management of Change and Process Hazard Analysis reviews, prior to the construction of new process, process unit rebuilds, significant process repairs and in the development of corrective actions from incident investigation recommendations.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action
Recommendations Status Change Summary

2012-03-I-CA-14

Monitor and confirm the effective implementation of the damage mechanism hazard review program (2012-03-I-CA-R9 and 2012-03-I-CA-R10), so that all necessary mechanical integrity work at all California Chevron Refineries is identified and recommendations are completed in a timely way.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action
Recommendations Status Change Summary

2012-03-I-CA-21

Based on the findings in this report, enhance and restructure California’s process safety management (PSM) regulations for petroleum refineries by including the following goal-setting attributes:

a. Require a comprehensive process hazard analysis (PHA) written by the company that includes:

i. Systematic analysis and documentation of all major hazards and safeguards, using the hierarchy of controls to identify hazards and significantly reduce risks to a goal of as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) or similar;

ii. Documentation of the recognized methodologies, rationale and conclusions used to claim that inherently safer systems have been implemented to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) or similar, and that additional safeguards intended to control remaining hazards will be effective;

iii. Documented damage mechanism hazard review conducted by a diverse team of qualified personnel. This review shall be an integral part of the process hazard analysis (PHA) cycle and shall be conducted on all covered processes, piping circuits and equipment. The damage mechanism hazard review shall identify potentia process damage mechanisms and consequences of failure, and shall ensure effective safeguards are in place to prevent or control hazards presented by those damage mechanisms. Require the analysis and incorporation of applicable industry best practices and inherently safer design to the greatest extent feasible into this review; and

iv. Documented use of inherently safer systems analysis and the hierarchy of controls to the greatest extent feasible in establishing safeguards for identified process hazards. The goal shall be to drive the risk of major accidents to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) or similar. Include requirements for inherently safer systems analysis to be automatically triggered for all management of change (MOC) and process hazard analysis (PHA) reviews, as well as prior to the construction of new processes, process unit rebuilds, significant process repairs, and in the development of corrective actions from incident investigation recommendations.

b. Require a thorough review of the comprehensive process hazard an alysis by technically competent regulatory personnel;

c. Require preventative audits and preventative inspections by the regulator to ensure the effective implementation of the comprehensive process hazard analysis (PHA);

d. Require that all safety codes, standards, employer internal procedures and recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP) used in the implementation of the regulations contain adequate minimum requirements;

e. Require mechanisms for the regulator, the refinery, and workers and their representatives to play an equal and essential role in the direction of preventing major incidents. Require an expanded role for workers in management of process safety by establishing the rights and responsibilities of workers and their representatives on health and safety-related matters, and the election of safety representatives and establishment of safety committees (with equal representation between management and labor) to serve health and safety-related functions. The elected representatives should have a legally recognized role that goes beyond consultation in activities such as the development of the comprehensive process hazard analysis, implementation of corrective actions generated from hierarchy of control analyses, management of change, incident investigation, audits, and the identification, prevention, and control of all processhazards. The regulation should provide workers and their representatives with the authority to stop work that is perceived to be unsafe until the employer resolves the matter or the regulator intervenes.  Workforce participation practices should be documented by the refinery to the regulator;

f. Require reporting of information to the public to the greatest extent feasible, such as a summary of the comprehensive process hazard analysis (PHA) which should include a list of inherently safer systems implemented; safeguards implemented for remaining hazards; standards utilized to reduce risks to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) or similar; and process safety indicators that demonstrate the effectiveness of the safeguards and management systems;

g. Implement an approach or system that determines when new or improved industry standards and practices are needed and initiate programs and other activities, such as an advisory committee or forum, toprompt the timely development and implementation of such standards and practices; and

h. Ensure that a means of sustained funding is established to support an independent, well-funded, well-staffed, technically competent regulator.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action
Recommendation Status Change Summary

2012-03-I-CA-22

Implement a compensation system to ensure the regulator has the ability to attract and retain a sufficient number of employees with the necessary skills and experience to ensure regulator technical competency at all levels of process safety regulatory oversight and policy development in California. A market analysis and benchmarking review should be periodically conducted to ensure the compensation system remains competitive with California petroleum refineries.

 

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recommendation Status Change Summary

2012-03-I-CA-23

Work with the regulator, the petroleum refining industry, labor, and other relevant stakeholders in the state of California to develop and implement a systemthat collects, tracks, and analyzes process safety leading and lagging indicators from refineries and contractors to promote continuous safety improvements. At a minimum, this program shall:

a. Require the use of leading and lagging process safety indicators to actively monitor the effectiveness of process safety management systems and safeguards for major accident prevention. Include leading and lagging indicators that are measureable, actionable, and standardized. Require that the reported data be used for continuous process safety improvement and accident prevention;

b. Analyze data to identify trends and poor performers and publish annual reports with the data at facility and corporate levels;

c. Require companies to publicly report required indicators annually at facility and corporate levels;

d. Use process safety indicators (1) to drive continuous improvement for major accident prevention by using the data to identify industry and facility safety trends and deficiencies and (2) to determine appropriate allocation of regulator resources and inspections; and

e. Be periodically updated to incorporate new learning from world-wide industry improvements in order to drive continuous major accident safety improvements in California.

Status: Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response
Recommendation Status Change Summary

Open: 0% | Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: January 28, 2015

2012-03-I-CA-3

Revise the Industrial Safety Ordinance (ISO) to require that Process Hazard Analyses include documentation of the recognized methodologies, rationale and conclusions used to claim that safeguards intended to control hazards will be effective. This process shall use established qualitative, quantitative, and/or semi-quantitative methods such as Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA).

Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action
Recommendations Status Change Summary

2012-03-I-CA-4

Revise the Industrial Safety Ordinance (ISO) to require the documented use of inherently safer systems analysis and the hierarchy of controls to the greatest extent feasible in establishing safeguards for identified process hazards. The goal shall be to drive the risk of major accidents to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). Include requirements for inherently safer systems analysis to be automatically triggered for all Management of Change and Process Hazard Analysis reviews, prior to the construction of new processes, process unit rebuilds, significant process repairs, and in the development of corrective actions from incident investigation recommendations.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action
Recommendations Status Change Summary

2012-03-I-CA-5

Ensure the effective implementation of the damage mechanism hazard review program (2012-03-I-CA-R1 and 2012-03-I-CA-R2), so that all necessary mechanical integrity work at the Chevron Richmond Refinery is identified and recommendations are completed in a timely way

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recommendations Status Change Summary

2012-03-I-CA-17

Participate in the joint regulatory program described in recommendation 2012-03-I-CA-R11. This participation shall include contributing relevant data to the repository of investigation and inspection data created by the California Department of Industrial Relations and jointly coordinating activities.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Status Change Summary

2012-03-I-CA-24

Implement or cause to be implemented a compensation system to ensure the regulator has the ability to attract and retain a sufficient number of employees with the necessary skills and experience to ensure regulator technical competency at all levels of process safety regulatory oversight and policy development in Richmond, California. A market analysis and benchmarking review should be periodically conducted to ensure the compensation system remains competitive with California petroleum refineries.

 

Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recommendation Status Change Summary

2012-03-I-CA-37

Revise the Richmond Industrial Safety Ordinance (RISO) regulations for petroleum refineries to require a process safety culture continuous improvement program including a written procedure for periodic process safety culture surveys across the work force. Require an oversight committee comprised of the regulator, the company, the company’s workforce and their representatives, and community representatives. This oversight committee shall:

a. Select an expert third party that will administer a periodic process safety culture survey;

b. Review and comment on the third party expert report developed from the survey;

c. Oversee the development and effective implementation of action items to effectively address identified process safety culture issues; and

d. Develop process safety culture indicators to measure major accident prevention performance.

The periodic process safety culture report shall be made available to the plant workforce.

Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action
Recommendation Status Change Summary