The CSB issues safety recommendations to prevent the recurrence or reduce the likelihood or consequences of similar incidents or hazards in the future. Recommendations are issued to a variety of parties, including government entities, safety organizations, trade unions, trade associations, corporations, emergency response organizations, educational institutions, and public interest groups. Recommendations are published in CSB reports and are closed only by vote of the Board. The CSB tracks all recommendations and communicates regularly with recommendations recipients to ensure that the recommended corrective actions are implemented. For more information, see Frequently Asked Questions about CSB recommendations.
2014-01-I-WV-1
Communicate the findings, lessons learned and recommendations contained within this report to all American Water Works Association members. Emphasize the importance of source water protection planning, emergency planning, and coordination with local, state and federal entities, and the public, to ensure timely notification of potential water contamination events and emergencies. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Communicate the findings, lessons learned and recommendations contained within this report to all American Water Works Association members. Emphasize the importance of source water protection planning, emergency planning, and coordination with local, state and federal entities, and the public, to ensure timely notification of potential water contamination events and emergencies.
2014-01-I-WV-2
Establish requirements for all American Water state utilities’ surface water treatment plants to undertake the following activities: 1. Conduct an inventory of all hazardous chemicals or classes of hazardous chemicals that are considered a potential source of significant contamination stored in the utility’s most vulnerable source water protection area (e.g., Zone of Critical Concern). Chemicals may be identified by accessing publicly available information, which may include Tier II reporting forms submitted to local emergency planning committees and electronically available information from federal, state or local databases. 2. For each inventoried chemical or class of chemicals, conduct a prioritized assessment to determine if existing analytical methods are available to detect the presence and/or concentration of the chemical or class of chemicals in the event of a release to the water supply and if the chemical or class of chemicals is capable of being treated or removed by the utility’s water treatment process. 3. For all chemicals or classes of chemicals that are not capable of being treated or removed by the treatment process, develop a contingency plan to respond to contamination events (e.g., as modeled by WVAW’s Kanawha Valley Water System June 2016 Source Water Protection Plan). Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Establish requirements for all American Water state utilities’ surface water treatment plants to undertake the following activities:
1. Conduct an inventory of all hazardous chemicals or classes of hazardous chemicals that are considered a potential source of significant contamination stored in the utility’s most vulnerable source water protection area (e.g., Zone of Critical Concern). Chemicals may be identified by accessing publicly available information, which may include Tier II reporting forms submitted to local emergency planning committees and electronically available information from federal, state or local databases.
2. For each inventoried chemical or class of chemicals, conduct a prioritized assessment to determine if existing analytical methods are available to detect the presence and/or concentration of the chemical or class of chemicals in the event of a release to the water supply and if the chemical or class of chemicals is capable of being treated or removed by the utility’s water treatment process.
3. For all chemicals or classes of chemicals that are not capable of being treated or removed by the treatment process, develop a contingency plan to respond to contamination events (e.g., as modeled by WVAW’s Kanawha Valley Water System June 2016 Source Water Protection Plan).
2014-01-I-WV-3
Update appropriate sections of the Crude MCHM Safety Data Sheet to include toxicological and ecological information based on the June 1, 2016, National Toxicology Program’s toxicity evaluation of Crude MCHM. Include information about the effects of Crude MCHM on fetal and early life growth and development. Distribute the revised Crude MCHM SDS to all customers that previously received and are currently using or storing MCHM from Eastman, and ensure all new MCHM customers receive the revised SDS with shipment. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Update appropriate sections of the Crude MCHM Safety Data Sheet to include toxicological and ecological information based on the June 1, 2016, National Toxicology Program’s toxicity evaluation of Crude MCHM. Include information about the effects of Crude MCHM on fetal and early life growth and development. Distribute the revised Crude MCHM SDS to all customers that previously received and are currently using or storing MCHM from Eastman, and ensure all new MCHM customers receive the revised SDS with shipment.
2002-01-I-AL-10
Evaluate and amend as necessary the ATSDR Medical Management Guidelines to consider the risk to responders posed by exposure to victims of high levels of hydrogen sulfide (H2S) gas. Specify procedures for adequate decontamination. Communicate the results of this activity to relevant organizations, such as the American Association of Occupational Health Nurses. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Evaluate and amend as necessary the ATSDR Medical Management Guidelines to consider the risk to responders posed by exposure to victims of high levels of hydrogen sulfide (H2S) gas. Specify procedures for adequate decontamination. Communicate the results of this activity to relevant organizations, such as the American Association of Occupational Health Nurses.
2002-01-I-AL-13
Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to your membership. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to your membership.
2002-01-I-AL-11
Train your employees on the specific hazards of hydrogen sulfide (H2S), including appropriate emergency response practices, in areas where Georgia-Pacific has identified this material as a hazard. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Train your employees on the specific hazards of hydrogen sulfide (H2S), including appropriate emergency response practices, in areas where Georgia-Pacific has identified this material as a hazard.
2002-01-I-AL-2
Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to those employees who haul or handle sodium hydrosulfide Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to those employees who haul or handle sodium hydrosulfide
2002-01-I-AL-1
Conduct periodic safety audits of Georgia-Pacific pulp and paper mills in light of the findings of this report. At a minimum, ensure that management systems are in place at the mills to: Evaluate process sewers where chemicals may collect and interact, and identify potential hazardous reaction scenarios to determine if safeguards are in place to decrease the likelihood or consequences of such interactions. Take into account sewer system connections and the ability to prevent inadvertent mixing of materials that could react to create a hazardous condition. Status: Closed - Exceeds Recommended Action
Conduct periodic safety audits of Georgia-Pacific pulp and paper mills in light of the findings of this report. At a minimum, ensure that management systems are in place at the mills to: Evaluate process sewers where chemicals may collect and interact, and identify potential hazardous reaction scenarios to determine if safeguards are in place to decrease the likelihood or consequences of such interactions. Take into account sewer system connections and the ability to prevent inadvertent mixing of materials that could react to create a hazardous condition.
Conduct periodic safety audits of Georgia-Pacific pulp and paper mills in light of the findings of this report. At a minimum, ensure that management systems are in place at the mills to: Identify areas of the mill where hydrogen sulfide (H2S) could be present or generated, and institute safeguards (including warning devices) to limit personnel exposure. Require that personnel working in the area are trained to recognize the presence of H2S and respond appropriately. Update emergency response plans for such areas to include procedures for decontaminating personnel exposed to toxic gas. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Conduct periodic safety audits of Georgia-Pacific pulp and paper mills in light of the findings of this report. At a minimum, ensure that management systems are in place at the mills to: Identify areas of the mill where hydrogen sulfide (H2S) could be present or generated, and institute safeguards (including warning devices) to limit personnel exposure. Require that personnel working in the area are trained to recognize the presence of H2S and respond appropriately. Update emergency response plans for such areas to include procedures for decontaminating personnel exposed to toxic gas.
2002-01-I-AL-3
Conduct periodic safety audits of Georgia-Pacific pulp and paper mills in light of the findings of this report. At a minimum, ensure that management systems are in place at the mills to: Apply good engineering and process safety principles to process sewer systems. For instance, ensure that hazard reviews and management of change (MOC) analyses are completed when additions or changes are made where chemicals could collect and react in process sewers. (Such principles may be found in publications from the Center for Chemical Process Safety [CCPS].) Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Conduct periodic safety audits of Georgia-Pacific pulp and paper mills in light of the findings of this report. At a minimum, ensure that management systems are in place at the mills to: Apply good engineering and process safety principles to process sewer systems. For instance, ensure that hazard reviews and management of change (MOC) analyses are completed when additions or changes are made where chemicals could collect and react in process sewers. (Such principles may be found in publications from the Center for Chemical Process Safety [CCPS].)
2002-01-I-AL-4
Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to the workforce and contractors at all Georgia-Pacific pulp and paper mills. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to the workforce and contractors at all Georgia-Pacific pulp and paper mills.
2002-01-I-AL-5
Evaluate mill process sewer systems where chemicals may collect and react to identify potential hazardous reaction scenarios to determine if safeguards are in place to decrease the likelihood or consequences of such interactions. Evaluate sewer connections and ensure that materials that could react to create a hazardous condition are not inadvertently mixed, and that adequate mitigation measures are in place if such mixing does occur. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Evaluate mill process sewer systems where chemicals may collect and react to identify potential hazardous reaction scenarios to determine if safeguards are in place to decrease the likelihood or consequences of such interactions. Evaluate sewer connections and ensure that materials that could react to create a hazardous condition are not inadvertently mixed, and that adequate mitigation measures are in place if such mixing does occur.
2002-01-I-AL-6
Establish programs to comply with recommendations from manufacturers of sodium hydrosulfide (NaSH) regarding its handling, such as preventing it from entering sewers because of the potential for acidic conditions. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Establish programs to comply with recommendations from manufacturers of sodium hydrosulfide (NaSH) regarding its handling, such as preventing it from entering sewers because of the potential for acidic conditions.
2002-01-I-AL-7
Establish programs to require the proper design and maintenance of manway seals on closed sewers where hazardous materials are present. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Establish programs to require the proper design and maintenance of manway seals on closed sewers where hazardous materials are present.
2002-01-I-AL-8
Identify areas of the plant where hydrogen sulfide (H2S) could be present or generated, and institute safeguards (including warning devices) to limit personnel exposure. Institute a plan and procedures for dealing with potential H2S releases in these areas, and require that anyone who may be present is adequately trained on appropriate emergency response practices, including attempting rescue. Require contractors working in these areas to train their employees on the specific hazards of H2S, including appropriate emergency response practices. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Identify areas of the plant where hydrogen sulfide (H2S) could be present or generated, and institute safeguards (including warning devices) to limit personnel exposure. Institute a plan and procedures for dealing with potential H2S releases in these areas, and require that anyone who may be present is adequately trained on appropriate emergency response practices, including attempting rescue. Require contractors working in these areas to train their employees on the specific hazards of H2S, including appropriate emergency response practices.
2009-01-I-AL-9
Update the Naheola mill emergency response plan to include procedures for decontaminating personnel who are brought to the first-aid station. Include specific instructions for decontaminating personnel exposed to H2S so that they do not pose a secondary exposure threat to medical personnel. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Update the Naheola mill emergency response plan to include procedures for decontaminating personnel who are brought to the first-aid station. Include specific instructions for decontaminating personnel exposed to H2S so that they do not pose a secondary exposure threat to medical personnel.
2002-01-I-AL-14
2009-01-I-AL-15
2009-01-I-AL-16
Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to your membership. Status: Closed - No Longer Applicable
2024-06-I-KY-12
Alert association members who manufacture corn syrup of the November 12, 2024, Givaudan incident and its causes, including but not limited to the sugar ingredient decomposition reaction that led to Reactor 6’s rupture. Request that they update their corn syrup safety data sheets to include: the decomposition temperature, the consequences of exceeding that temperature, and the decomposition products produced (for example, carbon dioxide). Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Alert association members who manufacture corn syrup of the November 12, 2024, Givaudan incident and its causes, including but not limited to the sugar ingredient decomposition reaction that led to Reactor 6’s rupture. Request that they update their corn syrup safety data sheets to include: the decomposition temperature, the consequences of exceeding that temperature, and the decomposition products produced (for example, carbon dioxide).
2024-06-I-KY-8
Create and fill a corporate senior leadership position responsible for overseeing process safety at all Givaudan caramel coloring facilities or identify a current senior leader who is competent in process safety management concepts to fill this role. Establish this senior leader’s job duties to oversee the process safety management system implementation at all Givaudan caramel coloring facilities. Assign this individual to develop corporate-level process safety management system policies to ensure consistent development and implementation of process safety management systems at all Givaudan caramel coloring facilities. One of the policies will address training operations personnel on defined safe operating limits and actions to take if those limits are exceeded. Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Create and fill a corporate senior leadership position responsible for overseeing process safety at all Givaudan caramel coloring facilities or identify a current senior leader who is competent in process safety management concepts to fill this role. Establish this senior leader’s job duties to oversee the process safety management system implementation at all Givaudan caramel coloring facilities. Assign this individual to develop corporate-level process safety management system policies to ensure consistent development and implementation of process safety management systems at all Givaudan caramel coloring facilities. One of the policies will address training operations personnel on defined safe operating limits and actions to take if those limits are exceeded.
2024-06-I-KY-1
Contract a third party to analyze the reactivity of the sugar ingredients in the caramel coloring product manufacturing process by, at a minimum: a. Conducting calorimetry testing on at least one representative recipe for all caramel coloring product types to determine their temperature and pressure behavior upon heating. b. Testing the composition of any produced non-condensable gases. Maintain this information for use during future equipment design efforts and hazard analyses. Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Contract a third party to analyze the reactivity of the sugar ingredients in the caramel coloring product manufacturing process by, at a minimum:
a. Conducting calorimetry testing on at least one representative recipe for all caramel coloring product types to determine their temperature and pressure behavior upon heating.
b. Testing the composition of any produced non-condensable gases.
Maintain this information for use during future equipment design efforts and hazard analyses.
2024-06-I-KY-2
Contract a third party to conduct a hazard analysis of each caramel coloring facility. Require this analysis to address reactivity hazards and include a review of the reactivity data obtained from implementing CSB Recommendation 2024-06-I-KY-R1. Implement the recommendations issued by the third party as a result of the hazard analyses. Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Contract a third party to conduct a hazard analysis of each caramel coloring facility. Require this analysis to address reactivity hazards and include a review of the reactivity data obtained from implementing CSB Recommendation 2024-06-I-KY-R1. Implement the recommendations issued by the third party as a result of the hazard analyses.
2024-06-I-KY-3
Contract a third party to develop a process safety management system to be used at each caramel coloring facility. This third party shall: a. Ensure the process safety management system is in alignment with current industry guidance such as the CCPS’s Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety. b. Ensure that the process safety management system requires hazard reviews/analyses to be conducted at prescribed intervals and include: (1) the review/incorporation of reactivity data from CSB Recommendation 2024-06-I-KY-R1 and any additional reactivity data obtained during the course of operating any caramel coloring facility, (2) the review/analysis of any process changes that could affect relief system designs, and (3) the review/updating of the facility siting study from CSB Recommendation 2024-06-I-KY-R7, as appropriate. Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Contract a third party to develop a process safety management system to be used at each caramel coloring facility. This third party shall:
a. Ensure the process safety management system is in alignment with current industry guidance such as the CCPS’s Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety.
b. Ensure that the process safety management system requires hazard reviews/analyses to be conducted at prescribed intervals and include:
(1) the review/incorporation of reactivity data from CSB Recommendation 2024-06-I-KY-R1 and any additional reactivity data obtained during the course of operating any caramel coloring facility,
(2) the review/analysis of any process changes that could affect relief system designs, and
(3) the review/updating of the facility siting study from CSB Recommendation 2024-06-I-KY-R7, as appropriate.
2024-06-I-KY-4
At each caramel coloring facility, hire a new or identify a current employee who is competent in process safety management concepts. Establish this employee’s job duties to specifically include overseeing the caramel coloring facility’s process safety management system established in 2024-06-I-KY-R3, its implementation, and personnel training on the system’s elements. Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
At each caramel coloring facility, hire a new or identify a current employee who is competent in process safety management concepts. Establish this employee’s job duties to specifically include overseeing the caramel coloring facility’s process safety management system established in 2024-06-I-KY-R3, its implementation, and personnel training on the system’s elements.
2024-06-I-KY-5
For each caramel coloring facility, contract a third party to design adequate emergency pressure relief systems for the vessels involved in caramel coloring manufacturing. Ensure the third party reviews/incorporates all reactivity data obtained from the testing required by CSB Recommendation 2024-06-I-KY-R1 when designing the emergency pressure relief systems. Document and maintain each vessel’s relief system design basis for the service life of the vessel. Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
For each caramel coloring facility, contract a third party to design adequate emergency pressure relief systems for the vessels involved in caramel coloring manufacturing. Ensure the third party reviews/incorporates all reactivity data obtained from the testing required by CSB Recommendation 2024-06-I-KY-R1 when designing the emergency pressure relief systems. Document and maintain each vessel’s relief system design basis for the service life of the vessel.
2024-06-I-KY-6
For each caramel coloring facility, establish automatic alerts, such as alarms or control screen indications, to notify operators when a safe operating limit has been reached. Follow industry guidance, such as the guidance presented in the Center for Chemical Process Safety Book Guidelines for Engineering Design for Process Safety (2nd Edition), Chapter 5 General Design. Provide initial and refresher training for operations personnel on the established safe operating limits including the actions to take if these limits are exceeded. Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
For each caramel coloring facility, establish automatic alerts, such as alarms or control screen indications, to notify operators when a safe operating limit has been reached. Follow industry guidance, such as the guidance presented in the Center for Chemical Process Safety Book Guidelines for Engineering Design for Process Safety (2nd Edition), Chapter 5 General Design. Provide initial and refresher training for operations personnel on the established safe operating limits including the actions to take if these limits are exceeded.
2024-06-I-KY-7
Contract a third party to conduct a facility siting study before constructing caramel coloring facility(ies) to help protect facility occupants and critical equipment from hazards created by explosion, fire, or toxic material release, using published industry guidance, such as that in the Center for Chemical Process Safety book, Guidelines for Siting and Layout of Facilities. Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Contract a third party to conduct a facility siting study before constructing caramel coloring facility(ies) to help protect facility occupants and critical equipment from hazards created by explosion, fire, or toxic material release, using published industry guidance, such as that in the Center for Chemical Process Safety book, Guidelines for Siting and Layout of Facilities.
2024-06-I-KY-11
Update all invert sugar safety data sheets to include: the decomposition temperature, the consequences of exceeding that temperature, and the decomposition products produced (for example, carbon dioxide). Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Update all invert sugar safety data sheets to include: the decomposition temperature, the consequences of exceeding that temperature, and the decomposition products produced (for example, carbon dioxide).
2024-06-I-KY-9
Publish a technical safety bulletin for caramel coloring manufacturing that encourages caramel color manufacturers to ensure known hazards, including sugar ingredient decomposition, are addressed. Emphasize the importance of obtaining information on calorimetric properties of sugar ingredients and ensuring appropriately sized emergency pressure relief systems to safely vent pressure and gases that could be produced by sugar ingredient decomposition reactions, as well as other overpressure scenarios identified in hazard analyses. Refer caramel color manufacturers to the CSB’s investigation report for additional details. Recommend in the technical safety bulletin that caramel coloring manufacturers implement, as appropriate, process safety management systems that are in alignment with local requirements and chemical industry good practice guidance, such as the Center for Chemical Process Safety Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety, Essential Practices for Managing Chemical Reactivity Hazards, and Guidelines for Implementing Process Safety Management. Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Publish a technical safety bulletin for caramel coloring manufacturing that encourages caramel color manufacturers to ensure known hazards, including sugar ingredient decomposition, are addressed. Emphasize the importance of obtaining information on calorimetric properties of sugar ingredients and ensuring appropriately sized emergency pressure relief systems to safely vent pressure and gases that could be produced by sugar ingredient decomposition reactions, as well as other overpressure scenarios identified in hazard analyses. Refer caramel color manufacturers to the CSB’s investigation report for additional details. Recommend in the technical safety bulletin that caramel coloring manufacturers implement, as appropriate, process safety management systems that are in alignment with local requirements and chemical industry good practice guidance, such as the Center for Chemical Process Safety Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety, Essential Practices for Managing Chemical Reactivity Hazards, and Guidelines for Implementing Process Safety Management.
2024-06-I-KY-10
Alert association members that manufacture caramel coloring of the November 12, 2024, Givaudan incident and its causes, including but not limited to the sugar ingredient decomposition reaction that led to Reactor 6’s rupture. Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Alert association members that manufacture caramel coloring of the November 12, 2024, Givaudan incident and its causes, including but not limited to the sugar ingredient decomposition reaction that led to Reactor 6’s rupture.
2004-1-I-IN-12
Conduct research into the feasibility and design of improved explosion protection for aluminum dust collector applications, including explosion venting, isolation and suppression systems. Coordinate this research activity with the Fire Protection Research Foundation. Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action/No Response Received
Conduct research into the feasibility and design of improved explosion protection for aluminum dust collector applications, including explosion venting, isolation and suppression systems. Coordinate this research activity with the Fire Protection Research Foundation.
2004-1-I-IN-13
Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to your members Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to your members
2004-1-I-IN-11
Conduct research into the feasibility and design of improved explosion protection for aluminum dust collector applications, including explosion venting, isolation and suppression systems. Coordinate this research activity with the Aluminum Association, Inc. Status: Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded
Conduct research into the feasibility and design of improved explosion protection for aluminum dust collector applications, including explosion venting, isolation and suppression systems. Coordinate this research activity with the Aluminum Association, Inc.
2004-1-I-IN-6
Conduct regular audits of all North American facilities that produce, process, or handle aluminum chips or dust, in light of the findings of this report. Emphasize engineering, hazard, and MOC reviews and compliance with NFPA-484. Ensure that: audits are documented and contain findings and recommendations, audit findings are shared with the work force at the facility, and audit recommendations are tracked and implemented. Status: Closed - No Longer Applicable
Conduct regular audits of all North American facilities that produce, process, or handle aluminum chips or dust, in light of the findings of this report. Emphasize engineering, hazard, and MOC reviews and compliance with NFPA-484. Ensure that: audits are documented and contain findings and recommendations, audit findings are shared with the work force at the facility, and audit recommendations are tracked and implemented.
2004-1-I-IN-7
Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to the work force at Hayes and other HLI facilities with similar operations. Status: Closed - No Longer Applicable
Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to the work force at Hayes and other HLI facilities with similar operations.
2004-1-I-IN-1
Develop and implement a means of handling and processing aluminum chips that minimizes the risk of dust explosions. Refer to: 1. The Aluminum Association Pamphlet F-1, Guidelines for Handling Aluminum Fines Generated During Various Aluminum Fabricating Operations. 2. NFPA 484, Standard for Combustible Metals, Metal Powders, and Metal Dusts. Status: Closed - No Longer Applicable
Develop and implement a means of handling and processing aluminum chips that minimizes the risk of dust explosions. Refer to: 1. The Aluminum Association Pamphlet F-1, Guidelines for Handling Aluminum Fines Generated During Various Aluminum Fabricating Operations. 2. NFPA 484, Standard for Combustible Metals, Metal Powders, and Metal Dusts.
2004-1-I-IN-2
Implement a program to provide regular training for all facility employees on the fire and explosion hazards of aluminum dust. Status: Closed - No Longer Applicable
Implement a program to provide regular training for all facility employees on the fire and explosion hazards of aluminum dust.
2004-1-I-IN-3
Develop and implement policies and procedures for conducting engineering, hazard, and management of change (MOC) reviews of plant projects and modifications to support systems such as chip processing. In particular, ensure that a hazard analysis is conducted during the design phase, as well as during the engineering and construction phases, and when changes are made to the system. Status: Closed - No Longer Applicable
Develop and implement policies and procedures for conducting engineering, hazard, and management of change (MOC) reviews of plant projects and modifications to support systems such as chip processing. In particular, ensure that a hazard analysis is conducted during the design phase, as well as during the engineering and construction phases, and when changes are made to the system.
2004-1-I-IN-4
Implement a program to conduct management reviews of incidents and near-miss incidents, including duct fires and dust flashes. Apply this program to all plant areas, including support areas such as chip processing. Address the root causes of the incidents and near-misses and implement and track corrective measures. Status: Closed - No Longer Applicable
Implement a program to conduct management reviews of incidents and near-miss incidents, including duct fires and dust flashes. Apply this program to all plant areas, including support areas such as chip processing. Address the root causes of the incidents and near-misses and implement and track corrective measures.
2004-1-I-IN-5
Develop and implement written operating procedures for chip processing and train all affected employees. Ensure that procedures address maintenance and housekeeping. Status: Closed - No Longer Applicable
Develop and implement written operating procedures for chip processing and train all affected employees. Ensure that procedures address maintenance and housekeeping.
2004-1-I-IN-10
Provide training for fire inspectors in Indiana jurisdictions on the recognition and prevention of aluminum dust explosion hazards. Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action/No Response Received
Provide training for fire inspectors in Indiana jurisdictions on the recognition and prevention of aluminum dust explosion hazards.
2004-1-I-IN-9
Develop and distribute an educational bulletin on the prevention of metal dust explosions. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Develop and distribute an educational bulletin on the prevention of metal dust explosions.
2004-1-I-IN-20
Communicate findings, recommendations and sections applicable to fire codes and standards to your membership. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Communicate findings, recommendations and sections applicable to fire codes and standards to your membership.
2004-1-I-IN-16
Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to your membership who work in facilities with similar combustible dust hazards. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to your membership who work in facilities with similar combustible dust hazards.
2004-1-I-IN-18
2004-1-I-IN-19
2004-1-I-IN-15
2004-1-I-IN-8
Communicate the findings and recommendations of this investigation to owners/operators of facilities to which Premelt supplies similar aluminum chip-melting systems. Include in your communication specific information that the chip drying process liberates small particles of aluminum, and that such particles may be explosive. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Communicate the findings and recommendations of this investigation to owners/operators of facilities to which Premelt supplies similar aluminum chip-melting systems. Include in your communication specific information that the chip drying process liberates small particles of aluminum, and that such particles may be explosive.
2004-1-I-IN-14
2004-1-I-IN-17