Open: 100% | Closed: 0%
Final Report Released On: December 23, 2022
2018-02-I-WI-1
Establish safeguards to prevent explosions in the FCC unit during transient operation (including startup, shutdown, standby, and emergency procedures). Incorporate these safeguards into written operating procedures. At a minimum establish the following specific safeguards:
a) Implementation of the reactor steam barrier, or a similar inert gas flow, to maintain an inert barrier at an elevated pressure between the main column (containing hydrocarbon) and the regenerator (containing air);
b) Purging the main column with a non-condensable gas as needed to prevent a dangerous accumulation of oxygen in the main column overhead receiver;
c) Monitoring to ensure that there is a sufficient non-condensable gas purge of the main column to prevent a dangerous accumulation of oxygen in the main column overhead receiver (either through direct measurement of the oxygen concentration and/or through engineering calculation);
d) Monitoring of critical operating parameters for flows, pressures, pressure differences, and catalyst levels;
e) Documentation of consequences of deviating from the transient operation safe operating limits and of predetermined corrective actions; and
f) Inclusion of the above items in the appropriate FCC operator training curricula.
Status:
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.
Recommendation Status Change Summary
2018-02-I-WI-2
Based on licensor input and good industry practices, determine the appropriate point(s) in the FCC unit’s shutdown procedures to shut down all wet gas compressor(s). Incorporate this information into all FCC unit shutdown procedures and operator training material.
Status:
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.
Recommendation Status Change Summary
2018-02-I-WI-3
Develop and implement a slide valve mechanical integrity program that addresses erosion and ensures proper functioning of the slide valves during a shutdown. The program must include, at a minimum:
a) A slide valve mechanical integrity standard that defines monitoring and inspection requirements, with acceptance criteria, required for the safe operation of the FCC unit during transient operation (such as a startup, shutdown, standby, and emergency).
b) Monitoring that includes process data analysis and mechanical preventive activities to evaluate the mechanical condition of the slide valves during the operation of the FCC unit between turnarounds;
c) Quarterly presentations of process data and mechanical preventive maintenance data to refinery operations management and maintenance management to drive key decisions such as shortening the turnaround cycle and/or planning a maintenance outage;
d) During turnarounds and other potential slide valve maintenance outages, evaluate the adequacy of the slide valve mechanical integrity program for the safe operation of the FCC unit during transient operation. If the inspection demonstrates unsuccessful performance, make appropriate corrections.
During the next major FCC unit turnaround at Cenovus Superior Refinery, demonstrate that the slide valve mechanical program is adequate for the safe operation of the FCC unit during transient operation. If the inspection demonstrates unsuccessful performance, make appropriate corrections to the slide valve mechanical integrity program.
Status:
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.
Recommendation Status Change Summary
2018-02-I-WI-4
Develop emergency procedures for responding to a loss of catalyst slide valve function (for example, when it leaks excessively or fails to close on demand).
Status:
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.
Recommendation Status Change Summary
2018-02-I-WI-5
Develop guidance for analyzing operating procedures to improve transient operation hazard evaluations during PHAs. Refer to section Chapter 9.1 in the CCPS publication Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, 3rd Ed. or an appropriate equivalent resource to develop the guidance. Incorporate the guidance into the appropriate Cenovus Superior Refinery PHA procedural documents and policies.
Status:
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.
Recommendation Status Change Summary
2018-02-I-WI-6
Develop and implement an FCC unit operator, supervisor, and manager training program based on the licensor’s guidance and on available industry guidance. Elements of the training program shall include:
a) A set of written training materials (such as a manual) consistent with the licensor’s technology information, encompassing:
i) FCC equipment;
ii) Normal operations;
iii) Transient operations (including startup, shutdown, standby, and emergency); and
iv) Case studies of industry FCC industry incidents, including ExxonMobil Torrance (2015) and this incident; and
b) Training delivery methods including:
i) Group and individual training; and
ii) Simulator training for board operators.
Status:
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.
Recommendation Status Change Summary
2018-02-I-WI-7
Incorporate lessons learned from this incident into the appropriate training materials for the Cenovus Superior Refinery Emergency Response Team. At a minimum, topics shall include the proper response to liquids potentially stored above their flash point, such as asphalt, and the ignition risk of pyrophoric material inside asphalt storage tanks.
Status:
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.
Recommendation Status Change Summary