Recent Recommendation Status Updates

Each recommendation the CSB issues is monitored by CSB staff from the time it is issued to closing. CSB staff evaluate recipient responses, and the Board votes to assign status designations to recommendations based on staff evaluation. This page highlights recommendations for which the Board has recently voted to change the status of the recommendation. For more information on how the CSB defines its recommendation statuses, please visit the Recommendations Frequently Asked Questions page.

To contact CSB Recommendations Staff please email [email protected] 

 

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Recommendations

Givaudan Sense Colour Explosion (2 Recommendations)
Corn Refiners Association (1 Recommendations)
Open: 0% | Closed: 100%
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Final Report Released On: May 27, 2026

2024-06-I-KY-12

Alert association members who manufacture corn syrup of the November 12, 2024, Givaudan incident and its causes, including but not limited to the sugar ingredient decomposition reaction that led to Reactor 6’s rupture. Request that they update their corn syrup safety data sheets to include: the decomposition temperature, the consequences of exceeding that temperature, and the decomposition products produced (for example, carbon dioxide).


Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

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International Molasses Corporation LTD (1 Recommendations)
Open: 0% | Closed: 100%
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Final Report Released On: May 27, 2026

2024-06-I-KY-11

Update all invert sugar safety data sheets to include: the decomposition temperature, the consequences of exceeding that temperature, and the decomposition products produced (for example, carbon dioxide).


Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

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Foundation Food Group Fatal Chemical Release (3 Recommendations)
International Code Council (ICC) (1 Recommendations)
Open: 100% | Closed: 0%
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Final Report Released On: December 11, 2023

2021-03-I-GA-12

Update the International Fire Code to:

a) require the use of atmospheric monitoring with cryogenic asphyxiants in accordance with industry guidance such as is contained in CGA P-76 Hazards of Oxygen-Deficient Atmospheres and CGA P-12 Safe Handling of Cryogenic Liquids in addition to CGA P-18 Standard for Bulk Inert Gas Systems; and,

b) include guidance on the adequate safe location of manual shutoff valves and devices such as emergency push buttons used to activate remotely operated emergency isolation valves (ROEIVs) in cryogenic fluid service. At a minimum this guidance should be harmonized with the requirements of ISO 13850 Safety of machinery – Emergency stop function – Principles for design.


Status: Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response
Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response (O - ARAR) - Response from recipient indicates a planned action that would satisfy the objective of the recommendation when implemented.
 

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Messer LLC (2 Recommendations)
Open: 0% | Closed: 100%
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Final Report Released On: December 11, 2023

2021-03-I-GA-2

Update the company product stewardship policy to:

a) include participation by Messer in customers’ process hazard analyses (PHAs). The policy should require that these PHAs be conducted in a manner which conforms with CCPS Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures prior to the startup of a cryogenic freezing process;

b) require verification that proper signage, in accordance with CGA P-76 Hazards of Oxygen-Deficient Atmospheres, is displayed on and/or near equipment; and,

c) require a facility and/or equipment siting review to ensure that emergency shutoff devices, including E-stops, are located such that they can be safely actuated during a release of liquid nitrogen.


Status: Closed - Exceeds Recommended Action
Closed - Exceeds Recommended Action (C - ERA) - Action on the recommendation meets and surpasses the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

2021-03-I-GA-3

Create an informational product that provides Messer customers with information on the safety issues described in this report. In this informational product, recommend that Messer customers develop and implement effective safety management systems to control asphyxiation hazards from inert gases based on the guidance published in CGA P-86 Guideline for Process Safety Management, CGA P-12 Guideline for Safe Handling of Cryogenic and Refrigerated Liquids, CGA P-18 Standard for Bulk Inert Gas Systems, and CGA P-76 Hazards of Oxygen-Deficient Atmospheres.


Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action
Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action (C - AAA)
 

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CAI / Arnel Chemical Plant Explosion (1 Recommendations)
International Code Council (ICC) (1 Recommendations)
Open: 100% | Closed: 0%
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Final Report Released On: May 13, 2008

2007-03-I-MA-11

Revise the International Fire Code: Chapter 20: - Specifically include "printing inks" in the definition of "organic coating." - Define equipment specifically discussed in the standard, such as open and closed kettles. - Require heated tanks and vessels containing flammable and combustible liquids to have equipment to prevent overheating, such as: devices to stop the heating process if the temperature exceeds the safe operating limits; devices to stop the heating process if the flammable vapor control equipment malfunctions (e.g., building ventilation system or heated tank vent); and a heating medium that is unable to heat the tank above safe operating temperatures. Chapters 20, 27, and 34: -Define "open", "closed", and "sealed and vented" process tanks. -Define "non-listed" process tanks. -Prohibit heating flammable and combustible liquids above their flashpoints in tanks inside buildings unless the tanks are sealed and vented to the building exterior.


Status: Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response
Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response (O - ARAR) - Response from recipient indicates a planned action that would satisfy the objective of the recommendation when implemented.
 

PDF Document Recommendations Status Change Summary

Third Coast Industries Petroleum Products Facility Fire (1 Recommendations)
International Code Council (ICC) (1 Recommendations)
Open: 100% | Closed: 0%
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Final Report Released On: March 06, 2003

2002-03-I-TX-3

Revise the International Fire Code to address the following issues: For facilities that are not staffed around the clock, specify circumstances where automatic fire detection is needed. Narrow exemptions for Class IIIB liquids. Expand fire protection analysis requirements to include all areas of a facility where there may be flammable or combustible fire risks.


Status: Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response
Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response (O - ARAR) - Response from recipient indicates a planned action that would satisfy the objective of the recommendation when implemented.
 

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Bio-Lab Lake Charles Chemical Fire and Release (1 Recommendations)
Bio-Lab Lake Charles (1 Recommendations)
Open: 0% | Closed: 100%
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Final Report Released On: April 24, 2023

2020-05-I-LA-3

Perform process hazard analyses (PHAs) on all buildings and units processing or storing trichloroisocyanuric acid. Ensure that the PHAs are revalidated at least every five years. Also include the building design basis as process safety information for the PHA team to reference during their analysis.


Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

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Shell Polymers Furnace Explosion and Fire (2 Recommendations)
Shell Polymers Monaca (2 Recommendations)
Open: 100% | Closed: 0%
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Final Report Released On: September 16, 2026

2025-05-I-PA-1

Review the Shell Polymers Monaca Ethane Cracking Unit process hazard analysis to identify process deviations that are addressed solely with administrative controls. Implement an inherently safer design or an engineered control for any scenario identified that could result in a fatality, serious injury, or substantial property damage.


Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

2025-05-I-PA-2

Based on licensor input and good industry practices, such as ANSI/ISA-61511-2-2018 / IEC 61511-2:2016, Functional Safety – Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industry Sector – Part 2: Guidelines for the application of IEC 61511-1:2016 and Part 3: Guidance for the Determination of the Required Safety Integrity Levels, implement and maintain an engineered control to prevent backflow of cracked gas into a furnace during all modes of furnace operation.


Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

LyondellBasell La Porte Fatal Chemical Release (1 Recommendations)
Valve Manufacturers Association of America (1 Recommendations)
Open: 100% | Closed: 0%
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Final Report Released On: May 25, 2023

2021-05-I-TX-6

Work with ASME and API and develop a white paper to the Valve Manufacturers Association of America addressing the issue of plug valve design with a focus on the following:

a. Recommend as an industry good practice that facilities using plug valves establish written procedures detailing the correct way to remove the plug valve actuator or gearbox for each specific plug valve design.

b. For existing plug valves, recommend as an industry good practice for facilities to clearly mark all pressure-retaining components (for example, with paint, accompanying warning signs, etc.). Work with ASME and API to ensure a consistent methodology is specified to the industry.

c. Recommend new plug valves be designed, consistent with Prevention through Design principles, to prevent the inadvertent removal of pressure-retaining components when removing the actuator or gearbox. Evaluate past plug valve incidents, and the associated plug valve designs involved in those incidents, when formulating a new plug valve design recommendation. Work with ASME and API to ensure a consistent design is recommended to the industry.


Status: Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response
Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response (O - ARAR) - Response from recipient indicates a planned action that would satisfy the objective of the recommendation when implemented.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary