The CSB issues safety recommendations to prevent the recurrence or reduce the likelihood or consequences of similar incidents or hazards in the future. Recommendations are issued to a variety of parties, including government entities, safety organizations, trade unions, trade associations, corporations, emergency response organizations, educational institutions, and public interest groups. Recommendations are published in CSB reports and are closed only by vote of the Board. The CSB tracks all recommendations and communicates regularly with recommendations recipients to ensure that the recommended corrective actions are implemented. For more information, see Frequently Asked Questions about CSB recommendations.
2020-07-I-NC-1
Issue a safety information product (such as a letter of interpretation) addressing the analysis and control of hazards that are not pre-existing but which result from work activities inside permit-required confined spaces. Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Issue a safety information product (such as a letter of interpretation) addressing the analysis and control of hazards that are not pre-existing but which result from work activities inside permit-required confined spaces.
2018-02-I-WI-11
Develop guidance documents for performing process hazard analysis on operating procedures to address transient operation hazards in facilities with Process Safety Management (PSM) covered processes. Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Develop guidance documents for performing process hazard analysis on operating procedures to address transient operation hazards in facilities with Process Safety Management (PSM) covered processes.
2007-6-I-KS-1
Revise the "Guidance for Hazard Determination for compliance with the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard" to advise chemical manufacturers and importers that prepare MSDSs to: -Evaluate flammable liquids to determine their potential to accumulate static electricity and form ignitable vapor-air mixtures in storage tanks. -Test the conductivity of the flammable liquid and include the testing results in the MSDS. Status: Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response
Revise the "Guidance for Hazard Determination for compliance with the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard" to advise chemical manufacturers and importers that prepare MSDSs to: -Evaluate flammable liquids to determine their potential to accumulate static electricity and form ignitable vapor-air mixtures in storage tanks. -Test the conductivity of the flammable liquid and include the testing results in the MSDS.
2005-4-I-TX-9
2. Amend the OSHA PSM standard to require that a management of change (MOC) review be conducted for organizational changes that may impact process safety including: a. major organizational changes such as mergers, acquisitions, or reorganizations; b. personnel changes, including changes in staffing levels or staff experience; and c. policy changes such as budget cutting. Status: Open - Unacceptable Response/No Response Received
2. Amend the OSHA PSM standard to require that a management of change (MOC) review be conducted for organizational changes that may impact process safety including: a. major organizational changes such as mergers, acquisitions, or reorganizations; b. personnel changes, including changes in staffing levels or staff experience; and c. policy changes such as budget cutting.
2017-07-I-WI-10
Promulgate a standard for all industries that handle combustible dust, which should be based on the requirements of current NFPA combustible dust standards, including NFPA 61, Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Dust Explosions in Agricultural and Food Processing Facilities, NFPA 484, Standard for Combustible Metals, NFPA 652, Standard on the Fundamentals of Combustible Dust, NFPA 654, Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions from the Manufacturing, Processing, and Handling of Combustible Particulate Solids, NFPA 655, Standard for Prevention of Sulfur Fires and Explosions, NFPA 664, Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities, or a successor standard. At a minimum, the standard should include the following elements: a. Hazard Recognition; b. Dust Hazard Analysis; c. Management of Change; d. Incident Investigation; e. Engineering Controls; f. Building Design; g. Fugitive Dust Management; h. Operating Procedures; i. Process Safety Information; j. External Audit Management; k. Training; l. Emergency Response; and m. Personal Protective Equipment. (Superseded the following recommendations: 2006-1-H-R1 from the Combustible Dust Hazard investigation, 2008-05-I-GA-R11 from the Imperial Sugar investigation, and 2011-04-I-TN-R1 and 2011-04-I-TN-R2 from the Hoeganaes Corporation investigation) Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Promulgate a standard for all industries that handle combustible dust, which should be based on the requirements of current NFPA combustible dust standards, including NFPA 61, Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Dust Explosions in Agricultural and Food Processing Facilities, NFPA 484, Standard for Combustible Metals, NFPA 652, Standard on the Fundamentals of Combustible Dust, NFPA 654, Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions from the Manufacturing, Processing, and Handling of Combustible Particulate Solids, NFPA 655, Standard for Prevention of Sulfur Fires and Explosions, NFPA 664, Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities, or a successor standard. At a minimum, the standard should include the following elements:
a. Hazard Recognition;
b. Dust Hazard Analysis;
c. Management of Change;
d. Incident Investigation;
e. Engineering Controls;
f. Building Design;
g. Fugitive Dust Management;
h. Operating Procedures;
i. Process Safety Information;
j. External Audit Management;
k. Training;
l. Emergency Response; and
m. Personal Protective Equipment.
(Superseded the following recommendations: 2006-1-H-R1 from the Combustible Dust Hazard investigation, 2008-05-I-GA-R11 from the Imperial Sugar investigation, and 2011-04-I-TN-R1 and 2011-04-I-TN-R2 from the Hoeganaes Corporation investigation)
2017-07-I-WI-11
Following implementation of CSB Recommendation No. 2017-07-I-WI-R10, update the Grain Handling Facilities Standard to clarify grain handling facilities with combustible dust are covered by the new Combustible Dust Standard. Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Following implementation of CSB Recommendation No. 2017-07-I-WI-R10, update the Grain Handling Facilities Standard to clarify grain handling facilities with combustible dust are covered by the new Combustible Dust Standard.
2017-07-I-WI-12
Develop a program to trigger follow-up inspections when hazard alert letters are issued for combustible dust hazards and there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that those hazards have been abated. Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Develop a program to trigger follow-up inspections when hazard alert letters are issued for combustible dust hazards and there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that those hazards have been abated.
2010-06-I-WV-2
Take sustained measures to minimize the exposure of hazards to workers handling highly toxic gases from cylinders and associated regulators, gages, hoses, and appliances. Ensure that OSHA managers, compliance officers, equivalent state OSHA plan personnel, and regulated parties conform, under the Process Safety Management Standard (29 CFR 1910.119) Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) provisions, to industry practices at least as effective as the following: NFPA 55 - Compressed Gases and Cryogenic Fluids Code (2010) CGA P-1 Safe Handling of Compressed Gases in Containers (2008) CGA E-9 Standard for Flexible, PTFE-lined Pigtails for Compressed Gas Service (2010) ASME B31.3 Process Piping (2008) Status: Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response
Take sustained measures to minimize the exposure of hazards to workers handling highly toxic gases from cylinders and associated regulators, gages, hoses, and appliances. Ensure that OSHA managers, compliance officers, equivalent state OSHA plan personnel, and regulated parties conform, under the Process Safety Management Standard (29 CFR 1910.119) Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) provisions, to industry practices at least as effective as the following:
2019-01-I-TX-7
Eliminate the atmospheric storage tank exemption from the PSM standard. (Superseded 2001-05-I-DE-R1 from the Motiva report and 2010-02-I-PR-R4 from the Caribbean Petroleum (CAPECO) report) Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Eliminate the atmospheric storage tank exemption from the PSM standard.
(Superseded 2001-05-I-DE-R1 from the Motiva report and 2010-02-I-PR-R4 from the Caribbean Petroleum (CAPECO) report)