Washington D.C. May 27, 2025 – The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) today released its final report addressing three serious chemical incidents involving toxic hydrogen fluoride (HF) at the Honeywell Performance Materials and Technologies facility in Geismar, Louisiana. The incidents occurred over a period of less than three years—from October 2021 to June 2024—and reveal systemic safety failures at the facility.
- October 21, 2021: A fatal HF release occurred during a unit startup when a corroded flange gasket catastrophically failed, spraying toxic HF on a worker’s face, ear, and neck. The worker, who was not wearing sufficient personal protective equipment, was transported to a hospital for treatment but died later that day. In addition to the fatality, Honeywell also reported $14 million in damages.
- January 23, 2023: A reboiler exploded at the facility, releasing over 800 pounds of toxic HF and 1,600 pounds of chlorine. Although no injuries occurred in this incident, the explosion caused $4 million in damage and resulted in a site-wide shelter-in-place order being issued and nearby highways being closed.
- June 7, 2024: A contract worker, who was not wearing face or respiratory protection, was seriously injured during maintenance when residual toxic HF was unexpectedly released from piping and contacted the worker in the face. The worker was transported to a local hospital, where he was admitted and spent two days recovering as a result of his serious injury. He sustained second-degree burns from the HF exposure.
CSB Chairperson Steve Owens said, “Not only were these three serious incidents completely unacceptable, our investigation found that they also were entirely preventable.”
The CSB’s investigation found that repeated failures in Honeywell’s safety management systems led to the incidents, including poor hazard identification, inadequate equipment maintenance, and lapses in critical safety systems.
In the fatal October 2021 incident, the CSB found that in 2007 Honeywell was aware of corrosion damage to the type of gasket that failed and had documented the need to change to a different type of gasket technology. Honeywell decided to replace the gaskets on an attrition basis, however, and at the time of the incident in 2021 -- more than 14 later -- Honeywell still had not fully replaced all the gaskets (including the one that failed).
In the January 2023 reboiler explosion, the CSB found that Honeywell had determined that the reboiler’s shell needed to be replaced and that in February 2022 management at the facility had approved a project to replace it. However, Honeywell never funded or implemented the project -- due in part to personnel changes and poor internal communications -- and the reboiler eventually ran to failure on January 23, 2023, when it exploded.
In the June 2024 incident, the CSB found that neither the worker who was seriously injured nor others on site were aware that the piping had not been cleared of HF prior to the maintenance work. However, there was HF trapped between a valve plug and a flange, and when the fasteners on the flange were loosened, the HF was released, contacting the worker in the face.
The CSB’s report makes several recommendations to Honeywell International, Inc., including calling on the company to strengthen its safety systems, ensure proper oversight, and fully implement recommended safety technologies and procedures to prevent future tragic incidents at the Geismar facility.
The CSB’s report also recommends that: (1) the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) initiate a review of HF under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to assess HF’s potential health and environmental risks, and (2) the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) amend its Process Safety Management (PSM) regulation to require Management of Change (MOC) reviews for organizational changes affecting process safety, including structural reorganizations, staffing changes, and policy shifts such as budget cuts.
The CSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating incidents and hazards that result, or may result, in the catastrophic release of extremely hazardous substances. The agency’s core mission activities include conducting incident investigations; formulating preventive or mitigative recommendations based on investigation findings and advocating for their implementation; issuing reports containing the findings, conclusions, and recommendations arising from incident investigations; and conducting studies on chemical hazards.
The agency's board members are appointed by the president subject to Senate confirmation. The Board does not issue citations or fines but makes safety recommendations to companies, industry organizations, labor groups, and regulatory agencies such as OSHA and EPA.
Please visit our website, www.csb.gov. For more information, contact Communications Manager Hillary Cohen at [email protected].