Recent Recommendation Status Updates

Each recommendation the CSB issues is monitored by CSB staff from the time it is issued to closing. CSB staff evaluate recipient responses, and the Board votes to assign status designations to recommendations based on staff evaluation. This page highlights recommendations for which the Board has recently voted to change the status of the recommendation. For more information on how the CSB defines its recommendation statuses, please visit the Recommendations Frequently Asked Questions page.

To contact CSB Recommendations Staff please email [email protected] 

 

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Recommendations

Foundation Food Group Fatal Chemical Release (2 Recommendations)
Messer LLC (2 Recommendations)
Open: 100% | Closed: 0%
View Investigation
Final Report Released On: December 11, 2023

2021-03-I-GA-2

Update the company product stewardship policy to:

a) include participation by Messer in customers’ process hazard analyses (PHAs). The policy should require that these PHAs be conducted in a manner which conforms with CCPS Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures prior to the startup of a cryogenic freezing process;

b) require verification that proper signage, in accordance with CGA P-76 Hazards of Oxygen-Deficient Atmospheres, is displayed on and/or near equipment; and,

c) require a facility and/or equipment siting review to ensure that emergency shutoff devices, including E-stops, are located such that they can be safely actuated during a release of liquid nitrogen.


Status: Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response
Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response (O - ARAR) - Response from recipient indicates a planned action that would satisfy the objective of the recommendation when implemented.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

2021-03-I-GA-3

Create an informational product that provides Messer customers with information on the safety issues described in this report. In this informational product, recommend that Messer customers develop and implement effective safety management systems to control asphyxiation hazards from inert gases based on the guidance published in CGA P-86 Guideline for Process Safety Management, CGA P-12 Guideline for Safe Handling of Cryogenic and Refrigerated Liquids, CGA P-18 Standard for Bulk Inert Gas Systems, and CGA P-76 Hazards of Oxygen-Deficient Atmospheres.


Status: Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response
Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response (O - ARAR) - Response from recipient indicates a planned action that would satisfy the objective of the recommendation when implemented.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

Didion Milling Company Explosion and Fire (1 Recommendations)
Didion Milling, Inc. (1 Recommendations)
Open: 0% | Closed: 100%
View Investigation
Final Report Released On: December 06, 2023

2017-07-I-WI-4

Contract a competent third party to assess and implement engineering controls for the structural design and venting requirements of the reconstructed facility to ensure they meet the requirements and guidance in NFPA 68, Standard on Explosion Protection by Deflagration Venting, for adequacy of venting capacity.


Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

CSB Safety Study: Remote Isolation of Process Equipment (1 Recommendations)
American Petroleum Institute (API) (1 Recommendations)
Open: 100% | Closed: 0%
View Investigation
Final Report Released On: July 25, 2024

2024-01-H-1

Develop a new publication or revise an existing publication or publications that should be applicable to various facility types such as refineries, chemical and petrochemical facilities, terminals, etc. with major process equipment and atmospheric storage tanks, that details conditions that necessitate the installation of remote isolation devices [use “shall” instead of “should” language] that may be automatically activated or remotely activated from a safe location, particularly during an emergency. When establishing these conditions refer to the guidance published by CCPS entitled Guidelines for Fire Protection in Chemical, Petrochemical, and Hydrocarbon Processing Facilities, Sections 8.1.10 and 8.1.11. At a minimum, the conditions should address major process equipment and atmospheric storage tanks, material volumes/weight as well as flammability, corrosivity, and toxicity


Status: Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response
Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response (O - ARAR) - Response from recipient indicates a planned action that would satisfy the objective of the recommendation when implemented.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

Husky Energy Superior Refinery Explosion and Fire (1 Recommendations)
American Petroleum Institute (API) (1 Recommendations)
Open: 100% | Closed: 0%
View Investigation
Final Report Released On: December 29, 2022

2018-02-I-WI-14

Modify the appropriate existing recommended practice (for example, API RP 553, Refinery Valves and Accessories for Control and Safety Instrumented Systems) to include information about the purpose, design, maintenance, and testing of additional FCC catalyst slide valve components, including the slide valve body. If an API product other than API RP 553 is modified, API RP 553 should guide the reader to that reference.


Status: Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response
Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response (O - ARAR) - Response from recipient indicates a planned action that would satisfy the objective of the recommendation when implemented.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

Chevron Richmond Refinery Fire (2 Recommendations)
American Petroleum Institute (API) (1 Recommendations)
Open: 0% | Closed: 100%
View Investigation
Final Report Released On: January 28, 2015

2012-03-I-CA-29

Revise API RP 578: Material Verification Program for New and Existing Alloy Piping Systems, to require users to establish and implement a program to identify carbon steel piping circuits that are susceptible to sulfidation corrosionand may contain low-silicon components.  These circuits have the potential to contain carbon steel components that were not manufactured to the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) A106 specification and may contain less than 0.10 weight percent silicon content.  Refer the reader to the 100 percent component inspection or pipe replacement requirements detailed in API RP 939-C: Guidelines for Avoiding Sulfidation (Sulfidic) Corrosion Failures in Oil Refineries (pursuant to recommendation 2012-03-I-CA-26(b))  and API 570: Piping Inspection Code:  In-service Inspection, Rating, Repair, and Alteration of Piping Systems (pursuant to 2012-03-I-CA-28(c)) for carbon steel piping circuits susceptible to sulfidation corrosion that may contain low-silicon components.


Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action
Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action (C - AAA)
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

Governor and Legislature of the State of California (1 Recommendations)
Open: 0% | Closed: 100%
View Investigation
Final Report Released On: January 28, 2015

2012-03-I-CA-23

Work with the regulator, the petroleum refining industry, labor, and other relevant stakeholders in the state of California to develop and implement a system that collects, tracks, and analyzes process safety leading and lagging indicators from refineries and contractors to promote continuous safety improvements. At a minimum, this program shall:

a. Require the use of leading and lagging process safety indicators to actively monitor the effectiveness of process safety management systems and safeguards for major accident prevention. Include leading and lagging indicators that are measureable, actionable, and standardized. Require that the reported data be used for continuous process safety improvement and accident prevention;

b. Analyze data to identify trends and poor performers and publish annual reports with the data at facility and corporate levels;

c. Require companies to publicly report required indicators annually at facility and corporate levels;

d. Use process safety indicators (1) to drive continuous improvement for major accident prevention by using the data to identify industry and facility safety trends and deficiencies and (2) to determine appropriate allocation of regulator resources and inspections; and

e. Be periodically updated to incorporate new learning from world-wide industry improvements in order to drive continuous major accident safety improvements in California.


Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

Kaltech Industries Waste Mixing Explosion (5 Recommendations)
Kaltech Industries and Beyond Signs (1 Recommendations)
Open: 0% | Closed: 100%
View Investigation
Final Report Released On: September 30, 2003

2002-02-I-NY-0 REITERATED!

Implement hazardous waste management practices that include the following: Characterization of unknown waste materials prior to mixing or disposal. Labeling of all waste containers with the words ?Hazardous Waste? and any other wording necessary to communicate the specific hazards associated with the material. Formal hazardous waste management training program.


Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action/No Response Received
Closed - Unacceptable Action/No Response Received (C - UA/NRR) - Recipient responds by expressing disagreement with the need outlined in the recommendation and the Board concludes that further correspondence on, or discussion of, the matter would not change the recipient?s position.
 

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) (4 Recommendations)
Open: 0% | Closed: 100%
View Investigation
Final Report Released On: September 30, 2003

2002-02-I-NY-0 REITERATED!

Disseminate information on the requirements of the Hazard Communication Standard, 29 CFR 1910.1200, in the major languages spoken by workers in New York City with limited or no English speaking proficiency.


Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

2002-02-I-NY-0 REITERATED!

Disseminate information on the requirements of the Hazard Communication Standard, 29 CFR 1910.1200, in the major languages spoken by workers in New York City with limited or no English speaking proficiency.


Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

2002-02-I-NY-0 REITERATED!

Disseminate information on the requirements of the Hazard Communication Standard, 29 CFR 1910.1200, in the major languages spoken by workers in New York City with limited or no English speaking proficiency.


Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

2002-02-I-NY-0 REITERATED!

Disseminate information on the requirements of the Hazard Communication Standard, 29 CFR 1910.1200, in the major languages spoken by workers in New York City with limited or no English speaking proficiency.


Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

PEMEX Deer Park Chemical Release (4 Recommendations)
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) (1 Recommendations)
Open: 100% | Closed: 0%
View Investigation
Final Report Released On: February 23, 2026

2024-05-I-TX-4

Develop written guidelines for marking equipment for opening. The guidelines should define a standard practice for equipment marking that includes clear identifiers of the area to be opened and means to remove the markings at the conclusion of the work.


Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

PEMEX Deer Park (3 Recommendations)
Open: 100% | Closed: 0%
View Investigation
Final Report Released On: February 23, 2026

2024-05-I-TX-3

Establish a conduct of operations system that establishes and enforces behavioral and performance metrics in accordance with CCPS’s Conduct of Operations and Operational Discipline. The system should include:

a) the management commitment to process safety,

b) employee input on policies and procedures,

c) methods to ensure that policies and procedures can be effectively followed, to include, at a minimum:

1) permitting,

2) equipment marking, and

3) energy isolation procedures, and

d) regular audits to verify adherence to conduct of operations metrics, to include, at a minimum:

1) performance expectations,

2) training,

3) management visibility,

4) leadership by example, and 

5) worker knowledge and awareness.


Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

2026-2024-05-I-TX-I-TX-1

Label all piping in ARU6 and ARU7 in accordance with ANSI/ASME A 13.1 Scheme for the identification of Piping Systems. 


Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.
 

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2026-2024-05-I-TX-I-TX-2

Develop procedures to ensure that any craftworkers introduced to or removed from a unit in Positive Isolation Status receive instructions that define the hazards, safeguards, and requirements of the unit associated with the work. The procedures should require each craftworker to receive clear communication on the identified hazards, control measures, and all other requirements before commencing work in a new area.


Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.