The CSB issues safety recommendations to prevent the recurrence or reduce the likelihood or consequences of similar incidents or hazards in the future. Recommendations are issued to a variety of parties, including government entities, safety organizations, trade unions, trade associations, corporations, emergency response organizations, educational institutions, and public interest groups. Recommendations are published in CSB reports and are closed only by vote of the Board. The CSB tracks all recommendations and communicates regularly with recommendations recipients to ensure that the recommended corrective actions are implemented. For more information, see Frequently Asked Questions about CSB recommendations.
2011-01-I-NY-1
Develop and enforce corporate-directed policies and procedures which will require all DuPont facilities to audit their hot work permitting systems prior to initiating hot work to ensure that: All potential explosion hazards associated with hot work activities are identified and mitigated All relevant forms required for permits are completed in accordance with corporate policies and industry standards (including NFPA 326 and NFPA 51B) Appropriate DuPont personnel officially approve hot work permits, by signature or equivalent, consistent with DuPont policies Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Develop and enforce corporate-directed policies and procedures which will require all DuPont facilities to audit their hot work permitting systems prior to initiating hot work to ensure that:
2011-01-I-NY-2
Revise corporate policies and procedures to require that all process piping, or similar connections to tanks or vessels be positively isolated, (using closed valves, blind flanges or pancake blanks) and the equipment appropriately vented before authorizing any hot work. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Revise corporate policies and procedures to require that all process piping, or similar connections to tanks or vessels be positively isolated, (using closed valves, blind flanges or pancake blanks) and the equipment appropriately vented before authorizing any hot work.
2011-01-I-NY-3
Revise corporate policies and procedures to require that the atmosphere inside the container be monitored for flammable vapor prior to performing any welding, cutting, or grinding on the container surface. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Revise corporate policies and procedures to require that the atmosphere inside the container be monitored for flammable vapor prior to performing any welding, cutting, or grinding on the container surface.
2011-01-I-NY-4
Revise corporate policies and procedures to require air monitoring for flammable vapor inside the container for the duration of the hot work consistent with industry standards (NFPA 326, NFPA 51B). Create a policy for determining criteria for requiring continuous or periodic testing for the duration of hot work. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Revise corporate policies and procedures to require air monitoring for flammable vapor inside the container for the duration of the hot work consistent with industry standards (NFPA 326, NFPA 51B). Create a policy for determining criteria for requiring continuous or periodic testing for the duration of hot work.
2005-06-I-LA-1
Expand the scope of DOT regulatory coverage to include chlorine railcar unloading operations. Ensure the regulations specifically require remotely operated emergency isolation devices that will quickly isolate a leak in any of the flexible hoses (or piping components) used to unload a chlorine railcar. The shutdown system must be capable of stopping a chlorine release from both the railcar and the facility chlorine receiving equipment. Require the emergency isolation system be periodically maintained and operationally tested to ensure it will function in the event of an unloading system chlorine leak. Status: Closed - No Longer Applicable
Expand the scope of DOT regulatory coverage to include chlorine railcar unloading operations. Ensure the regulations specifically require remotely operated emergency isolation devices that will quickly isolate a leak in any of the flexible hoses (or piping components) used to unload a chlorine railcar. The shutdown system must be capable of stopping a chlorine release from both the railcar and the facility chlorine receiving equipment. Require the emergency isolation system be periodically maintained and operationally tested to ensure it will function in the event of an unloading system chlorine leak.
2016-02-I-MS-1
Develop a new informational product or incorporate into the next revision of Brazed Aluminum Plate-Fin Heat Exchangers for General Refinery Services 1st ed.; ANSI/API Standard 668 (formerly Standard 662, Part 2), guidance focused on the safe operation, maintenance, and repair of brazed aluminum heat exchangers (BAHX) to advance understanding of thermal fatigue hazards and how to mitigate them. At a minimum the informational product/incorporated material must include: a. Information on the potential for both minor leaks and catastrophic failure as a result of accumulated thermal fatigue (beyond a single cyclic thermal shock event); b. Clarification on the optimal placement of BAHX temperature and pressure sensors to effectively monitor the operating conditions for the potential impact of accumulated thermal fatigue on BAHX, including temperature rates of change; and c. Clarification on the need to safely vent layers that have been blocked off as part of the repair process for interpass leaks in all BAHX configurations, as well as information describing the consequences when safe venting does not occur. d. Should applicable data from CSB Recommendation No. 2016-02-I-MS-R4 (R4) be available prior to finalizing the requirements of this recommendation, then the data from R4 will be considered for inclusion and/or incorporation by reference in the product required by this recommendation. If the decision is made not to include/incorporate by reference the data from R4, then a detailed explanation for the exclusion will be provided. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Develop a new informational product or incorporate into the next revision of Brazed Aluminum Plate-Fin Heat Exchangers for General Refinery Services 1st ed.; ANSI/API Standard 668 (formerly Standard 662, Part 2), guidance focused on the safe operation, maintenance, and repair of brazed aluminum heat exchangers (BAHX) to advance understanding of thermal fatigue hazards and how to mitigate them. At a minimum the informational product/incorporated material must include:
a. Information on the potential for both minor leaks and catastrophic failure as a result of accumulated thermal fatigue (beyond a single cyclic thermal shock event);
b. Clarification on the optimal placement of BAHX temperature and pressure sensors to effectively monitor the operating conditions for the potential impact of accumulated thermal fatigue on BAHX, including temperature rates of change; and
c. Clarification on the need to safely vent layers that have been blocked off as part of the repair process for interpass leaks in all BAHX configurations, as well as information describing the consequences when safe venting does not occur.
d. Should applicable data from CSB Recommendation No. 2016-02-I-MS-R4 (R4) be available prior to finalizing the requirements of this recommendation, then the data from R4 will be considered for inclusion and/or incorporation by reference in the product required by this recommendation. If the decision is made not to include/incorporate by reference the data from R4, then a detailed explanation for the exclusion will be provided.
2016-02-I-MS-2
Revise GPA Technical Bulletin: Brazed Aluminum Heat Exchangers, or develop a new bulletin, to incorporate the significant lessons learned from this incident, including but not limited to: a. information on the potential of both minor leaks and catastrophic failure as a result of thermal fatigue; b. clarification on the optimal placement of BAHX temperature and pressure sensors to better monitor operating conditions, including temperature rates of change; and c. clarification on the need to safely vent layers that have been blocked off after interpass leak repairs, in all BAHX configurations. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Revise GPA Technical Bulletin: Brazed Aluminum Heat Exchangers, or develop a new bulletin, to incorporate the significant lessons learned from this incident, including but not limited to:
a. information on the potential of both minor leaks and catastrophic failure as a result of thermal fatigue;
b. clarification on the optimal placement of BAHX temperature and pressure sensors to better monitor operating conditions, including temperature rates of change; and
c. clarification on the need to safely vent layers that have been blocked off after interpass leak repairs, in all BAHX configurations.
2016-02-I-MS-3
Develop a database for operators to submit BAHX operational data for collaborative industry learning and analysis. Encourage your members to submit pressure and temperature data associated with the entire service life of brazed aluminum heat exchangers as well as the date(s) of leak(s) or failure(s) for each exchanger on which data is being submitted. At a minimum this system should: a. provide a way to anonymously input data into the database; b. specify the time interval between measurements such that data can be normalized across different exchangers; and c. capture the type of service in which the exchanger was operating. Status: Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded
Develop a database for operators to submit BAHX operational data for collaborative industry learning and analysis. Encourage your members to submit pressure and temperature data associated with the entire service life of brazed aluminum heat exchangers as well as the date(s) of leak(s) or failure(s) for each exchanger on which data is being submitted. At a minimum this system should:
a. provide a way to anonymously input data into the database;
b. specify the time interval between measurements such that data can be normalized across different exchangers; and
c. capture the type of service in which the exchanger was operating.
2016-02-I-MS-4
Using available operational process data of BAHXs in midstream gas plant operation collected in fulfillment of 2016-02-I-MS-R3, continue data analysis efforts to determine what, if any, correlation exists between operational process data and the frequency or timing of thermal fatigue-generated cracking to more accurately predict the service life of a BAHX. Should predictors be identified, develop and offer to your members industry tools, techniques, or criteria for estimating when thermal fatigue warrants preemptive replacement of a BAHX (e.g., risk assessment tools or damage rate calculations). Status: Closed - No Longer Applicable
Using available operational process data of BAHXs in midstream gas plant operation collected in fulfillment of 2016-02-I-MS-R3, continue data analysis efforts to determine what, if any, correlation exists between operational process data and the frequency or timing of thermal fatigue-generated cracking to more accurately predict the service life of a BAHX.
Should predictors be identified, develop and offer to your members industry tools, techniques, or criteria for estimating when thermal fatigue warrants preemptive replacement of a BAHX (e.g., risk assessment tools or damage rate calculations).
2016-02-I-MS-5
Work with members (industry, emergency response, community) to explicitly define the communication methods for community notification and incident updates (e.g., social media, local news outlets, passive phone system), and the expectations for their use, so that members of the public can efficiently and effectively obtain current safety information. Publish these defined community notification methods and expectations for use on the most appropriate mediums available, such as the Jackson County Emergency Management website, the Jackson County LEPC website, and the social media outlets Jackson County utilizes to disseminate safety information to the community. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Work with members (industry, emergency response, community) to explicitly define the communication methods for community notification and incident updates (e.g., social media, local news outlets, passive phone system), and the expectations for their use, so that members of the public can efficiently and effectively obtain current safety information. Publish these defined community notification methods and expectations for use on the most appropriate mediums available, such as the Jackson County Emergency Management website, the Jackson County LEPC website, and the social media outlets Jackson County utilizes to disseminate safety information to the community.
2007-1-I-NC-1
Ensure that the emergency response planning required for permitted hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities (40 CFR 264.37) includes providing written information to state and local emergency response officials on the type, approximate quantities, and locations of materials within the facility (similar to reporting requirements of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act). Additionally, ensure that permit holders periodically update this information throughout the ten-year permit period. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Ensure that the emergency response planning required for permitted hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities (40 CFR 264.37) includes providing written information to state and local emergency response officials on the type, approximate quantities, and locations of materials within the facility (similar to reporting requirements of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act). Additionally, ensure that permit holders periodically update this information throughout the ten-year permit period.
2007-1-I-NC-2
Petition the National Fire Protection Association, following the guidelines of their "Codes and Standards Development Process" (http://www.nfpa.org/index.asp), to develop a fire protection standard (occupancy standard) specific to hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. This standard should address fire prevention, detection, control, and suppression requirements. Note: This recommendation was superseded by 2009-10-I-OH-R6, issued pursuant to the Veolia Environmental Services Flammable Vapor Explosion and Fire Case Study (2010). Status: Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded
Petition the National Fire Protection Association, following the guidelines of their "Codes and Standards Development Process" (http://www.nfpa.org/index.asp), to develop a fire protection standard (occupancy standard) specific to hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. This standard should address fire prevention, detection, control, and suppression requirements.
Note: This recommendation was superseded by 2009-10-I-OH-R6, issued pursuant to the Veolia Environmental Services Flammable Vapor Explosion and Fire Case Study (2010).
2007-1-I-NC-3
Develop standardized guidance for the handling and storage of hazardous waste to reduce the likelihood of releases and fires at hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. Note: This recommendation was superseded by 2009-10-I-OH-R7, issued pursuant to the Veolia Environmental Services Flammable Vapor Explosion and Fire Case Study (2010). Status: Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded
Develop standardized guidance for the handling and storage of hazardous waste to reduce the likelihood of releases and fires at hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities.
Note: This recommendation was superseded by 2009-10-I-OH-R7, issued pursuant to the Veolia Environmental Services Flammable Vapor Explosion and Fire Case Study (2010).
2007-1-I-NC-1 URGENT!
Revise and or develop company procedures and policies to require and ensure that unspent chemical oxygen generators that have exceeded their service life be actuated so that the chemical core is expended before shipping by any transport mode. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Revise and or develop company procedures and policies to require and ensure that unspent chemical oxygen generators that have exceeded their service life be actuated so that the chemical core is expended before shipping by any transport mode.
2007-1-I-NC-2 URGENT!
Review and revise as necessary company procedures and policies for transporting hazardous waste to ensure that hazardous waste is correctly characterized on the shipping manifest. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Review and revise as necessary company procedures and policies for transporting hazardous waste to ensure that hazardous waste is correctly characterized on the shipping manifest.
2007-1-I-NC-3 URGENT!
Communicate to all of your waste brokers and treatment, storage, and disposal facilities to which unspent oxygen generators were shipped: - the hazards associated with unspent chemical oxygen generators and - that the incorrect shipping name and UN code was, or might have been used, for unspent chemical oxygen generators shipped from your facility. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Communicate to all of your waste brokers and treatment, storage, and disposal facilities to which unspent oxygen generators were shipped: - the hazards associated with unspent chemical oxygen generators and - that the incorrect shipping name and UN code was, or might have been used, for unspent chemical oxygen generators shipped from your facility.
2015-02-I-CA-10
Facilitate forum(s)—attended by fluid catalytic cracking unit engineers and other relevant personnel from American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers member companies—to discuss the causal factors of the February 18, 2015 ExxonMobil Torrance refinery incident. Encourage participants to share topics such as design, maintenance, and procedural practices that can prevent a similar incident. Topics of discussion should include: (1) Detection of hydrocarbons flowing to an ESP; (2) Isolation strategies to prevent mixing of air and hydrocarbons during standby operations; (3) Safe operation during unit standby; (4) Use of SCSVs as a safeguard during standby operations; (5) Use of reactor steam as a safeguard during standby operations; (6) Measuring reactor / main column differential pressure during standby operations; (7) ESP explosion safeguards; and (8) Preventing ESP explosions. Create documentation that creates institutional knowledge of the information discussed in the forum(s), and share with the member companies and forum attendees. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Facilitate forum(s)—attended by fluid catalytic cracking unit engineers and other relevant personnel from American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers member companies—to discuss the causal factors of the February 18, 2015 ExxonMobil Torrance refinery incident. Encourage participants to share topics such as design, maintenance, and procedural practices that can prevent a similar incident. Topics of discussion should include: (1) Detection of hydrocarbons flowing to an ESP; (2) Isolation strategies to prevent mixing of air and hydrocarbons during standby operations; (3) Safe operation during unit standby; (4) Use of SCSVs as a safeguard during standby operations; (5) Use of reactor steam as a safeguard during standby operations; (6) Measuring reactor / main column differential pressure during standby operations; (7) ESP explosion safeguards; and (8) Preventing ESP explosions. Create documentation that creates institutional knowledge of the information discussed in the forum(s), and share with the member companies and forum attendees.
2015-02-I-CA-1
A Variance to a safety policy or procedure requires robust analysis of the proposed safeguards prior to its approval and implementation. To ensure the proposed methodology described in the Variance is safe and the proposed safeguards are sufficiently robust, revise corporate and U.S. refinery standard(s) to require that a multidisciplinary team reviews the Variance before it is routed to management for their approval. Include knowledgeable personnel on the Variance multidisciplinary team such as: (1) the developer of the Variance; (2) a technical process representative (e.g. process engineer for the applicable unit); (3) an hourly operations representative (e.g. experienced operator in the applicable unit); and (4) a health and safety representative. The role of the multidisciplinary team is to formally meet to review, discuss, and analyze the proposed Variance, and adjust the safety measures as needed to ensure a safe operation. In the event the expert team members do not come to a consensus that the Variance measures can result in a safe operation, require the proposed work to be routed to a higher management level for final approval. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
A Variance to a safety policy or procedure requires robust analysis of the proposed safeguards prior to its approval and implementation. To ensure the proposed methodology described in the Variance is safe and the proposed safeguards are sufficiently robust, revise corporate and U.S. refinery standard(s) to require that a multidisciplinary team reviews the Variance before it is routed to management for their approval. Include knowledgeable personnel on the Variance multidisciplinary team such as: (1) the developer of the Variance; (2) a technical process representative (e.g. process engineer for the applicable unit); (3) an hourly operations representative (e.g. experienced operator in the applicable unit); and (4) a health and safety representative. The role of the multidisciplinary team is to formally meet to review, discuss, and analyze the proposed Variance, and adjust the safety measures as needed to ensure a safe operation. In the event the expert team members do not come to a consensus that the Variance measures can result in a safe operation, require the proposed work to be routed to a higher management level for final approval.
2015-02-I-CA-2
ExxonMobil did not have an operating procedure for operating the FCC unit in its Safe Park mode of operation. At all ExxonMobil U.S. refineries, develop a program to ensure operating procedures are written and available for each mode of operation—such as unit standby—for all ExxonMobil U.S. refinery FCC units. Specify in the program that ExxonMobil U.S. refineries develop and train operators on any new procedure. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
ExxonMobil did not have an operating procedure for operating the FCC unit in its Safe Park mode of operation. At all ExxonMobil U.S. refineries, develop a program to ensure operating procedures are written and available for each mode of operation—such as unit standby—for all ExxonMobil U.S. refinery FCC units. Specify in the program that ExxonMobil U.S. refineries develop and train operators on any new procedure.
2015-02-I-CA-3
The spent catalyst slide valve, specified as a safety-critical device for normal operation, could not perform its safety-critical function of preventing air and hydrocarbons from mixing while the FCC unit was in its “Safe Park” mode of operation. Also, ExxonMobil Torrance did not operate the FCC unit as if the reactor steam was a safety critical safeguard. Require identification of all safety critical equipment and consequence of failure for each mode of operation and ensure safety critical devices can successfully function when needed. Develop and implement a policy that requires all U.S. ExxonMobil refineries to: (1) specify each safety-critical device’s safety function; (2) identify the consequences of failure of each safety-critical device; (3) specify the testing strategy used to verify whether the safety-critical device can function as intended to perform its required safety function; and (4) maintain target availability (e.g. safe operating life) for each safety-critical device through inspection and maintenance. Require that items (1) through (4) above consider each mode of operation, including but not limited to normal operation, start up, shut down, and “Safe Park” modes of operation. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
The spent catalyst slide valve, specified as a safety-critical device for normal operation, could not perform its safety-critical function of preventing air and hydrocarbons from mixing while the FCC unit was in its “Safe Park” mode of operation. Also, ExxonMobil Torrance did not operate the FCC unit as if the reactor steam was a safety critical safeguard. Require identification of all safety critical equipment and consequence of failure for each mode of operation and ensure safety critical devices can successfully function when needed. Develop and implement a policy that requires all U.S. ExxonMobil refineries to: (1) specify each safety-critical device’s safety function; (2) identify the consequences of failure of each safety-critical device; (3) specify the testing strategy used to verify whether the safety-critical device can function as intended to perform its required safety function; and (4) maintain target availability (e.g. safe operating life) for each safety-critical device through inspection and maintenance. Require that items (1) through (4) above consider each mode of operation, including but not limited to normal operation, start up, shut down, and “Safe Park” modes of operation.
2015-02-I-CA-4
ExxonMobil extended the maintenance interval of the spent catalyst slide valve and the inspection interval of the pumparound heat exchanger without analyzing whether the extended operation lowered their availability (by operating them beyond their predicted safe operating life) and could result in negative safety consequences. In the event safety-critical equipment is operated beyond its inspection and/or maintenance interval (e.g. extended turnaround interval), require all ExxonMobil U.S. refineries to perform a risk evaluation (e.g. MOC or risk assessment) to identify the safety consequences of the extended operation. Require that each mode of operation, including but not limited to normal operation, start up, shut down, and “Safe Park” modes of operation is evaluated during the risk evaluation. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
ExxonMobil extended the maintenance interval of the spent catalyst slide valve and the inspection interval of the pumparound heat exchanger without analyzing whether the extended operation lowered their availability (by operating them beyond their predicted safe operating life) and could result in negative safety consequences. In the event safety-critical equipment is operated beyond its inspection and/or maintenance interval (e.g. extended turnaround interval), require all ExxonMobil U.S. refineries to perform a risk evaluation (e.g. MOC or risk assessment) to identify the safety consequences of the extended operation. Require that each mode of operation, including but not limited to normal operation, start up, shut down, and “Safe Park” modes of operation is evaluated during the risk evaluation.
2015-02-I-CA-5
Electrostatic precipitators create potential ignition sources during normal operation, and have historically caused explosions within the refining industry. At all U.S. ExxonMobil refineries, require a siting risk analysis be performed of all electrostatic precipitators and implement appropriate safeguards to minimize the consequences of an electrostatic precipitator explosion. Status: Closed - No Longer Applicable
Electrostatic precipitators create potential ignition sources during normal operation, and have historically caused explosions within the refining industry. At all U.S. ExxonMobil refineries, require a siting risk analysis be performed of all electrostatic precipitators and implement appropriate safeguards to minimize the consequences of an electrostatic precipitator explosion.
2015-02-I-CA-6
Implement protective systems that prevent ignition of flammable gases (including hydrocarbons not in the presence of CO) inside of the electrostatic precipitator, for each mode of operation. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Implement protective systems that prevent ignition of flammable gases (including hydrocarbons not in the presence of CO) inside of the electrostatic precipitator, for each mode of operation.
2015-02-I-CA-7
The spent catalyst slide valve, specified as a safety-critical device for normal operation, could not perform its safety-critical function of preventing air and hydrocarbons from mixing while the FCC unit was in its “Safe Park” mode of operation. Require identification of all safety critical equipment and consequence of failure for each mode of operation and ensure safety-critical devices can successfully function when needed. Develop and implement a policy that requires the Torrance refinery to: (1) specify each safety-critical device’s safety function; (2) identify the consequences of failure of each safety-critical device; (3) specify the testing strategy used to verify whether the safety-critical device can function as intended to perform its required safety function; and (4) maintain target availability (e.g. safe operating life) for each safety-critical device through inspection and maintenance. Require that items (1) through (4) above consider each mode of operation, including but not limited to normal operation, start up, shut down, and “Safe Park” modes of operation. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
The spent catalyst slide valve, specified as a safety-critical device for normal operation, could not perform its safety-critical function of preventing air and hydrocarbons from mixing while the FCC unit was in its “Safe Park” mode of operation. Require identification of all safety critical equipment and consequence of failure for each mode of operation and ensure safety-critical devices can successfully function when needed. Develop and implement a policy that requires the Torrance refinery to: (1) specify each safety-critical device’s safety function; (2) identify the consequences of failure of each safety-critical device; (3) specify the testing strategy used to verify whether the safety-critical device can function as intended to perform its required safety function; and (4) maintain target availability (e.g. safe operating life) for each safety-critical device through inspection and maintenance. Require that items (1) through (4) above consider each mode of operation, including but not limited to normal operation, start up, shut down, and “Safe Park” modes of operation.
2015-02-I-CA-8
The Torrance refinery extended the maintenance interval of the spent catalyst slide valve and the inspection interval of the pumparound heat exchanger without analyzing whether the extended operation lowered their availability (by operating them beyond their predicted safe operating life) and could result in negative safety consequences. In the event safety critical equipment is operated beyond its inspection and/or maintenance interval (e.g. extended turnaround interval), require the Torrance refinery to perform a risk evaluation (e.g. MOC or risk assessment) to identify the safety consequences of the extended operation. Require that each mode of operation, including but not limited to normal operation, start up, shut down, and “Safe Park” modes of operation is evaluated during the risk evaluation. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
The Torrance refinery extended the maintenance interval of the spent catalyst slide valve and the inspection interval of the pumparound heat exchanger without analyzing whether the extended operation lowered their availability (by operating them beyond their predicted safe operating life) and could result in negative safety consequences. In the event safety critical equipment is operated beyond its inspection and/or maintenance interval (e.g. extended turnaround interval), require the Torrance refinery to perform a risk evaluation (e.g. MOC or risk assessment) to identify the safety consequences of the extended operation. Require that each mode of operation, including but not limited to normal operation, start up, shut down, and “Safe Park” modes of operation is evaluated during the risk evaluation.
2015-02-I-CA-9
Electrostatic precipitators create potential ignition sources during normal operation, and have historically caused explosions within the refining industry. At the Torrance refinery, require a siting risk analysis be performed of the FCC unit electrostatic precipitator and implement appropriate safeguards to minimize the consequences of an electrostatic precipitator explosion. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Electrostatic precipitators create potential ignition sources during normal operation, and have historically caused explosions within the refining industry. At the Torrance refinery, require a siting risk analysis be performed of the FCC unit electrostatic precipitator and implement appropriate safeguards to minimize the consequences of an electrostatic precipitator explosion.