The CSB issues safety recommendations to prevent the recurrence or reduce the likelihood or consequences of similar incidents or hazards in the future. Recommendations are issued to a variety of parties, including government entities, safety organizations, trade unions, trade associations, corporations, emergency response organizations, educational institutions, and public interest groups. Recommendations are published in CSB reports and are closed only by vote of the Board. The CSB tracks all recommendations and communicates regularly with recommendations recipients to ensure that the recommended corrective actions are implemented. For more information, see Frequently Asked Questions about CSB recommendations.
2005-4-I-TX-2 URGENT!
In light of the findings concerning the March 23rd incident at BP's Texas City refinery, revise your Recommended Practice 752, Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Buildings or issue a new Recommended Practice to ensure the safe placement of occupied trailers and similar temporary structures away from hazardous areas of process plants. Ensure that the new recommended practice: - Protects occupants from accident hazards such as heat, blast overpressure, and projectiles; - Establishes minimum safe distances for trailers and similar temporary structures away from hazardous areas of process plants; - Evaluates the siting of trailers under a separate methodology from permanent structures, since trailers are more susceptible to damage, are more readily relocated, and likely do not need to be placed near hazardous areas. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
In light of the findings concerning the March 23rd incident at BP's Texas City refinery, revise your Recommended Practice 752, Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Buildings or issue a new Recommended Practice to ensure the safe placement of occupied trailers and similar temporary structures away from hazardous areas of process plants. Ensure that the new recommended practice: - Protects occupants from accident hazards such as heat, blast overpressure, and projectiles; - Establishes minimum safe distances for trailers and similar temporary structures away from hazardous areas of process plants; - Evaluates the siting of trailers under a separate methodology from permanent structures, since trailers are more susceptible to damage, are more readily relocated, and likely do not need to be placed near hazardous areas.
2005-4-I-TX-3 URGENT!
Issue a safety alert to your membership to take prompt action to ensure the safe placement of occupied trailers away from hazardous areas of process plants. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Issue a safety alert to your membership to take prompt action to ensure the safe placement of occupied trailers away from hazardous areas of process plants.
2005-4-I-TX-4
Revise API Recommended Practice 521, Guide for Pressure Relieving and Depressurizing Systems to ensure that the guidelines: - Identifies overfilling vessels as a potential hazard for evaluation in selecting and designing pressure relief and disposal systems; - Addresses the need to adequately size disposal drums for credible worse-case liquid relief scenarios, based on accurate relief valve and disposal collection piping studies; - Warns against the use of atmospheric blowdown drums and stacks attached to collection piping systems that receive flammable discharges from multiple relief valves and urges the use of appropriate inherently safer alternatives such as a flare system Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Revise API Recommended Practice 521, Guide for Pressure Relieving and Depressurizing Systems to ensure that the guidelines: - Identifies overfilling vessels as a potential hazard for evaluation in selecting and designing pressure relief and disposal systems; - Addresses the need to adequately size disposal drums for credible worse-case liquid relief scenarios, based on accurate relief valve and disposal collection piping studies; - Warns against the use of atmospheric blowdown drums and stacks attached to collection piping systems that receive flammable discharges from multiple relief valves and urges the use of appropriate inherently safer alternatives such as a flare system
2005-4-I-TX-6
Work together to develop two new consensus American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards. a. In the first standard, create performance indicators for process safety in the refinery and petrochemical industries. Ensure that the standard identifies leading and lagging indicators for nationwide public reporting as well as indicators for use at individual facilities. Include methods for the development and use of the performance indicators. (CSB2005-04-I-TX-R6A) In the development of each standard, ensure that a. the committees are accredited and conform to ANSI principles of openness, balance, due process, and consensus; b. include representation of diverse sectors such as industry, labor, government, public interest and environmental organizations and experts from relevant scientific organizations and disciplines. Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action
Work together to develop two new consensus American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards. a. In the first standard, create performance indicators for process safety in the refinery and petrochemical industries. Ensure that the standard identifies leading and lagging indicators for nationwide public reporting as well as indicators for use at individual facilities. Include methods for the development and use of the performance indicators. (CSB2005-04-I-TX-R6A) In the development of each standard, ensure that a. the committees are accredited and conform to ANSI principles of openness, balance, due process, and consensus; b. include representation of diverse sectors such as industry, labor, government, public interest and environmental organizations and experts from relevant scientific organizations and disciplines.
2005-4-I-TX-7
Work together to develop two new consensus American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards. b. In the second standard, develop fatigue prevention guidelines for the refining and petrochemical industries that, at a minimum, limit hours and days of work and address shift work. (CSB2005-04-I-TX-R7a) In the development of each standard, ensure that the committees a. are accredited and conform to ANSI principles of openness, balance, due process, and consensus; b. include representation of diverse sectors such as industry, labor, government, public interest and environmental organizations and experts from relevant scientific organizations and disciplines. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Work together to develop two new consensus American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards. b. In the second standard, develop fatigue prevention guidelines for the refining and petrochemical industries that, at a minimum, limit hours and days of work and address shift work. (CSB2005-04-I-TX-R7a) In the development of each standard, ensure that the committees a. are accredited and conform to ANSI principles of openness, balance, due process, and consensus; b. include representation of diverse sectors such as industry, labor, government, public interest and environmental organizations and experts from relevant scientific organizations and disciplines.
2005-4-I-TX-1 URGENT!
1. Commission an independent panel to assess and report on the effectiveness of BP North America's corporate oversight of safety management systems at its refineries and its corporate safety culture. Provide the panel with necessary funding, resources, and authority - including full access to relevant data, corporate records, and employee interviews - in order to conduct a thorough, independent, and credible inquiry. 2. Ensure that, at a minimum, the panel report examines and recommends any needed improvements to: Corporate safety oversight, including the safe management of refineries obtained through mergers and acquisitions; Corporate safety culture, including the degree to which: - Corporate officials exercise appropriate leadership to promote adherence to safety management systems; - Process safety is effectively incorporated into management decisionmaking at all levels; - Employees at all levels are empowered to promote improved process safety; - Process safety programs receive adequate resources and are appropriately positioned within organizational structures; Corporate and site safety management systems, specifically: - Near-miss reporting and investigation programs; - Mechanical integrity programs; - Hazard analysis programs, management-of-change programs, and up-todate operating procedures for processes with catastrophic potential; - Siting policies for occupied structures near hazardous operating units. 3. Ensure that the panel has a diverse makeup, including an external chairperson; employee representatives; and outside safety experts, such as experts in process safety; experts in corporate culture, organizational behavior, and human factors; and experts from other high-risk sectors such as aviation, space exploration, nuclear energy, and the undersea navy. 4. Ensure that the report and recommendations of the independent panel, which should be completed within 12 months, are made available to the BP workforce and to the public. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
1. Commission an independent panel to assess and report on the effectiveness of BP North America's corporate oversight of safety management systems at its refineries and its corporate safety culture. Provide the panel with necessary funding, resources, and authority - including full access to relevant data, corporate records, and employee interviews - in order to conduct a thorough, independent, and credible inquiry. 2. Ensure that, at a minimum, the panel report examines and recommends any needed improvements to: Corporate safety oversight, including the safe management of refineries obtained through mergers and acquisitions; Corporate safety culture, including the degree to which: - Corporate officials exercise appropriate leadership to promote adherence to safety management systems; - Process safety is effectively incorporated into management decisionmaking at all levels; - Employees at all levels are empowered to promote improved process safety; - Process safety programs receive adequate resources and are appropriately positioned within organizational structures; Corporate and site safety management systems, specifically: - Near-miss reporting and investigation programs; - Mechanical integrity programs; - Hazard analysis programs, management-of-change programs, and up-todate operating procedures for processes with catastrophic potential; - Siting policies for occupied structures near hazardous operating units. 3. Ensure that the panel has a diverse makeup, including an external chairperson; employee representatives; and outside safety experts, such as experts in process safety; experts in corporate culture, organizational behavior, and human factors; and experts from other high-risk sectors such as aviation, space exploration, nuclear energy, and the undersea navy. 4. Ensure that the report and recommendations of the independent panel, which should be completed within 12 months, are made available to the BP workforce and to the public.
2005-4-I-TX-11
1. Appoint an additional non-executive member of the Board of Directors with specific professional expertise and experience in refinery operations and process safety. Appoint this person to be a member of the Board Ethics and Environmental Assurance Committee. Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action
1. Appoint an additional non-executive member of the Board of Directors with specific professional expertise and experience in refinery operations and process safety. Appoint this person to be a member of the Board Ethics and Environmental Assurance Committee.
2005-4-I-TX-12
2. Ensure and monitor that senior executives implement an incident reporting program throughout your refinery organization that a. encourages the reporting of incidents without fear of retaliation; b. requires prompt corrective actions based on incident reports and recommendations, and tracks closure of action items at the refinery where the incident occurred and other affected facilities; and c. requires communication of key lessons learned to management and hourly employees as well as to the industry. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
2. Ensure and monitor that senior executives implement an incident reporting program throughout your refinery organization that a. encourages the reporting of incidents without fear of retaliation; b. requires prompt corrective actions based on incident reports and recommendations, and tracks closure of action items at the refinery where the incident occurred and other affected facilities; and c. requires communication of key lessons learned to management and hourly employees as well as to the industry.
2005-4-I-TX-13
3. Ensure and monitor that senior executives use leading and lagging process safety indicators to measure and strengthen safety performance in your refineries. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
3. Ensure and monitor that senior executives use leading and lagging process safety indicators to measure and strengthen safety performance in your refineries.
2005-4-I-TX-14
1. Evaluate your refinery process units to ensure that critical process equipment is safely designed. At a minimum, a. Ensure that distillation towers have effective instrumentation and control systems to prevent overfilling such as multiple level indicators and appropriate automatic controls. b. Configure control board displays to clearly indicate material balance for distillation towers. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
1. Evaluate your refinery process units to ensure that critical process equipment is safely designed. At a minimum, a. Ensure that distillation towers have effective instrumentation and control systems to prevent overfilling such as multiple level indicators and appropriate automatic controls. b. Configure control board displays to clearly indicate material balance for distillation towers.
2005-4-I-TX-16
3. Work with the United Steelworkers Union and Local 13-1 to establish a joint program that promotes the reporting, investigation, and analysis of incidents, near-misses, process upsets, and major plant hazards without fear of retaliation. Ensure that the program tracks recommendations to completion and shares lessons learned with the workforce. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
3. Work with the United Steelworkers Union and Local 13-1 to establish a joint program that promotes the reporting, investigation, and analysis of incidents, near-misses, process upsets, and major plant hazards without fear of retaliation. Ensure that the program tracks recommendations to completion and shares lessons learned with the workforce.
2005-4-I-TX-15
2. Ensure that instrumentation and process equipment necessary for safe operation is properly maintained and tested. At a minimum, a. Establish an equipment database that captures the history of testing, inspections, repair, and successful work order completion. b. Analyze repair trends and adjust maintenance and testing intervals to prevent breakdowns. c. Require repair of malfunctioning process equipment prior to unit startups. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
2. Ensure that instrumentation and process equipment necessary for safe operation is properly maintained and tested. At a minimum, a. Establish an equipment database that captures the history of testing, inspections, repair, and successful work order completion. b. Analyze repair trends and adjust maintenance and testing intervals to prevent breakdowns. c. Require repair of malfunctioning process equipment prior to unit startups.
2005-4-I-TX-17
4. Improve the operator training program. At a minimum, require a. face-to-face training conducted by personnel with process-specific knowledge and experience who can assess trainee competency, and; b. training on recognizing and handling abnormal situations including the use of simulators or similar training tools. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
4. Improve the operator training program. At a minimum, require a. face-to-face training conducted by personnel with process-specific knowledge and experience who can assess trainee competency, and; b. training on recognizing and handling abnormal situations including the use of simulators or similar training tools.
2005-4-I-TX-18
5. Require additional board operator staffing during the startup of process units. Ensure that hazard reviews address staffing levels during abnormal conditions such as startups, shutdowns, and unit upsets. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
5. Require additional board operator staffing during the startup of process units. Ensure that hazard reviews address staffing levels during abnormal conditions such as startups, shutdowns, and unit upsets.
2005-4-I-TX-19
6. Require knowledgeable supervisors or technically trained personnel to be present during especially hazardous operation phases such as unit startup. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
6. Require knowledgeable supervisors or technically trained personnel to be present during especially hazardous operation phases such as unit startup.
2005-4-I-TX-20
7. Ensure that process startup procedures are updated to reflect actual process conditions. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
7. Ensure that process startup procedures are updated to reflect actual process conditions.
2005-4-B-TX-1
Revise the maintenance quality control program to require positive material identification testing or another suitable material verification process for all critical service alloy steel piping components removed and reinstalled during maintenance and inform work crews of special material handling precautions. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Revise the maintenance quality control program to require positive material identification testing or another suitable material verification process for all critical service alloy steel piping components removed and reinstalled during maintenance and inform work crews of special material handling precautions.
2005-4-I-TX-10
Issue management of change guidelines that address the safe control of the following: a. major organizational changes including mergers, acquisitions, and reorganizations; b. changes in policies and budgets; c. personnel changes; d. staffing during process startups, shutdowns and other abnormal conditions. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Issue management of change guidelines that address the safe control of the following: a. major organizational changes including mergers, acquisitions, and reorganizations; b. changes in policies and budgets; c. personnel changes; d. staffing during process startups, shutdowns and other abnormal conditions.
2005-4-B-TX-2
Develop / update the written piping component installation quality control procedure to require positive material identification testing or other suitable verification or tracking process for all alloy steel piping components removed during maintenance. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Develop / update the written piping component installation quality control procedure to require positive material identification testing or other suitable verification or tracking process for all alloy steel piping components removed during maintenance.
2005-4-I-TX-5
1. Implement a national emphasis program for all oil refineries that focuses on: - The hazards of blowdown drums and stacks that release flammables to the atmosphere instead of to an inherently safer disposal system such as a flare. Particular attention should be paid to blowdown drums attached to collection piping systems servicing multiple relief valves; - The need for adequately sized disposal knockout drums to safely contain discharged flammable liquid based on accurate relief valve and disposal collection piping studies 2. Urge states that administer their own OSHA plan to implement comparable emphasis programs within their respective jurisdictions. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
1. Implement a national emphasis program for all oil refineries that focuses on: - The hazards of blowdown drums and stacks that release flammables to the atmosphere instead of to an inherently safer disposal system such as a flare. Particular attention should be paid to blowdown drums attached to collection piping systems servicing multiple relief valves; - The need for adequately sized disposal knockout drums to safely contain discharged flammable liquid based on accurate relief valve and disposal collection piping studies 2. Urge states that administer their own OSHA plan to implement comparable emphasis programs within their respective jurisdictions.
2005-4-I-TX-8
1. Strengthen the planned comprehensive enforcement of the OSHA Process Safety Management (PSM) standard. At a minimum: a. Identify those facilities at greatest risk of a catastrophic accident by using available indicators of process safety performance and information gathered by the EPA under its Risk Management Program (RMP). b. Conduct, or have conducted, comprehensive inspections, such as those under your Program Quality Verification (PQV) program at facilities identified as presenting the greatest risk. c. Establish the capacity to conduct more comprehensive PSM inspections by hiring or developing a sufficient cadre of highly trained and experienced inspectors. d. Expand the PSM training offered to inspectors at the OSHA National Training Institute. Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action
1. Strengthen the planned comprehensive enforcement of the OSHA Process Safety Management (PSM) standard. At a minimum: a. Identify those facilities at greatest risk of a catastrophic accident by using available indicators of process safety performance and information gathered by the EPA under its Risk Management Program (RMP). b. Conduct, or have conducted, comprehensive inspections, such as those under your Program Quality Verification (PQV) program at facilities identified as presenting the greatest risk. c. Establish the capacity to conduct more comprehensive PSM inspections by hiring or developing a sufficient cadre of highly trained and experienced inspectors. d. Expand the PSM training offered to inspectors at the OSHA National Training Institute.
2005-4-I-TX-9
2. Amend the OSHA PSM standard to require that a management of change (MOC) review be conducted for organizational changes that may impact process safety including: a. major organizational changes such as mergers, acquisitions, or reorganizations; b. personnel changes, including changes in staffing levels or staff experience; and c. policy changes such as budget cutting. Status: Open - Unacceptable Response/No Response Received
2. Amend the OSHA PSM standard to require that a management of change (MOC) review be conducted for organizational changes that may impact process safety including: a. major organizational changes such as mergers, acquisitions, or reorganizations; b. personnel changes, including changes in staffing levels or staff experience; and c. policy changes such as budget cutting.
Work together to develop two new consensus American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards. a. In the first standard, create performance indicators for process safety in the refinery and petrochemical industries. Ensure that the standard identifies leading and lagging indicators for nationwide public reporting as well as indicators for use at individual facilities. Include methods for the development and use of the performance indicators.(CSB2005-04-I-TX-R6b) In the development of each standard, ensure that the committees a. are accredited and conform to ANSI principles of openness, balance, due process, and consensus; b. include representation of diverse sectors such as industry, labor, government, public interest and environmental organizations and experts from relevant scientific organizations and disciplines. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Work together to develop two new consensus American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards. a. In the first standard, create performance indicators for process safety in the refinery and petrochemical industries. Ensure that the standard identifies leading and lagging indicators for nationwide public reporting as well as indicators for use at individual facilities. Include methods for the development and use of the performance indicators.(CSB2005-04-I-TX-R6b) In the development of each standard, ensure that the committees a. are accredited and conform to ANSI principles of openness, balance, due process, and consensus; b. include representation of diverse sectors such as industry, labor, government, public interest and environmental organizations and experts from relevant scientific organizations and disciplines.
Work together to develop two new consensus American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards. b. In the second standard, develop fatigue prevention guidelines for the refining and petrochemical industries that, at a minimum, limit hours and days of work and address shift work. (CSB2005-04-I-TX-R7b) In the development of each standard, ensure that the committees a. are accredited and conform to ANSI principles of openness, balance, due process, and consensus; b. include representation of diverse sectors such as industry, labor, government, public interest and environmental organizations and experts from relevant scientific organizations and disciplines. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Work together to develop two new consensus American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards. b. In the second standard, develop fatigue prevention guidelines for the refining and petrochemical industries that, at a minimum, limit hours and days of work and address shift work. (CSB2005-04-I-TX-R7b) In the development of each standard, ensure that the committees a. are accredited and conform to ANSI principles of openness, balance, due process, and consensus; b. include representation of diverse sectors such as industry, labor, government, public interest and environmental organizations and experts from relevant scientific organizations and disciplines.
2005-4-I-TX-21
Work with BP to establish a joint program that promotes reporting, investigating, and analyzing incidents, near-misses, process upsets, and major plant hazards without fear of retaliation. Ensure that the program tracks recommendations to completion and shares lessons learned with the workforce. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Work with BP to establish a joint program that promotes reporting, investigating, and analyzing incidents, near-misses, process upsets, and major plant hazards without fear of retaliation. Ensure that the program tracks recommendations to completion and shares lessons learned with the workforce.
2001-03-I-GA-10
Communicate the findings of this report to your membership. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Communicate the findings of this report to your membership.
2001-03-I-GA-9
Communicate the findings of this report to your chemical and plastics manufacturing facilities in North America. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Communicate the findings of this report to your chemical and plastics manufacturing facilities in North America.
2009-03-I-GA-11
2001-03-I-GA-1
Examine the manufacturing businesses acquired from BP Amoco Performance Polymers and ensure that a systematic safety review procedure is developed and implemented for identifying and controlling hazards from unintended chemical reactions. Additionally, ensure that reactive hazards are identified and evaluated: - During product R&D, during conceptual design of a new process, and during detailed design of a new process. - Before changes are made to existing equipment or process chemistry. - Communicate the results of this review to the workforce. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Examine the manufacturing businesses acquired from BP Amoco Performance Polymers and ensure that a systematic safety review procedure is developed and implemented for identifying and controlling hazards from unintended chemical reactions. Additionally, ensure that reactive hazards are identified and evaluated: - During product R&D, during conceptual design of a new process, and during detailed design of a new process. - Before changes are made to existing equipment or process chemistry. - Communicate the results of this review to the workforce.
2001-03-I-GA-2
Ensure that a program is in place at facilities acquired from BP Amoco Performance Polymers to systematically review the hazards associated with new and modified processes and equipment as operating experience accrues. Ensure that facilities correct all identified design, operation, and maintenance deficiencies. Verify that operating experience does not invalidate the design basis for equipment. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Ensure that a program is in place at facilities acquired from BP Amoco Performance Polymers to systematically review the hazards associated with new and modified processes and equipment as operating experience accrues. Ensure that facilities correct all identified design, operation, and maintenance deficiencies. Verify that operating experience does not invalidate the design basis for equipment.
2001-03-I-GA-3
Revise the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for Amodel to warn of the hazards of accumulating large masses of molten polymer. Communicate the MSDS changes to current and past customers (who may retain inventories of this product). Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Revise the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for Amodel to warn of the hazards of accumulating large masses of molten polymer. Communicate the MSDS changes to current and past customers (who may retain inventories of this product).
2001-03-I-GA-4
Implement a program to conduct periodic management reviews of incidents and near-miss incidents. Look for trends and patterns among incidents. Address root causes and implement and track corrective measures. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Implement a program to conduct periodic management reviews of incidents and near-miss incidents. Look for trends and patterns among incidents. Address root causes and implement and track corrective measures.
2001-03-I-GA-5
Revise process safety information to include: - Information regarding the decomposition reactions of Amodel. - Design intent, basis, capacity, and limitations of equipment. - Hazards and consequences of deviations from design intent and operating limits. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Revise process safety information to include: - Information regarding the decomposition reactions of Amodel. - Design intent, basis, capacity, and limitations of equipment. - Hazards and consequences of deviations from design intent and operating limits.
2001-03-I-GA-6
Revalidate hazard analyses for the Amodel process to address: - Credible deviations from process intent and their consequences. - Hazards associated with startup and shutdown operations. - Prevention of accumulations of potentially hazardous masses of polymer. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Revalidate hazard analyses for the Amodel process to address: - Credible deviations from process intent and their consequences. - Hazards associated with startup and shutdown operations. - Prevention of accumulations of potentially hazardous masses of polymer.
2001-03-I-GA-7
Revise your lockout/tagout program to ensure that equipment is rendered safe prior to opening for maintenance. At a minimum, ensure that equipment opening procedures contain a stop work provision that requires higher levels of management review and approval when safe opening conditions, such as equipment depressurization, cannot be verified. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Revise your lockout/tagout program to ensure that equipment is rendered safe prior to opening for maintenance. At a minimum, ensure that equipment opening procedures contain a stop work provision that requires higher levels of management review and approval when safe opening conditions, such as equipment depressurization, cannot be verified.
2001-03-I-GA-8
Ensure that your management of change policy applies to operational and procedural modifications. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Ensure that your management of change policy applies to operational and procedural modifications.
2007-03-I-MA-8
Develop a written safety program to manage hazardous process operations. The program should : -Prohibit heating flammable or combustible liquids above their flashpoints in tanks inside buildings unless the tanks are sealed and vented to the building exterior. -Require safety controls to prevent overheating of flammable or combustible liquids. - Apply the process safety management program elements as contained in the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) Guidelines for Implementing Process Safety Management Systems to all processes that use flammable, toxic, or reactive chemicals. -Comply with the following, as applicable: OSHA Flammable and Combustible Liquids standard (29 CFR 1910.106), OSHA Process Safety Management standard (29 CFR 1910.119), National Fire Protection Association Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code (NFPA 30), and National Fire Protection Association Standard for the Manufacture of Organic Coatings (NFPA 35). Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action/No Response Received
Develop a written safety program to manage hazardous process operations. The program should : -Prohibit heating flammable or combustible liquids above their flashpoints in tanks inside buildings unless the tanks are sealed and vented to the building exterior. -Require safety controls to prevent overheating of flammable or combustible liquids. - Apply the process safety management program elements as contained in the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) Guidelines for Implementing Process Safety Management Systems to all processes that use flammable, toxic, or reactive chemicals. -Comply with the following, as applicable: OSHA Flammable and Combustible Liquids standard (29 CFR 1910.106), OSHA Process Safety Management standard (29 CFR 1910.119), National Fire Protection Association Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code (NFPA 30), and National Fire Protection Association Standard for the Manufacture of Organic Coatings (NFPA 35).
2007-03-I-MA-3
Incorporate the Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code (NFPA 30) and Standard for the Manufacture of Organic Coatings (NFPA 35) into the Massachusetts Board of Fire Prevention Regulations. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Incorporate the Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code (NFPA 30) and Standard for the Manufacture of Organic Coatings (NFPA 35) into the Massachusetts Board of Fire Prevention Regulations.
2007-03-I-MA-4
Revise 527 CMR 14 to specify the maximum interval (such as annually) for local fire departments to conduct inspections of manufacturing facilities holding one or more licenses and permits to store and handle flammable materials. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Revise 527 CMR 14 to specify the maximum interval (such as annually) for local fire departments to conduct inspections of manufacturing facilities holding one or more licenses and permits to store and handle flammable materials.
2007-03-I-MA-5
Develop mandatory written inspection criteria to be used by the local fire departments when performing manufacturing facility inspections. Develop inspection training material and provide training to the local fire departments. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Develop mandatory written inspection criteria to be used by the local fire departments when performing manufacturing facility inspections. Develop inspection training material and provide training to the local fire departments.
2007-03-I-MA-6
Revise the license and registration forms (FP-2 and FP-5) to require listing each hazardous material type and quantity. Identify the requirement that a separate license and permit are required for each of the eight classes of flammable material when the facility possesses more than the listed threshold quantity specified in 527 CMR 14.03 (2). Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Revise the license and registration forms (FP-2 and FP-5) to require listing each hazardous material type and quantity. Identify the requirement that a separate license and permit are required for each of the eight classes of flammable material when the facility possesses more than the listed threshold quantity specified in 527 CMR 14.03 (2).
2007-03-I-MA-1
Revise the General Laws of Massachusetts addressing flammable materials licensing and registration: - As part of the annual registration renewal, require new and existing product manufacturing registrants to submit written certification to local governments stating that the facility complies with, at a minimum, all state and local fire codes and hazardous chemical regulations. -Require all companies holding a license and current registration to apply for an amended license and re-register the facility before increasing any flammable material quantity above the licensed amount or adding a different regulated chemical. Include a requirement in the approval process to solicit input from affected landowners, similar to the requirement for obtaining the original license and registration. Status: Closed - Exceeds Recommended Action
Revise the General Laws of Massachusetts addressing flammable materials licensing and registration: - As part of the annual registration renewal, require new and existing product manufacturing registrants to submit written certification to local governments stating that the facility complies with, at a minimum, all state and local fire codes and hazardous chemical regulations. -Require all companies holding a license and current registration to apply for an amended license and re-register the facility before increasing any flammable material quantity above the licensed amount or adding a different regulated chemical. Include a requirement in the approval process to solicit input from affected landowners, similar to the requirement for obtaining the original license and registration.
2007-03-I-MA-2
Amend the General Laws of Massachusetts to require the Office of the State Fire Marshal to audit local governments for compliance with the flammable materials licensing regulation and audit fire departments for compliance with permit issuance and inspection of manufacturing facilities licensed to store and handle flammable liquids and solids. The audits should be conducted at least once every five years. Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action
Amend the General Laws of Massachusetts to require the Office of the State Fire Marshal to audit local governments for compliance with the flammable materials licensing regulation and audit fire departments for compliance with permit issuance and inspection of manufacturing facilities licensed to store and handle flammable liquids and solids. The audits should be conducted at least once every five years.
2007-03-I-MA-11
Revise the International Fire Code: Chapter 20: - Specifically include "printing inks" in the definition of "organic coating." - Define equipment specifically discussed in the standard, such as open and closed kettles. - Require heated tanks and vessels containing flammable and combustible liquids to have equipment to prevent overheating, such as: devices to stop the heating process if the temperature exceeds the safe operating limits; devices to stop the heating process if the flammable vapor control equipment malfunctions (e.g., building ventilation system or heated tank vent); and a heating medium that is unable to heat the tank above safe operating temperatures. Chapters 20, 27, and 34: -Define "open", "closed", and "sealed and vented" process tanks. -Define "non-listed" process tanks. -Prohibit heating flammable and combustible liquids above their flashpoints in tanks inside buildings unless the tanks are sealed and vented to the building exterior. Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action/No Response Received
Revise the International Fire Code: Chapter 20: - Specifically include "printing inks" in the definition of "organic coating." - Define equipment specifically discussed in the standard, such as open and closed kettles. - Require heated tanks and vessels containing flammable and combustible liquids to have equipment to prevent overheating, such as: devices to stop the heating process if the temperature exceeds the safe operating limits; devices to stop the heating process if the flammable vapor control equipment malfunctions (e.g., building ventilation system or heated tank vent); and a heating medium that is unable to heat the tank above safe operating temperatures. Chapters 20, 27, and 34: -Define "open", "closed", and "sealed and vented" process tanks. -Define "non-listed" process tanks. -Prohibit heating flammable and combustible liquids above their flashpoints in tanks inside buildings unless the tanks are sealed and vented to the building exterior.
2007-03-I-MA-9
Revise Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code (NFPA 30): - Prohibit heating flammable and combustible liquids above their flashpoints in tanks inside buildings, unless the tanks are sealed and vented to the building exterior. - Require heated tanks and vessels containing flammable and combustible liquids to have equipment to prevent overheating, such as: devices to stop the heating process if the temperature exceeds the safe operating limits; devices to stop the heating process if the flammable vapor control equipment malfunctions (e.g., building ventilation system or heated tank vent); and a heating medium that is unable to heat the tank above safe operating temperatures. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Revise Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code (NFPA 30): - Prohibit heating flammable and combustible liquids above their flashpoints in tanks inside buildings, unless the tanks are sealed and vented to the building exterior. - Require heated tanks and vessels containing flammable and combustible liquids to have equipment to prevent overheating, such as: devices to stop the heating process if the temperature exceeds the safe operating limits; devices to stop the heating process if the flammable vapor control equipment malfunctions (e.g., building ventilation system or heated tank vent); and a heating medium that is unable to heat the tank above safe operating temperatures.
2007-03-I-MA-10
Revise The Standard for the Manufacture of Organic Coatings (NFPA 35): -Define equipment specifically discussed in the standard, such as kettles and thin-down tanks. -Define the terms "open, "closed", and "sealed" and "vented." -Prohibit heating flammable and combustible liquids above their flashpoints in tanks inside buildings unless the tanks are sealed and vented to the building exterior. -Require heated tanks and vessels containing flammable and combustible liquids to have equipment to prevent overheating, such as: Devices to stop the heating process if the temperature exceeds the safe operating limits; Devices to stop the heating process if the flammable vapor control equipment malfunctions (e.g., building ventilation system or heated tank vent); and a heating medium that is unable to heat the tank above safe operating temperatures. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Revise The Standard for the Manufacture of Organic Coatings (NFPA 35): -Define equipment specifically discussed in the standard, such as kettles and thin-down tanks. -Define the terms "open, "closed", and "sealed" and "vented." -Prohibit heating flammable and combustible liquids above their flashpoints in tanks inside buildings unless the tanks are sealed and vented to the building exterior. -Require heated tanks and vessels containing flammable and combustible liquids to have equipment to prevent overheating, such as: Devices to stop the heating process if the temperature exceeds the safe operating limits; Devices to stop the heating process if the flammable vapor control equipment malfunctions (e.g., building ventilation system or heated tank vent); and a heating medium that is unable to heat the tank above safe operating temperatures.
2007-03-I-MA-7
Pending revision of the Massachusetts Fire Safety Code (527 CMR), revise the town bylaws addressing 527 CMR 14 requirements applicable to facility licensing and annual registration to: -Require new and current product manufacturing registrants to certify in writing that the facility complies with, at a minimum, all state and local fire codes and hazardous chemical regulations as part of the annual registration renewal. -Require companies holding a license and current registration for any of the eight classes of flammable materials specified in 527 CMR 14.03 (2) to re-register the facility before increasing any chemical quantity above the registered amount or adding a different regulated chemical at the facility. Include a requirement in the approval process to solicit input from affected landowners, similar to the requirement for obtaining the original license and registration. -Revise the license and registration forms to require listing each hazardous material type and quantity, and require a separate license and permit for each of the eight classes of flammable materials specified in 527 CMR 14.03 (2) . -Require the fire department to annually inspect licensed manufacturing facilities for compliance with the fire code. Status: Closed - No Longer Applicable
Pending revision of the Massachusetts Fire Safety Code (527 CMR), revise the town bylaws addressing 527 CMR 14 requirements applicable to facility licensing and annual registration to: -Require new and current product manufacturing registrants to certify in writing that the facility complies with, at a minimum, all state and local fire codes and hazardous chemical regulations as part of the annual registration renewal. -Require companies holding a license and current registration for any of the eight classes of flammable materials specified in 527 CMR 14.03 (2) to re-register the facility before increasing any chemical quantity above the registered amount or adding a different regulated chemical at the facility. Include a requirement in the approval process to solicit input from affected landowners, similar to the requirement for obtaining the original license and registration. -Revise the license and registration forms to require listing each hazardous material type and quantity, and require a separate license and permit for each of the eight classes of flammable materials specified in 527 CMR 14.03 (2) . -Require the fire department to annually inspect licensed manufacturing facilities for compliance with the fire code.
2011-5-I-KY-2
Modify the design and procedures for the electric arc furnace and related structures including the control room to comply with the NFPA standard developed per R1 of this case study. Status: Closed - No Longer Applicable
Modify the design and procedures for the electric arc furnace and related structures including the control room to comply with the NFPA standard developed per R1 of this case study.
2011-5-I-KY-3
Implement a mechanical integrity program for the electric arc furnace and cover, including preventive maintenance based on periodic inspections, and timely replacement of the furnace cover. At a minimum, the program should include factors such as leak detection and repair and refractory lining wear. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Implement a mechanical integrity program for the electric arc furnace and cover, including preventive maintenance based on periodic inspections, and timely replacement of the furnace cover. At a minimum, the program should include factors such as leak detection and repair and refractory lining wear.
2011-5-I-KY-1
Establish a committee to evaluate and develop a standard that defines the safety requirements for electric arc furnaces operated with flammable materials and low oxygen atmospheres. At a minimum, establish requirements that electric arc furnaces containing flammables have: • Adequate safety instrumentation and controls to prevent explosions and overpressure events; • Mechanical integrity and inspection programs; • A documented siting analysis to ensure that control rooms and other occupied areas are adequately protected. Status: Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded
Establish a committee to evaluate and develop a standard that defines the safety requirements for electric arc furnaces operated with flammable materials and low oxygen atmospheres. At a minimum, establish requirements that electric arc furnaces containing flammables have: • Adequate safety instrumentation and controls to prevent explosions and overpressure events; • Mechanical integrity and inspection programs; • A documented siting analysis to ensure that control rooms and other occupied areas are adequately protected.
2010-02-I-PR-7
Revise ANSI/API 2350, Overfill Protection for Storage Tanks in Petroleum Facilities (2015), to require the installation of an automatic overfill prevention systems for existing and new facilities at bulk aboveground storage tanks storing gasoline, jet fuel, other fuel mixtures or blendstocks, and other flammable liquids having an NFPA 704 flammability rating of 3 or higher. At a minimum, this system shall meet the following requirements: a. Separated physically and independent from the level control and monitoring system. b. Engineered, operated, and maintained to achieve an appropriate safety integrity level in accordance with the requirements of Part 1 of International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 61511-SER ed1-2004, Functional Safety – Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industry Sector. c. Specified to achieve the necessary risk reduction as determined by a documented risk assessment methodology set in accordance with Center for Chemical Process Safety Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, 3rd Edition, accounting for the following factors: 1. The existence of nearby populations and contamination of nearby environmental resources; 2. The nature and intensity of facility operations; 3. Realistic reliability for the tank gauging system; and 4. The extent/rigor of operator monitoring. d. Proof tested with sufficient frequency in accordance with the validated arrangements and procedures to maintain the required safety integrity level. e. Ensure that the above changes are not subject to grandfathering provisions in the standard. Status: Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response
2010-02-I-PR-8
Develop detailed guidance on conducting a risk assessment for onsite and offsite impacts of a potential tank overfill during transfer operations involving one and multiple tanks and for determining the Safety Integrity Level of the required overfill prevention safeguard to replace Annex E of ANSI/API 2350, Overfill Protection for Storage Tanks in Petroleum Facilities (2015). Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
2010-02-I-PR-9
Develop a single publication or resource describing all API standards and other relevant codes, standards, guidance, and information for filling operations of aboveground storage tanks in petroleum facilities that describes: a. The required design and management practices for control of filling operations; b. The minimum set of independent overfill prevention safeguards if the control fails; and c. Operational challenges (e.g., monitoring/calculating flow rates, ability to maintain constant line pressures, and influences of valve cracking) related to loading multiple tanks concurrently from a single product source. Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action
2010-02-I-PR-1
(Superseded by 2019-01-I-TX-R8) Revise where necessary the Spill Prevention, Control and Countermeasure (SPCC); Facility Response Plan (FRP); and/or Accidental Release Prevention Program (40 CFR Part 68) rules to prevent impacts to the environment and/or public from spills, releases, fires, and explosions that can occur at bulk aboveground storage facilities storing gasoline, jet fuels, blendstocks, and other flammable liquids having an NFPA 704 flammability rating of 3 or higher. At a minimum, these revisions shall incorporate the following provisions: a) Ensure bulk above ground storage facilities conduct and document a risk assessment that takes into account the following factors: 1. The existence of nearby populations and sensitive environmenls; 2. The nature and intensity of facility operations; 3. Realistic reliability of the tank gauging system; and 4. The extent/rigor of operator monitoring b) Equip bulk aboveground storage containers/tanks with automatic overfill prevention systems that are physically separate and independent from the lank level control systems. c) Ensure these automatic overfill prevention systems follow good engineering practices. d) Engineer, operate, and maintain automatic overfill prevention systems to achieve appropriate safety integrity levels in accordance with good engineering practices, such as Part 1 of lnternational Electro-technical Commission (IEC) 61511-SER ed1.0B-2004, Functional Safety - Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industry Sector. e) Regularly inspect and test automatic overfill prevention systems to ensure their proper operation in accordance with good engineering practice. Status: Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded
2010-02-I-PR-2
Conduct a survey of randomly selected bulk aboveground storage containers storing gasoline or other flammable liquids with a NFPA 704 flammability rating of 3 or higher, at terminals in high risk locations (such as near population centers or sensitive environments) that are already subject to the Spill Prevention, Control and Countermeasure (SPCC) and/or Facility Response Plan (FRP) rules to determine: a) The nature of the safety management systems in place to prevent overfilling a storage tank during loading operations. Analysis of the safety management systems should include equipment, training, staffing, operating procedures and preventative maintenance programs. b) The extent to which terminals use independent high level alarms, automated shutoff/diversion systems, redundant level alarms or other technical means to prevent overfilling a tank c) The history of overfilling incidents at the facilities, with or without consequence d) Whether additional reporting requirements are needed to understand the types of incidents leading to overfilling spills that breach secondary containment and have the potential to impact the environment and/or the public, as well as the number of safeguards needed to prevent them. Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action
2010-02-I-PR-3
As an interim measure, until the rule changes in CSB Recommendation No. 2010-02-I-PR-R1 are adopted and go into effect: issue appropriate guidance or an alert, similar to EPA’s previously issued Chemical Safety Alert addressing Rupture Hazard from Liquid Storage Tanks, to illustrate the hazards posed by spills, releases, fires and explosions due to overfilling bulk aboveground storage containers storing gasoline, jet fuel, blendstocks, and other flammable liquids having an NFPA 704 flammability rating of 3 or higher. Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
2010-02-I-PR-5
Revise the Section 5704.2.7.5.8 (2015), Overfill Prevention of the International Fire Code (IFC) to require an automatic overfill prevention system (AOPS) for bulk aboveground storage tank terminals storing gasoline, jet fuel, other fuel mixtures or blendstocks, and other flammable liquids having an NFPA 704 flammability rating of 3 or higher, or equivalent designation. These safeguards shall meet the following requirements: a) Engineered, operated, and maintained to achieve an appropriate safety integrity level in accordance with the requirements of Part 1 of International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 61511-SER ed1-2004, Functional Safety – Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industry Sector. b) Specified to achieve the necessary risk reduction as determined by a documented risk assessment methodology in accordance with Center for Chemical Process Safety Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, 3rd Edition, accounting for the following factors: i. The existence of nearby populations and sensitive environments; ii. The nature and intensity of facility operations; iii. Realistic reliability for the tank gauging system; and iv. The extent/rigor of operator monitoring. c) Proof tested in accordance with the validated arrangements and procedures with sufficient frequency to maintain the specified safety integrity level. d) Ensure that the above changes are not subject to grandfathering provisions in the codes. Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
2010-02-I-PR-6
Revise NFPA 30, Storage of Flammable and Combustible Liquids, Section 21.7.1.1 (2015) for bulk aboveground storage tank terminals storing gasoline, jet fuel, other fuel mixtures or blendstocks, and other flammable liquids having an NFPA 704 flammability rating of 3 or greater. This modification shall meet the following requirements: a. More than one safeguard to prevent a tank overfill, all within an automatic overfill prevention system as described in ANSI/API Standard 2350 (2015) Overfill Protection for Storage Tanks in Petroleum Facilities with an independent level alarm as one of the safeguards. The safeguards should meet the following standards: 1. Separated physically and electronically and independent from the tank gauging system; 2. Engineered, operated, and maintained for an appropriate level of safety based on the predetermined risk level after considering part b of this recommendation; and 3. Proof tested with sufficient frequency in accordance with the validated arrangements and procedures. b. Specified to achieve the necessary risk reduction as determined by a documented risk assessment methodology conducted in accordance with Center for Chemical Process Safety Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, 3rd Edition, accounting for the following factors: 1. The existence of nearby populations and contamination of nearby environmental resources; 2. The nature and intensity of facility operations; 3. Realistic reliability for the tank gauging system; and 4. The extent/rigor of operator monitoring. c. Ensure that the above changes not subject to grandfathering provisions in the code. Status: Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded
2010-02-I-PR-4
(Superseded by 2019-01-I-TX-R7) a) Revise the Flammable and Combustible Liquids standard (29 CFR§ 1910.106) to require installing, using, and maintaining a high-integrity automatic overfill prevention system with a means of level detection, logic/control equipment, and independent means of flow control for bulk aboveground storage tanks containing gasoline, jet fuel, other fuel mixtures or blends tocks, and other flammable liquids having an NFPA 704 flammability rating of 3 or higher, to protect against loss of containment. At a minimum, this system shall meet the following requirements: 1. Separated physically and electronically and independent from the tank gauging system. 2. Engineered, operated, and maintained to achieve an appropriate level of safety integrity in accordance with the rrequirements of Part 1 of International Electro-technical Commission (IEC) 61511-SER ed1.0B-2004, Functional Safety - Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industry Sector. Such a system would employ a safety integrity level (SIL) documented in accordance with the principles in Part 3 of IEC 61511-SER ed1.0B-2004, accounting for the following factors: i. The existence of nearby populations and sensitive environments; ii. The nature and intensity of facility operations; iv. The extent/ rigor of operator monitoring. 3. Proof tested in accordance with the validated arrangements and procedures with sufficient frequency to ensure the specified safety integrity level is maintained. b) Establish hazard analysis, management of change and mechanical integrity management system elements for bulk above ground storage tanks in the revised 1910.106 standard that are similar to those in the Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals standard (29 CFR § 1910.119) and ensure these facilities are subject to Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP). Status: Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded